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Prologue
My deployments to Afghanistan made me wonder and at times question the use of 
international military engagements. Sure, an armed servant is trained not to question the 
political use and necessity of endeavours but my curiosity led me to dig into the concepts that 
had put us there. But, whilst reflecting upon our engagements with the Afghan population, 
these suddenly seemed rather shallow concepts. This is not to say I came to reject them, but 
more so these deployments came to cater an interest to further investigate our stabilisation 
efforts in (post-) conflict states. 
In 2005, whilst preparing a conference with prof. dr. Myriame Bollen of the Netherlands 
Defence Academy, she asked me whether I would be interested in conducting a PhD 
research project to analyse my operational experiences from operations from an academic 
perspective. My commander at that time, Colonel Harry Knoop, was a great supporter of 
the initiative and encouraged me to discuss the matter with the director of our personnel 
department. Armed with his letter of recommendation and an evaluation report of my 
competences, I was determined to convince the personnel department of the need to 
allow me to conduct a PhD project. However, it was the head of the personnel department 
who convinced me that an academic tour would seriously hamper and endanger a military 
career. My ambition prevailed and I chose to listen to her. Some years later, I realised that 
my interest in broadening my view and to further investigate the theories and concepts on 
practices in the field, was greater than my initial desire to seek safety in trying to follow a 
traditional career path. This in itself had been questionable from the outset, since my career 
in the military so far had been everything but traditional. 
The time that I was allowed by the army to fully indulge myself into the wonders of 
academia allowed me the hindsight that is often needed to gain discerning insights. As so 
expressively formulated by a former commander of the NATO forces in Afghanistan: “It is 
much harder to be an active practitioner than to be an analyst/historian/academic/journalist, 
etc., especially when they have the benefit of hindsight and no pressure of time and events”.1
The initial academic journey started out in the summer of 2010 at the Netherlands 
Defence Academy with critically analysing the concept of the comprehensive approach. I 
had been a firm believer in the concept on paper but when put into practice some defies 
with regard to its underlying assumptions surfaced. It was not so much the often discussed 
differences between the civilian and military actors in the field that seemed to hamper the 
implementation of the comprehensive approach, but more so the ability and willingness of 
the state subject to the stabilisation project. 
1 Sir General Richard quoted in Jack Fairweather, A War of Choice: The British in Iraq 2003-9 (Random House, London). 217
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As such, I came to redirect my intention to those who design and implement military 
operations: the senior civil and military decision-makers. On the basis of what premise do 
they come to design missions like to ones to Afghanistan? And what informs their decision-
making and ultimately their strategy? Questions likes these came to guide the research that 











‘What happened?’, ‘Why did we end up here’, ‘For what purpose? - just a collection of questions raised 
by practitioners1 and scholars2 when addressing the two major Western military interventions 
of the last two decades: Iraq and Afghanistan. The recurring theme primarily exposes an 
everlasting search for a sound strategy, linking the use of these military endeavours to a 
predefined political outcome. Western governments are encountering great difficulties with 
formulating political goals explicating the purpose of the intervention: without a sense 
of purpose or political meaning it is rather difficult to engage in the making of policy, or 
strategy for that matter.3 Consequently, military interventions are increasingly justified in 
moral or value based terms, and by doing so, providing legitimacy to the actions.4 
Hence, the ‘grammar of war seems to be dictating the logic’5 of the campaign in countries 
like Afghanistan. Some practitioners even argue operations in Afghanistan to be the reverse 
of the classic Clausewitz adage and claim that ‘politics has become an extension of war’6 
potentially heralding a completely novel reading of events. Often, the underlying rationale of 
the engagement in general, and the reasoning underpinning the actions of those designing 
the engagement, remains unclear. Consequently, general and vague terminology is employed 
to articulate the purpose leaving many to guess and consequently even to question the road 
taken by their respective governments. 
1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World (London 2005); Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: 
Twenty-first Century Combat as Politics (Oxford 2012); Wilfried Rietdijk, ‘De ‘comprehensive approach’ in Uruzgan, schaken op 
vier borden tegelijk’, Militaire Spectator 177 (2008) 472-486; Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan, British Generals 
in Blair’s Wars (London 2013). 
2	 Hew	Strachan,	‘Making	Strategy:	Civil–Military	Relations	after	Iraq’,	Survival 48(3) (2006) 59-82; Jan Ångström and Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn (eds), Modern War and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods and Strategy (London 2010); David Chandler, ‘War 
Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of Global War’, Security Dialogue 40(3) (2009) 243-262; King, A.,  ‘Military command 
in	the	last	decade’,		International	Affairs	87(2)	(2011)	377-396.
3 This argument is put forward by David Chandler who largely builds his argument on perspectives provided by Alain Badiou 
and Zaki Laïdi. They argue that Western political elites refrain from embracing a strong political vision and are believed 
to hold a transformed perception of, and relationship to, political power. As such, governments and policy-makers are 
supposedly experiencing their policy-making power more as a ‘risk’ or a cause of potential embarrassment, than as an 
opportunity. In other words, they seem to reject rather than welcome the responsibilities of power, seeking to devolve 
policy-making responsibilities either to regional and local authorities or to higher bodies such as the European Union 
or	other	international	institutions.	See:	David	Chandler,	‘Hollow	Hegemony:	Theorising	the	Shift	from	Interest-based	to	
Value-based International Policy-making’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies 35(3)  (2007) 703-723; Alain Badiou, 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (Londen 2002); Zaki Laïdi, A World without Meaning: The Crisis 
of Meaning in International Relations, trans. June Burnham and Jenny Coulon (Londen 1998).
4 Chandler, ‘Hollow hegemony’, 719.
5 Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy and the Limitation of War’, Survival 50(1) (2008) 31-54.
6 Stabilisation Conference, London, December 2010. 
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The dearth of strategy and the involvement of the military in the act of strategy making for 
recent operations have brought to light the fact that in practice the actions of those involved 
challenge the traditional predicates that have dominated Western thought on how to best 
design and plan a military operation; civil military relations and strategy.  
These prescriptions are informed by the belief that the military needs to be restricted 
in order to prevent them from taking power over the state. The difficulties of crafting 
strategy for contemporary operations cannot be separated from traditional models and 
consequent prescriptions on civil military relations. By itself, the distinction made between 
the political [strategic level] and the operational level [situated between the tactical level 
and the strategic level] has been closely guarded, as the drafting of strategy is believed to 
be a ‘civilian responsibility’.7 However, some concerns are voiced addressing the potential 
danger for Western democracies in neglecting the development of coherent strategy due to 
the fact that current prescriptions of civil military relations limit the role of the military in 
policy making.8
However, as witnessed in Afghanistan when then ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal9, 
presented the ‘Afghanistan Strategy’ in October 200910, the operational level  fills the void 
when the strategic level neglects to draft a comprehensive strategy. Shortly thereafter, 
NATO and EU officials indicated their support for the strategy.11 The guiding authority of this 
document for the stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan, painfully illustrated the remissness 
of the international community and its civilian agencies in providing political direction for 
what had become a predominantly military campaign.  
But what underlies the act to assign military means in the first place? The principal held 
belief holds that states articulate their ambition and assign means accordingly. But is this 
really what occurs? What are in fact the circumstances that shape the decision to deploy 
military forces? How does that decision translate into an actual deployment? What about the 
actors that have engaged in the decision-making process to commit military forces and the 
setting in which they operate? What conditioned and informed their actions?   
7 Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the operational level of war’, Survival 52(5) (2010) 157-182, 159. 
Strachan points to the Cold War era as foundational for this clear separation.




political masters for neglecting to provide political guidance. See: Micheal Hastings ‘The runaway general’ (22 Juni 2010), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622	 (10.07.2013).	By	doing	so,	he	briefly	 injected	
new momentum in the debate about the need for political strategy and a review of traditional civil military relations, only 
before the discussion went silent again.
10 Commander’s Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009. Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (2010 Kabul) 2-10.
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A problem calling for foreign policy action generally tends to get structured into a series 
of decisions that involve different segments of government. Occasions for decisions are 
moments when those involved feel they need to act even if the action itself is not to act at all 
or to inquire more information. Consequentially, there might be various occasions for the 
decision that may be addressed across time by the same decision unit or by different decision 
units. The specific occasions studied are strategic actions that lead to authoritative actions on 
the part of governments.12
In this dissertation, the way decisions to commit military forces came about and how 
respectively a strategy for this deployment was designed, is at the centre of attention. The study 
seeks to go beyond generally held assumptions about how decisions are made with regard 
to the use of military means (civil military relations) and the use of strategy at the strategic 
level (strategic studies). The act of deciding if and how military forces will be deployed lies at 
the heart of what is known as the strategic civil military interface. In this interface13, the design 
and direction of the military operations is constructed by a group of senior civil and military 
decision-makers. This decision unit14 is situated within the wider context of their respective 
political system.  
Consequently, this study takes the agency of individuals seriously and scrutinises the ways 
in which they came to make up their minds and acted accordingly. In the process of figuring 
out what to do, actors routinely twist and intertwine what conventional scholarly accounts 
of human action struggle to keep neat and separate. This twisting and intertwining, in turn, 
has crucial repercussions for their political efficacy. Hence, whether they fail or succeed to 
influence political decisions and transform social relations, and for what cause, defines the 
result of their actions.15 
It is the actions of the senior civil and military decision-makers in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, whilst deciding to deploy their troops to South Afghanistan, that will serve 
as cases in point, in order to be able to answer the following central research question: ‘Why 
12 Margaret G. Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: a Theoretical Framework’, International Studies Review 3(2) 
(2001) 47-81, 54.
13 The term civil military interface is used to describe the strategic level. It does not only include a level in the chain of command, 
but it also provides the funds, as well as the physical and conceptual directions that are necessary to implement the decisions 
of the political leadership. In this arena decisions are taken regarding the size, organization, materiel and deployments 
of the military are made. It is at this level where the campaign plans are created and implemented. See: Robert Egnell, 
‘Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations: The Civil-Military Dimension’, The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 29(6) (2006) 1041-1075, 1042,1045-1046. 
14 This terminology is taken from Margaret G. Hermann and her work on foreign policy decisions. See: Hermann, ‘How 
Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’; Ryan K. Beasley et al, ‘People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking: Insights from 
Comparative Case Studies’, International Studies Review 3(2) (2001) 217-250; Margaret G Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe 
D. Hagan, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior’ in: Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. 
Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Londen 1987) 309 - 336. 
15	 Markus	Kornprobst	‘The	Agent’s	Logics	of	Action:	Defining	and	Mapping	Political	Judgement’,		International Theory 3 (2011) 
70-104, 70-72.
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did the senior civil and military decision-makers of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom decide to provide 
military means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan and how was the political ambition to stabilise 
South Afghanistan converted into a military operation [2004-2006]? 16
 
1.2 Objectives and Relevance
The research objective of this study is to reconstruct why and how it was decided to use 
military means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan by the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. By doing so, the black box of senior civil military decision-making on the use of 
military meansis unfolded. Hence, it entails a particular focus on systematically comparing 
the actions of these decision-makers and thus asks questions about how this decision unit17 
came about assigning government means (the military). 
This study in consequence asks why and how the senior civil military decision-makers 
engaged in the use of military means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan; did the 
primacy of politics, as the text books would prescribe, guide the actions of senior civil and 
military decision-makers; how did this decision group interpret and make sense of the task 
at hand; was there a strategy and a subsequent narrative articulating the purpose of the use 
of the military means? Systematically reconstructing and comparing the activities of the 
senior civil and military decision-makers will allow us to reach a sound judgment about why 
and how the decision to commit military troops was made.
Instead of solely focussing on the conditions that resulted in this decision, a particular 
focus will be directed towards the members of this decision unit. It does so by closing in on 
the configuration and the dynamics of the decision unit within the process of committing 
military resources for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan. During this process, the 
decision unit perceives and interprets pressures and constraints posed upon them by 
domestic and international actors.18
The research objectives are both theoretical and empirical. The study offers a detailed 
account of how the senior civil and military decision-makers came to the decision to employ 
their military means and subsequently aimed to draft their respective strategies. By doing 
16	 This	period	is	limited	in	time	in	the	sense	that	after	once	the	military	plan	was	drafted	and	political	approval	was	granted,	
the investigation ceases. This will be further explicated in chapter 3. 
17 The use of the model of decision units is grounded in the work of Margaret Hermann. Her studies examine occasions 
for decisions that lead to authoritative actions on the part of the government in dealing with a perceived foreign policy 
problem.	By	doing	so,	it	focuses	on	understanding	the	processes	that	affects	the	commitment	of	government’s	resources	
and its choice of policy. See Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 55.
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so, it explores the conversion process of political goals into military operations against the 
background of stabilisation missions and addresses the underlying process mechanisms 
within their own political and organisational context (NL/UK), whilst testing underlying 
theoretical prescriptions, on civil military relations and stategy. 
Investigating why and how it was decided to use military means for the stabilisation of 
South Afghanistan seems pointless if the context of why such operations are used is not 
delineatet. Military means are often treated as if they are neutral, an ‘all-in-one toolkit’ to be 
employed when other methods of achieving a particular political goal fail. Yet, the methods 
adopted may affect the ability to achieve the specified goal. The ‘how’ is as important as the 
‘why’.19 By learning about how these foreign policy decisions are made, we gain information 
about the intentions and strategies of governments and how their definitions of the situation 
are translated into action.20
Scholars, with a few exceptions, tend not to engage that much in operational analysis of 
contemporary military missions. This might be related to the fact that, as already outlined 
by Richard Betts, political science no longer encourages scholars to conduct operational 
analysis as a prime undertaking. As a result, few political scientists learn sufficiently about 
the processes of decision-making and military operations to grasp the difficulties of 
implementing strategic plans. ‘Few focus on the conversion processes that open gaps between 
what government leaders decide to do and what government leaders actually do’.21 It is this 
conversion process [within the current context of stabilisation operations] and the inherent 
tensions and difficulties as illustrated above, that constitute the core of this dissertation. 
 
1.3 Research Strategy
This study is interdisciplinary since the phenomenon of deciding why and how military means 
are used cannot be limited to one field of science. The analysis will include perspectives from 
the field of international relations, social and organisational theory, and foreign policy 
analysis. It follows from generic insights of social and organisational theory that the context 
in which human beings operate is constructed around rules, identities, and roles.22  A context 
19 Isaiah Wilson, Thinking Beyond War: Civil-military Relations and why America Fails to Win the Peace (Basinstoke and New York 2007) 
XXIII ; Mary Kaldor and Andrew Salmon, ‘Military Force and European Strategy’, Survival 48(1) (2006) 19-34, 20; Smith,  The 
Utility of Force.
20 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units shape Foreign Policy’, 48.
21	 Richard	K.	Betts,	‘Is	Strategy	an	Illusion?’,	International Security 25(2) (2000) 5-50, 7.
22 Anthony Giddens, Central problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradictions in Social Analysis (Berkeley and Los Angeles 
1979); Pierre Bourdieu, Practical reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford 1998); Bob Jessop, ´Interpretive Sociology and the 
Dialectic of Structure and Agency´ Theory, Culture & Society 13(1) (1996) 119-128; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
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that by definition conditions all actions of the actors: being either the calculation of costs and 
benefits (consequences), abiding of identity-constituting rules (appropriateness), generating 
a convincing argument (argumentation), or following tacit common sense (practice).23 The 
conceptualisation of the senior civil and military decision-makers originates from the 
framework of decision units.24 
The interdisciplinary approach is supposed to advance to a more thorough understanding 
of the decision-making process on the use of military means for contemporary operations.
As indicated by Lawrence Freedman, many important academic cleavages though cut across 
these boundaries. Consequently, practical problems such as the use of military means can 
rarely be encapsulated in terms of a single discipline. Every so often an interdisciplinary 
approach facilitates innovation and influences new thinking.25
Comparative case study
The empirical part of this research is based on a comparative case-study research design. 
The actions of the senior civil and military decision-makers of both the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom as to how their political ambition to stabilise South Afghanistan was 
translated into a military campaign are scrutinised. The case selection is based on the 
criteria of most-dissimilar cases combined with a sense of pragmatism due to funding and 
possibilities to access data. As the exact description of the case selection will be provided in 
chapter three, only the most central features of the two cases will be highlighted here. The 
major dissimilarities between the cases lie in the differences between their political systems, 
the differences in the decision-making process with regard to the use of military means and 
the assumed differences between the group of senior civil and military decision-makers and 
their perspectives on the role of their nation within the larger international security context.
By comparing why and how it was decided to use the armed forces of the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom for the stabilisation of South Afganistan, prevalent patterns of why and 
how Western states use their military means for stabilisation purposes will be highlighted. 
The data for this study has been collected through qualitative methods and techniques. The 
research employs a structured and focused comparison. 
The process of why and how the decisions were made by the senior civil and military 
decision-makers is reconstructed by studying a large amount of primary and secondary 
Politics (Cambridge 1999); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’ in: Martin Rein, Michael 
Moran, Robert Goodin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Oxford 2005) 689-708.
23 Kornprobst, ‘The Agent’s Logics of Action’, 71.
24 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units shape Foreign Policy’.
25 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Does Strategic Studies have a future?’, in: John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, eds. Strategy 




 I  


























documents and conducting over one hundred semi-structured interviews with key actors in 
both the political and military arena in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Document 
analysis, interviewing and observation were structured by means of a set of broad topics and 
general questions reflecting the theoretical focus of this study. Propositions were developed 
to shape the data plan and provided priorities to the relevant analytic methods.26
 
1.4 Book Outline
The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the conceptual, theoretical, 
and, methodological issues of the research. Chapter One presents the theme of the study by 
introducing the topic and the research design. It sets out the rationale behind the research 
project and presents structure of the dissertation. Chapter Two introduces the main concepts 
and their status quaestionis. First of all, the context of contemporary military interventions 
will be delineated, with a particular focus on the concept of stabilisation operations. This 
concept was, and arguably still is, the dominant concept wherein the decisions that are at 
the centre of attention for this study were made. Subsequently, the senior civil and military 
decision-makers and the nature of their relations will be attended to. These actors are the main 
unit of analysis in this research project and as such need to be conceptualised. Successively, 
a theoretical description of their core process, the act of strategy making, will be presented. 
From than onwards, the analytical framework that will provide the prism of the research 
project will be introduced. It commences with the sketching the institutional context and 
its conditioning mechanisms, thereby providing the setting in which the senior civil and 
military decision-makers are to come to a decision. Successively, the analytical framework 
that sets out how to reconstruct the decision paths of the group of senior civil and military 
decision-makers. The chapter is concluded with listing the dispositions that will guide the 
data collection and analysis of this research project. 
Chapter three explicates the methods and techniques applied for the data collection and 
analysis. It commences with embarking upon the unit of analysis, after which the multiple 
case study as a research strategy is explained, followed by a description of the applied 
method ‘structured focussed comparison’. Subsequently, an overview of the techniques for 
the collection and analysis of the data is presented. The last section discusses the reliability, 
validity, and to what extent the study can be generalised. The chapter is concluded with an 
overview of the limitations of the study.
26 Robert K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods (Thousand Oaks 2008) 130-131.
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Part Two of the book presents the context, the cases and the analysis of the collected 
data. It starts off by providing a short overview of the genesis of the Western intervention 
in Afghanistan until the time that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom decided to 
employ their military means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan (Chapter Four). This 
chapter serves merely to set out the developments in Afghanistan since the intervention 
of the ‘coalition of the willing’: a formation of Western military powers led by the United 
States that invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 until NATO’s expansion to the South of 
Afghanistan in the summer of 2006. The chapter is designed to provide an understanding 
of the environment in which the Netherlands and the United Kingdom felt they needed to 
engage by contributing to NATO’s expansion in this country.  
Successively, chapter five discusses the foreign and security policy of the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom and provides a description of their senior civil and military decision- 
makers and the procedures  of deciding to use military means all within their specific political 
context. The two cases are presented in the successive chapters, the Dutch case (Chapter Six) 
and British case (Chapter Seven). In these chapters the actions and decisions of the senior 
civil military decision-makers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are carefully 
reconstructed. The structure of the reconstruction is founded on the analytical framework 
as presented in chapter two. Subsequently, a cross case comparison is conducted in Chapter 
Eight. The workings of the actions undertaken and the decisions made by the senior civil and 
military decision-makers in both nations will be compared in this chapter. The findings will 
be structured along the lines of the propositions that have guided the research project.
Part Three of the book presents the concluding chapter in which the questions that 
instigated and guided this research will be answered. First of all, the question of why the 
senior civil and military decision-makers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
decided to provide military means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan will be 
answered.  Secondly, the question as to how this political ambition was converted into a 
military operation will be answered, followed by theoretical deductions, inductions, and 
recommendations. Subsequently, avenues for future research are proposed for advancing 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Foundations
Interventions, Strategies and Decision-Makers
2.1 Introduction
The act of deciding if and how military force will be deployed lies at the heart of what is 
known as the strategic civil military interface. In this interface1, military operations are designed 
and directed by a group of senior civil and military decision-makers. They and their actions 
are the focus of the theoretical and empirical puzzle of this study. Before outlining the 
theoretical prescriptions on the relations among senior civil and military decision-makers, 
this chapter first briefly sketches the international setting in which they operate. One 
cannot comprehend the ‘how’ of decision-making - responding to foreign policy problems 
and occasions for decision2 - without an understanding of the context. This perspective is 
founded in the constructivist belief that the world should be seen and analysed as a (social) 
construction whilst being appreciative to differences across context.3 
Therefore, first of all, the context of contemporary military interventions will be 
delineated, with a particular focus on the concept of stabilisation operations. This concept 
was, and arguably still is, the dominant concept wherein the decisions that are at the centre 
of attention for this study, were made. Subsequently, the senior civil and military decision-
makers and the nature of their relations will be attended to. These actors are the main unit 
of analysis in this research project and need to be conceptualised. Successively, a theoretical 
description of their core process, the act of strategy making, will be presented. From than 
onwards, the analytical framework that provides the prism of the research project will be 
introduced. It commences with sketching the institutional context and its conditioning 
mechanisms, thereby providing the setting in which the senior civil and military decision- 
makers are to come to a decision. Successively, the analytical framework that sets out how 
to reconstruct the decision paths of the group of senior civil and military decision-makers 
1 The term civil military interface is used to describe the strategic level. It not only includes a level in the chain of command, but 
it also provides the funds, as well as the physical and conceptual directions that are necessary to implement the decisions 
of the political leadership. In this arena, decisions are taken regarding the size, organisation, materiel and deployment of 
the military are made. It is at this level that the campaign plans are created and implemented. See: Egnell, ‘Explaining US 
and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations’, 1042, 1045-1046.
2 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units shape Foreign Policy’, 51.
3 Karin M. Fierke,‘Constructivism’, in: Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds) International Relations Theories. Discipline 
and Diversity (second edition Oxford 2010) 187-204;Vendulka Kubálková (ed.). Foreign policy in a constructed world. Vol. 4. 
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is presented. The chapter is concluded with listing the propositions that will guide the data 
collection and analysis of this research project. 
2.2 Contemporary Military Interventions 
The history of military intervention by Western states has been variable and cyclical in 
nature, rather than progressing in a clearly defined direction. Military interventions have 
exhibited  considerable variation in terms of the normative dimension.4 Hence, the pattern 
of military intervention throughout the last decades cannot be understood in isolation 
from the changing normative context in which it occurs; the context shapes the various 
conceptions of interest. Standard analytical [mostly realist] assumptions about states and 
other actors pursuing their interests tend to leave the sources and motivations of interests 
vaguely defined or unspecified.5 
The end of the Cold War heralded a rapid and dramatic transformation in the practice 
of military interventions. Now, the majority of interventions came to be multinational 
peacekeeping operations instead of unilateral intervention by world powers. Ever since, 
the number of this type of mission increased greatly.6 Moreover, a qualitative shift in the 
nature of peacekeeping: ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping missions emerged. Since the 
early nineties of the last decade an increase of intrastate conflicts was seen to endanger 
international security. Consequently, peacekeepers were sent to intrastate conflicts, thus 
stretching the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and limited use of 
force. Hence, in addition to the traditional truce observation role of peacekeepers7, this type 
4	 Edward	D.	Mansfield	and	Jack	Snyder,	‘Democratization	and	War’,	Foreign	Affairs	74(3)	(1995)	79-97;	James	Burk,	‘What	
Justifies	 Peacekeeping?’,	 Peace	 Review	 12(3)	 (2000)	 467-473;	 Alex	 J.	 Bellamy,	 ‘The	 great	 beyond:	 Rethinking	 military	
Responses to new Wars and complex Emergencies’,  Defence Studies 2(1) (2002) 25-50; Roland Paris, At War’s End: building 
Peace	after	civil	Conflict	(Cambridge	2004);	Mary	Kaldor,	New	and	old	Wars:	Organised	Violence	in	a	global	Era	(Cambridge	
2013);	 Helen	 Dexter,	 ‘New	 War,	 Good	 War	 and	 the	 War	 on	 Terror:	 Explaining,	 Excusing	 and	 Creating	 Western	 Neo‐
interventionism’,	Development	and	Change	38(6)	(2007)	1055-1071;	Mark	Duffield,		Development,	Security	and	unending	
War:	governing	 the	World	of	Peoples	 (Cambridge	2007);	David	A.	 Lake,	 ‘Building	Legitimate	States	after	Civil	Wars’	 in:	
Matthew	Hoddie	and	Caroline	A.	Hartzell	(eds.),	Strengthening	Peace	in	Post-civil	War	States:	Transforming	Spoilers	into	
Stakeholders (Chicago 2010) 29-51; Andrew J. Enterline and J. Michael Greig, ‘The History of Imposed Democracy and the 
Future of Iraq and Afghanistan’,  Foreign Policy Analysis 4(4) (2008) 321-347; Sonja Grimm and Wolfgang Merkel, ‘War and 
Democratization:	Legality,	Legitimacy	and	Effectiveness’,		Democratisation	15(3)	(2008)	457-471.
5 Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’ in: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York 1996) 153.
6 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations web site, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml
7 This typology is taken from Michael Lipson, ‘A “Garbage Can Model” of UN Peacekeeping’, Global Governance: A Review 
of Multilateralism and International Organizations 13(1) (2007) 79-97, 79. He uses the term to describe post–Cold War 
missions that increasingly undertake peace enforcement or peace building activities in addition to traditional interposition 
and truce observation functions. Typologies of peacekeeping generations include Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in 
Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate (Boulder 1995) 25–26; Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in 
the Post-Cold War Era (2nd ed. Boulder 2000) 78–108; Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, ‘Cascading Generations of 
Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor’ in: Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.) United 
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of peacekeeping also entailed significant nation-building activities in various places like 
Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Mozambique, Bosnia, Croatia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Kosovo.8
One of the striking features of these peacekeeping operations is that they all sought 
to remake (post-) conflict states into liberal democracies on the grounds that this is the 
‘appropriate’ model of domestic political organisation for states to adopt.9 These set 
objectives however were not without their own difficulties. One of the most prominent 
peacekeeping operations, which revealed the growing difficulties of competing mandates 
and unclear political objectives, were the UN and NATO missions in the Balkans.  
In addition to the transformation of types of interventions, Western powers 
demonstrated a growing reluctance to intervene without justification in terms of widely-
shared normative principles. Although political interest continued to play a significant role 
in contemporary intervention by major powers, these powers were now required to justify 
their actions in terms of general normative principles. Consequently, they rarely intervened 
in the internal affairs of other states without authorisation based on these general principles 
from legitimate multilateral institutions10, in particular the United Nations.
In turn, the notion that sovereignty is conditional and contingent upon state 
performance in terms of protecting the rights of citizens, became increasingly influential. 
The legal prescription for intervention11 became weaker as a consequence, as applicability 
of the principle of non-intervention started to depend on ‘standards of civilisation’. More 
specifically, ‘civilised’ states engaged in the protection of norms whereas ‘uncivilised’ states 
or polities did not.12  In fact, Russia, after the end of the Cold War more and more viewed 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (New York 2001) 3–25; John Mackinlay and 
Jarat Chopra, ‘Second Generation Multinational Operations’, The Washington Quarterly 15(3) (Summer 1992) 113–131; 
Marrack	Goulding,	‘The	Evolution	of	United	Nations	Peacekeeping’,		International	Affairs	69(3)	(July	1993)	451–464	cited	in:	
Lipson, ‘A “Garbage Can Model” of UN Peacekeeping’, 79.
8 Roland Paris, ‘Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture’, European Journal of International Relations 9(3) (2003) 441-
473; Niels van Willigen, ‘International administration and institutional autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo’, 
East European Politics 28.4 (2012): 429-451;Frans Osinga and James A. Russel, ‘Conclusion: Military Adaptation and the War in 
Afghanistan’, in Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A. Russell, eds. Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford University 
Press, 2013) 288-236, 289.
9 Roland Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice’’, Review of International Studies 28(4) (2002) 637–55; 
Roland Paris, ’Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of international studies 36(2) (2010) 337-365.
10 Chiyuki Aoi. Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era (New York 2010); James Dobbins 
et al.., The UN’s role in nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq II (Arlington, 2005); Simon Chesterman ‘Legality Versus 
Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the Rule of Law’, Security Dialogue 33(3) (2002) 293-307; 
Neil S Macfarlane,  Carolyn J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: is Anyone Interested in 
Humanitarian Intervention?’, Third World Quarterly 25(5) (2004) 977-992; Andreas Krieg, ‘National Interests and Altruism in 
Humanitarian Intervention’ in: Andreas Krieg, Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention (London 2013) 37-58.
11 See: Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton 1999); Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, 
International Security 20(3) (1995) 115-151;Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political 
Possibilities (New York 2013); Janice E. Thomson, ‘State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between 
Theory and Empirical Research’, International Studies Quarterly 39 (1995) 213-233; Winston P Nagan and Craig Hammer, ‘The 
Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations’,  Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 43(1) (2004) 141.
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as an ‘uncivilised state’13 and was mostly excluded from participating in multinational 
interventions. 
Engaging the term ‘humanitarian’ in concordance with military intervention became 
rather prominent about a decade ago. One of the legacies of the NATO operation Allied Force 
in Kosovo14 was the emergence of a new predicament known as humanitarian intervention.15 
Ever since, many prominent political leaders have become strong proponents of the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes and the principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P).16 Although the causal weight of these principles in determining state behaviour in 
the international arena is contestable, it on the one hand limited (Western) states’ flexibility 
in contemplating intervention on the pure grounds of self-interest.17 On the other hand, 
interventionist behaviour of states in internal affairs of other states, was in fact facilitated by 
employing a normative framework as a justification for the intervention.18
Consequently, interventions are increasingly often accompanied by normative 
justification and rhetoric.19 Collective values such as conflict resolution, the protection of 
human rights, and the promotion of democracy have gained influence at the expense of 
more clearly self-interested political objectives.20  One of the critiques voiced against this 
type of contemporary mission is the discernible trend toward less clear political guidance 
and less profound or even absent objectives that are to guide them.21 Some describe the 
13 Daniel C. Thomas, ‘Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies 
7(3) (2005) 110-141, 129. Also, Russia viewed the international normative environment  as a means for Western powers to 
secure their economic resources and/or as an alternative for possible cultural isolation of other states. Ibid.
14 NATO conducted a 78 day air campaign (From 24 March 1999 until 10 June 1999) in the Southern Yugoslav province of 
Kosovo.	The	campaign	was	directed	against	Serbia	and	Serbian	forces	who	were	supposedly	committing	genocide	against	
ethnic Albanians. For more information about operation Allied Force see: Adam Roberts, ’NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over 
Kosovo’, Survival 41(3) (1999) 102-123; Alex J Bellamy, Kosovo and international society (New York 2002).
15	 Humanitarian	 intervention	 as	 an	 act	 of	 foreign	 involvement	 in	 internal	 affairs	 of	 another	 state	 was	 no	 novelty	 at	 all.	
Throughout	history	one	can	witness	various	interventions	by	states	under	the	banner	of	‘relieving	human	suffering’.	The	
use	of	the	term	however	as	a	predicament	became	very	prominent	after	the	intervention	in	Kosovo.	
16 There seems to be a common belief among governments (particularly members of the Non-Aligned Movement) that the 
principle simply encompasses a more sophisticated way of conceptualising and legitimising humanitarian intervention. In 
fact, since 2005, it has been widely suggested that R2P ‘legalises’ or ‘legitimises’ non-consensual intervention potentially 
without the sanction of the UN Security Council.  Others claim that the principle is inadequate because it did not provide 
clear	guidance	about	the	circumstances	in	which	coercive	military	intervention	might	be	justified	or	about	the	appropriate	
decision-making process in situations where the Security Council is deadlocked. They argue that the set of criteria 
proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 to guide international 
decision-making in times of major humanitarian emergencies was an important casualty of pre-summit diplomacy in 2005 
and should be put back on the international agenda. See Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of 
military intervention’, International Affairs 84(4) (2008) 616-617.
17 MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, 81.
18 See: Dexter, ‘New War, Good War and the War on Terror’, 1055-1071.
19 See: Daniel Charles Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton 
2001).
20 Kaldor and Salmon, ‘Military Force and European Strategy’, 19-34; MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, 78.
21 Hew Strachan, ‘The lost meaning of strategy’, Survival 47(3) (2005) 33-54; David Betz and Anthony Cormack, ‘Iraq, 
Afghanistan and British Strategy’, Orbis 53(2) (2009) 319-336; David E. Johnson, ‘What are you prepared to do? NATO and 
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contemporary era of value-based foreign policy making, as it is short on instrumental policy 
making and marked by the inability to construct a clear political goal, coherent values, 
frameworks, and strategic interests.22 
However, the way interests are defined does depend on one’s theoretical standpoint. 
Does one view interest as being material in its existence or as a ‘social construction’? The 
realist interpretation of interest, the basis for state action in pursuit of power, is an often-
heard axiom in the debate about the stabilisation of (post) conflict states. In essence, 
stabilisation of (post-) conflict states is argued to be about powerful Western states seeking 
to forge, secure, or support, a particular political order in line with their particular strategic 
objectives.23
If interest, however, is viewed as a social construction, there is argued to be a process of 
interpretation that is required in order to understand both what situation the state faces and 
how they should respond to it. It presupposes a shared language by those who determine 
state action and for its public. In addition, rhetoric is produced by interests as well as used 
to justify the pursuit of those interests. This rhetoric mediates between clear state interests 
as dictated by the international system and state action.24 In the case of contemporary 
operations, the construction of legitimacy seems to be an inextricable part of the process 
the Strategic Mismatch between Ends, Ways, and Means in Afghanistan—and in the Future’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
34(5) (2011) 383-401; Chandler, ‘War Without End (s)’, 243-262.
22 David Chandler, ‘Hollow Hegemony’, 703-723. To him, the Cold War era represented a convergence of clear values and 
distinct	interests,	reflected	in	instrumental	policy-making,	and	the	post-Cold	War	period	is	seen	as	an	epoch	where	the	
value/interest framework (based on consequentialist reasoning) has collapsed, resulting in ad hoc and non-instrumentalist 
policy-making (based on habitual responses and appropriatenalist reasoning). See: Chandler, ‘Hollow Hegemony’, 703-
723; David Chandler, ‘The Security–Development Nexus and the Rise of ‘Anti-Foreign Policy’, Journal of International Relations 
and Development 10(4)	(2007)	362-386;	David	Chandler,	‘Rhetoric	without	Responsibility:	the	Attraction	of	‘Ethical’	Foreign	
Policy’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations	5(3)	(2003)	295-316.	Chandler’s	views	are	influenced	by	the	works	
of the French philosopher’s Zaki Laïdi  and Alain Badiou who denounce the key to understanding value- based projections 
of power by Western nations, as the incapacity of their ruling elites to formulate a collective project and the retreat from 
political responsibility for taking society forward. As such, the post-cold war era is viewed to portray a ‘gap between 
power and meaning’. See: Laïdi, A World without Meaning, 11; Badiou, Ethics,	31.	Put	differently,	linking	the	pursuit	of	national	
interest to the pursuit of perceived global values does nothing more than to remove politics from the ‘earthly realm of a 
struggle over interests into an idealised realm of the struggle over ‘values’. David Chandler, Hollow Hegemony, 19.
23 Sarah Collinson, Samir Elhawary and Robert Muggah, ‘States of Fragility: Stabilisation and its Implications for Humanitarian 
Action’, Disasters	 34(3)	 (2010)	 275-296;	 Duffield,	 Development, Security and Unending War;	 Mark	 Duffield,	 ‘Governing	 the	
Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid’, Disasters 25(4) (2001) 308-320.
24 As outlined by Bill McSweeny, identity and interests are mutually constituted by knowledgeable agents, monitoring, 
managing, and manipulating the narrative of one in respect to another. To say that both are chosen by human individuals is 
to	make	a	constructivist	claim	that	the	behavior	of	states	is	an	effect	of	cognitive	and	material	structures,	of	the	distribution	
of power informed by ideas and the choice is made in the context of interaction with other states in the international 
arena and with sub-state groups within the domestic. In addition, and in fact in opposition to  constructivist claims, is 
that	state	choices	are	not	only	constrained	by	structure;	they	effect	the	progressive	transformation	of	structure	within	a	
reflexive	structure-agent	relationship	which	can	never	be	dissolved	in	favor	of	the	determinative	role	of	the	actor	or	of	the	
structure and the conception of action. This implies, the concept of structure and the conception of causality in the social 
sciences	to	be	radically	distinct	from	the	ideas	applicable	from	our	understanding	of	the	natural	order.	To	affirm	to	co-
constitution	of	behavior	by	agent	and	structure	is	to	affirm	causality	in	the	social	order,	but	is	not	to	affirm	what	we	mean	
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of national interest construction.25 In other words, this perspective acknowledges norms 
as instrumental to the structuring of state’s interests. The contra position on the use of 
normative rhetoric is that norms are in fact employed as a vehicle to acquire justification for 
purely self-serving purposes of states.26
As postulated earlier, the influence of norms27 with regard to military intervention has 
been manifest over the last three decades. It has evolved into a requirement for states to 
combine their interests with prescriptive norms since these norms not only affect their 
interests, but also shape the instruments or means that states deem available and appropriate 
to use. Hence, even when actors are aware of a wide array of means to accomplish their policy 
objectives, they may nevertheless reject some means as inappropriate due to normative 
constraints’.28 
The most recent Western incarnation of value-laden intervention is known as stabilisation 
operations. Current writings on stabilisation of (post-) conflict states and stabilisation 
operations draw heavily on operations as conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a matter 
of fact, the stabilisation discourse emerged on the basis of the experiences of Western 
stabilisation efforts in these countries. The foundation and objectives of stabilising (post-) 
conflict states and the process of meeting these objectives remain deeply controversial, 
reflecting competing mandates, priorities, interests, and capacities of the many different 
actors involved. Approaches tend to be divided between prioritising security imperatives 
and taking direct and immediate action to counter perceived threats such as insurgents and 
pursuing wider peace-building, state-building and development goals.29
The (post-) conflict states that are subject to the stabilisation efforts of Western states are 
often characterised by weak governments which, more often than not, lack a monopoly on 
violence and by the presence of various groups, mostly known and defined as insurgents. It 
is for this reason that the terms ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN) and ‘stabilisation operations’ 
are intertwined and have been used interchangeably.30 This highlights the lack of conceptual 
25	 Jutta	Weldes,	‘Constructing	national	interests’,	European Journal of International Relations 2(3) (1996) 276-277, 303.
26 Dexter, ‘New War, Good War and the War on Terror’, 1058
27 Norms, like for example laws and habits, prescribe social behaviour and aim to regulate human behaviour They can take 
many forms but the kinds of norms that are of particular interest for this study are those norms that regulate the behaviour 
of actors in international politics. An authoritative norm when looking at foreign interventions is the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’	(R2P)	prescribing	rules	for	international	conduct	like	the	alleviation	of	human	suffering.	Paul	Kowert	and	Jeffrey	
Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and their Limits: a Theoretical Reprise’, The Culture of national Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (1996) 451-97.
28 Kowert and Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits’, 463.
29 Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, ‘States of fragility’, 280; Ann Fitz-Gerald and Stephanie Blair, ‘Stabilisation and Stability 
Operations: a Literature Review’, (2009) https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/	 bitstream/1826/4247/1/Stabilisation%20
article_statebuilding_intervention_FitzGerald.pdf 1-26, 24; Clare Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States: A 
Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World (Oxford 2008); Wilson, Thinking Beyond War.
30 The concept of COIN is viewed by leading nations such as the United Kingdom as the ‘the heart of stabilisation and an integral 
part of providing stability in fragile states’ notwithstanding that ‘stabilisation may be broader than counterinsurgency’. 
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clarity surrounding stabilisation and is indicative of the overwhelming influence of, and 
current focus on, the Afghanistan and Iraq experience.31 
The intangibility of the two concepts seems to be founded in military operations 
conducted as a response to the events of 9/11. Ever since then, the relationship between 
peace operations and counterinsurgency has grown significantly: rapid offensive successes 
in Afghanistan and Iraq were followed by classical protracted ‘pacification campaigns’. These 
type of operations encompass a diverse range of activities falling somewhere between peace 
operations, state-building, counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. Consequently, labels 
like ‘stabilisation’, or ‘reconstruction’ have been attached to these missions.32
Hence, the term stabilisation operation is in fact a ‘catch all’ description. More often than 
not, such operations contain a substantive military component, although the potentially 
violent aspects of the stabilisation effort are habitually down played for various (domestic) 
political reasons.33 The principle of military response in this complex politicized context 
concerns the use of force, but explicitly recognises the limitations of the use of force.34 
Hence, military successes alone are no longer sufficient in and of themselves, but must also 
facilitate and foster sustainable peace or stability.35
Nevertheless, the contemporary role of the military in stabilisation operations is 
seen to be in creating conditions for the attainment of stability. In fact, many scholars36 
argue military operations with political aims of stability, democratisation, and economic 
development are the most prominent since the end of the Cold War. Studies have indicated 
a sharp increase in the number of responses and interventions seeking to stabilise (post-) 
The major common denominator for both counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations is the understanding that local 
population is the centre of gravity. See: Fitz-Gerald and Blair, ‘Stabilisation and Stability Operations’, 8.
31 Fitz-Gerald and Blair, ‘Stabilisation and Stability Operations’, 8.
32 Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘Counterinsurgency and peace operations’ in: Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.) The 
Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (London and New York 2012) 80-98, 92.
33 Brocades Zaalberg, ‘Counterinsurgency and peace operations’, 82; Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing 
Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca and London 2004); Ian Manners, ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2) (2002) 235-258; Hanns W Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian 
Power?’, Survival 42(2) (2000) 56-80.
34 Kaldor and Salmon, ‘Military Force and European Strategy’; MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, 26-27; 
Smith, The Utility of Force. 
35 As a result, nowadays military operations are supposed to impact decisively on political outcomes. This idea is referred to 
as	the	‘peace	paradox’		The	paradox	explains	the	difficulty	of	achieving	and	maintaining	peace	on	the	long	term.	Lasting	
results and success of contemporary operations  depend on the ability to preserve the peace or some form of stability. This 
is more closely related to restoring for  example governance and civil society which means extending military tasks and 
functions. See: Wilson, Thinking Beyond War.
36 See: David Chandler, ‘Introduction: Peace without Politics?’, International Peacekeeping 12(3) (2005) 307-321; Steven L Burg, et 
al. Military intervention: cases in context for the twenty-first century.	Eds.	William	J.	Lahneman.	(Rowman	&	Littlefield	Publishers,	
2004); Robert Egnell, ‘Winning ‘Hearts andMminds’? A Critical Analysis of Counter Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, 
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conflict states.37  In fact, military means are increasingly applied as a viable instrument for 
transforming non-liberal countries or regions – like for example Iraq and Afghanistan – into 
liberal ones, thereby extending the ‘zone of peace’.38
The normative dimension of these interventions is part of the broader conception of 
intervention as a political/military instrument that states use to pursue their perceived 
interests.39 The concept of stability operations is new to both scholars and practitioners 
in the field. The term stabilisation and its derived ‘type of operation’ have been used 
primarily by Western governments and are shaped by their political and strategic interests 
and priorities. Hence, following the prominence of the terms peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement missions, the current discourse of stabilisation is now on the agenda of the 
United Nations and a growing array of regional organisations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development.40  
As a result, integrated responses most commonly known as ‘comprehensive approaches’ 
have been developed, taking in all three elements of power: military, economic, and 
political. The concept contains various elements of the best counterinsurgency practices; 
a mix of economic, political, and security components, civil-military hybrids (provincial 
reconstruction teams) as implementing tools, and a focus on strengthening local governance 
and security forces. The main aim is to foster development that will create a local host-nation 
administrative capacity, capable of providing security, meeting basic needs and providing 
services to citizens in a manner which is perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the local 
population. 
 The application of the term stabilisation operation also reveals changes in the language 
used to describe contemporary military undertakings by Western states. The application of 
the term war has proven to be problematic in a number of countries – depending on their 
background – for several reasons. First of all, there are different conceptions of what war is. 
Originally, war was understood as an instrument of policy, but it is equally an instrument 
in terms of the analytical framework it provides for the military: the ability to use force to 
37 Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, ‘States of Fragility’, 4.
38	 Tarak	Barkawi	and	Mark	Laffey,	‘The	Imperial	Peace:	Democracy,	Force	and	Globalization’,	European Journal of International 
Relations 5(4)	(1999)	403-434;	Mark	Laffey,	‘Discerning	the	Patterns	of	World	Order	Noam	Chomsky	and	International	Theory	
after	 the	Cold	War’,	 Review of International Studies 29(4) (2003): 587-604, 593. For more on the liberal peace paradigm also 
known as the democratic peace	see:	Michael	W.	Doyle,	‘Kant,	Liberal	Legacies,	and	Foreign	Affairs’,	Philosophy & Public Affairs 
(1983)	205-235;	Bruce	Russett	et	al.,	‘The	Democratic	Peace’,	International Security 19(4) (1995) 164-184; David Chandler, ‘The 
Uncritical Critique of ‘Liberal Peace’’, Review of International Studies	36(1)	(2010)	137-155;	David	E.	Spiro,	‘The	Insignificance	
of the Liberal Peace’, International Security	19(2)	(1994)	50-86;	Roland	Paris,	 ‘Human	Security:	Paradigm	Shift	or	Hot	Air?’,	
International Security 26(2) (2001) 87-102; Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ‘Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the 
Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction’, Global Society 21(4)  (2007) 491-497.
39 Neil MacFarlane,  Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, Adelphi Paper 350 (Londen 2002).
40 Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, ‘States of Fragility’, 277.
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transmit a political intention.41 Secondly, force is often not a ‘role’  states like to employ, 
regardless of whether or not the ends they seek are ultimately the same as those countries 
who do employ this terminology. Here, a distinction can be made between smaller European 
military powers and great military powers such as the United States.42 As where in the United 
States the use of the word ‘war’ in foreign policy and foreign policy actions does not seem to 
disturb its citizens, the employment of the term does cause nuisance amongst constituents 
of smaller European nations.43
Thirdly, war as an interpretive unit assumes a mutual understanding of the term,44 but 
this is not always the case amongst those who wage it, let alone those who have it forced 
upon them, like the recent examples of Iraq and Afghanistan. In traditional interstate war, 
the use of force was intended to yield a military outcome, facilitating a political solution. 
Consequently, in order for force to be used in an effective manner, an enemy needs to be 
identified and subsequently the purpose of the war needs to be defined.45 However, the 
identification of (and often agreement upon) t́he enemy´ has proven to be a complex 
endeavour since it is often a diverse grouping of actors that constitutes a threat. Secondly, the 
purpose of the armed engagement often remains vague for primarily political (diplomatic) 
purposes.46 
In summary, the contemporary approaches of Western states with regard to intervention 
are entangled with normative prescriptions of how states should behave amongst each other 
at the international level. Moreover, these prescriptions, derived from neo-liberal models 
of governance, set out how states should be designed and ruled. The various debates about 
these Western military undertakings portray the beliefs and desires that have conditioned 
its use. This, however, does not diminish the importance of the ever-present dynamic 
of interests – however constructed – of states in their international relations. The most 
recent label attached to these interventions is stabilisation operations. The term carries 
with it a considerable degree of conceptual indistinctiveness about what it is and is not, 
but it nevertheless remains a powerful normative mobilising concept on the basis of which 
Western nations engage in the ‘stabilisation’ of (post) conflict states. 
41 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 27. 
42 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘European Security, Strategic Culture, and the Use of Force’, European Security 13(4) (2004) 323-343; Pascal 
Vennesson et al., ‘Is there a European Way of War? Role Conceptions, Organizational Frames, and the Utility of Force’, 
Armed Forces & Society 35(4) (2009) 628-645.  
43 See: David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis 1992); Ole Waever, 
‘European Security Identities’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1) (1996): 103-132.
44 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 64
45 Smith, The Utility of Force ; Angstrom and Duyvesteyn (eds.), Modern War and the Utility of Force; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Exploring 
the Utility of Force: Some Conclusions’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 19(3) (2008) 423-443; Simpson, War from the Ground Up.
46 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 64; King, A., The transformation of Europe’s armed forces: from the Rhine to Afghanistan. 
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2.3 Senior Civil and Military Decision-Makers and the Nature of Their Relations
The act of deciding if and how military forces will be deployed lies at the heart of what is 
known as the civil military interface. Within this interface, also known as the strategic level, 
funds, as well as the physical and conceptual directions that are necessary to implement the 
decisions of the political leadership, are provided. Hence, in this arena decisions regarding 
the size, organization, materiel and deployments of the military are made and where the 
campaign plans ought to be created and implemented47 by the senior civil and military 
decision-makers.48
Within International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature, these 
groups of actors are often referred to as civil-military elites, foreign policy elites or epistemic 
communities.49 However, these concepts often take either a very broad view of what is 
meant by the civil military interface, or do not define it at all, allowing space for subjective 
interpretation of this grouping of actors. 
The relationship between senior civil and military decision-makers is predominantly 
seen as an end in itself, not necessarily as a way of making the state more efficient in its use of 
military means.50 This is a result of Western prescriptions for how civil and military decision-
makers should engage with one another.51 The nature of civil-military relations, which has 
been studied extensively from a normative perspective, addressing the need for civilian 
control over the military, derives from the work of two key authors: Samuel Huntington and 
Morris Janowitz. Both works put forward an American perspective on civil military relations 
founded in the realities of the Cold War, but  nevertheless remain to be authoritative works 
primarily adhered to by Western states.  
The Huntingtonian approach advocates a clear divide between civilian and military 
leadership and the Western liberal societal ideology that supports objective control of 
the military, allowing the military to develop its own skill set based on its own view of 
47 Egnell, ‘Explaining US and British Performance in Complex Expeditionary Operations’, 1042,1045, 1046.
48	 In	order	to	embark	the	group	of	senior	civil	and	military	decision-makers	for	this	study,	Margaret	Hermann’s	definition	of	
a decision unit as a group of actors  that have the ability to commit government resources and the power or authority to 
make a decision that cannot be easily reversed is employed. The conceptualisation will be dealt with later on in the chapter. 
See: Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 48, 56. See also: Hermann, Hermann and Hagan, ‘How Decision 
Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior’, 311; Beasley et al., ‘People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking’, 219.
49 Margriet Ellen Drent, A Europeanisation of the Security Structure: The Security Identities of the United Kingdom and Germany (PhD 
dissertation, Groningen 2010); Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs 78(2) (1999) 35-49; Thomas 
Risse‐Kappen,	‘Exploring	the	Nature	of	the	Beast:	International	Relations	Theory	and	comparative	Policy	Analysis	meet	the	
European Union’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1) (1996) 53-80; Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, ‘Conclusion: 
Epistemic	Communities,	World	Order,	and	the	Creation	of	a	Reflective	Research	Program’,	International Organization 46(1) 
(1992) 367-390; Eva Etzioni-Halevy, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites’ 
Connection in Israel’, Armed Forces & Society 22(3) (1996) 401-417.
50 Strachan, Making Strategy’, 66.
51 Jan Angstrom, ‘The Changing Norms of Civil and Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24(2) 
(2013) 224-236.
39
 Chapter 2   Theoretical Foundations 
Part I     Theories, Concepts and M
ethods
the functional imperative.52 It assumes that it is possible to segregate an autonomous area of 
military science from political purpose.53
Military deference to civilian control, rooted in a conservative realist perspective, is one 
of the core premises of Huntington’s work and has dominated thought on civil-military 
relations up to the present time. This perspective was challenged by Samuel Finer, over five 
decades ago, in his work on the role of military in politics, where he argued that it is exactly 
the ‘professionalism’ of the military that may lead them to see themselves as servants of 
the state rather than servants of those in power.54 Also Sam Sarkesian expressed his doubts 
about the ‘professionalism’ of the military as described by Huntington when he stated ‘the 
generally accepted idea of acceptance of the military in democratic societies as an apolitical 
organization, characterized by civilian control and supremacy is, in practice, mere ignorance 
of history and reality’.55 Only recently, mainly due to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, have 
the Huntingtonian prescriptions about civil-military relations been challenged again. Those 
who have operated at various levels while planning and executing present-day operations, 
especially, have experienced the untenability of categorising the military as politically inert 
operators only executing policy.56  
The contemporary context of civil-military relations, the belief in a concerted civilian-
military effort to stabilise (post-) conflict states, adheres more to the framework of the work 
of yet another prominent theorist in the field of civil-military relations, Morris Janowitz. 
His framework prescribes a politically attuned military and therefore advocates civil-
military integration in order to create coordinated advice and to develop increased mutual 
understanding and trust between the actors in the civil-military interface. The logic informing 
his argument is the belief he holds about the need for intertwined political and military policy 
and decision-making. Janowitz’s notion of civil-military relations advocates that the officer 
corps be politically educated in order to be able to function well in the political domain. He 
refers to the military as a ‘constabulary force’ and denounces a clear separation of the civil-
military domain, since to him civilian control cannot be achieved through a professional 
military tradition not to intervene in politics, but through ‘self-imposed professional 
standards and meaningful integration with civilian values’.57
52 Huntington distinguishes two imperatives: the functional and societal.  The former aims to potential threats to a society’s 
security, as where the later derives from ideologies, social forces and institutions that are dominant within the society. See: 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA 1957) 79.
53 Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
54 Samuel Edward Finer, The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics (London, 2002) 25.
55 Sam C. Sarkesian, ‘Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West’, International Political Science Review 
2(3) (1981) 283-297 quoted in: Rene Moelker, ´Culture’s Backlash on Decision-making’, Nação e Defesa 107(2)  (2004) 11-35, 
Pgnummer citaat!
56 Simpson. War from the Ground Up, 113-116.
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Even though the founding fathers of civil-military relations and their (Western) prescriptions 
still very much dominate the discourse, more novel insights have begun to materialise. For 
example, James Burk, when reviewing the theories on civil-military relations, points to the 
danger of total military obedience because the military could potentially be forced to follow 
the passions of the civilian majority in control of the democratic state. Blindly obeying 
public opinion could reduce military strength, distracting it from its purpose to provide 
(inter-) national security.58
More recently, Peter Feaver has expanded the body of literature on civil-military relations 
by applying the principal-agent theory and exposing the ‘civil–military problematique’59 as a 
strategic game. Civilians control the military through monitoring and punishment whereas 
the military either ‘work or shirk’. He suggests civilians might exercise oversight of the 
military by monitoring or non-monitoring whether the military has obeyed their orders. In 
the event that the military has not executed its orders, civilians can decide to either punish 
the military or not. In the whole process of managing the military, the civilians – according 
to Feaver – have the ‘right to be wrong’, i.e. to make mistakes in their strategic guidance 
directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction.60 
The case of Kosovo is used by Feaver to illustrate what refers to as a highly detailed and 
efficient monitoring of the American force commander and his operations by Washington. 
He argues that during this campaign, American civilians could sufficiently access information 
to exercise near-term tactical control over their military agents. The case demonstrates that 
cheap and effective (information) technology provides information to civilians to detect and 
punish commanders’ deviations from their guidance. The principal-agent model than puts 
forward the assumption that military agents would therefore adhere strictly to a  suboptimal 
use of military resources because civilian principals stipulate and efficiently enforce political 
constraints.61
An interesting, but lesser known perspective on civil-military relations, has been 
developed by Rebecca Schiff. She sees the citizenry as a party, in addition to the civil and 
military actors and articulates that these parties should aim for a cooperative relationship, 
one that may or may not involve separation, but does not require it in and of itself. Her 
‘concordance theory’ argues that the type of civil-military relationship adopted matters 
less than the ability of the three partners to agree on the social composition of the officer 
58 James Burk, ‘Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations’, Armed Forces & Society 29(1) (2002) 7-29.
59 He refers to this problematique as the tension between a strong military protecting society versus being a threat to the civil 
liberties of society themselves. See: Peter Feaver. Armed servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA 
2005).
60 Feaver, Armed Servants.
61	 Damon	Coletta	and	Peter	D.	Feaver,	‘Civilian	monitoring	of	US	military	operations	in	the	information	age’,	Armed Forces & 
Society 33(1) (2006) 106-126. 109,110,116,120. 
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corps, the political decision-making process, the recruitment method, and military style. In 
addition, she argues for the inclusion of elements of society, amongst which culture is central 
in both the prescriptions and descriptions related to civil-military relations.62 
As mentioned above, the dominant approaches within civil-military relations derive from 
American perspectives on this relationship and focus very much on institutional analysis. 
Despite the dominance of these American views, even in the majority of other Western 
nations, it is worthwhile to draw some distinctions. First of all, smaller nations with a lesser 
military capability have tended to view the potential ability of the military to seize control 
as a less likely option.63 They might, therefore, provide the military with some more ‘space 
to manoeuvre’ in the sense that they are not overly worried about the military’s potential 
influence on policy, for example. This is notwithstanding the fact that the civil-military 
structures embedded within their political system and the consequent rules and roles 
assigned to the civil and military actors originated from the American models and are no 
longer reflective of the way the civil military is believed to operate best.
However, the majority of European studies of civil-military relations focus on the 
cooperation and relations of these actors during operations.64 A particular focus is directed 
toward trying to identify when and how civil and military organisations should work together 
in the field. As said, this includes another angle of civil-military relations that extends beyond 
the scope of this study, but is indicative of the European operational focus on the matter. 
In conclusion, despite the shortcomings of the organisational and American-centric view 
on civil-military relations, Janowitz’s and Hungtington’s models still very much underpin the 
thoughts of theorists and - arguably to a lesser extent - practitioners. Their prescriptions are 
embedded in the organisational setting, rules, and codes that exist between civil and military 
actors. However, as outlined above, these models have proven to be quite problematic when 
preparing and executing strategies for contemporary operations. 
62	 Rebecca	L.	Schiff,	‘Civil-military	Relations	Reconsidered:	A	Theory	of	Concordance’,nArmed Forces & Society 22(1) (1995) 7-24, 7.
63 See for example: Erik Hedlund, ‘Civil–Military Control over the Swedish Military Profession An Analysis from the Perspective 
of	Officer	Rank	and	Officer	Education’,	Armed Forces & Society 39.1 (2013): 135-157.
64 See for example: Sebastiaan Rietjens and Myriame Bollen (eds.), Managing civil-military Cooperation: a 24/7 Joint Effort for Stability 
(Aldershot and Burlington 2008); Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities 
in Modern Peace Operations	 (Amsterdam	 2006);	 Hugo	 Slim,	 ’The	 Stretcher	 and	 the	 Drum:	 Civil‐Military	 Relations	 in	 Peace	
Support Operations’, International Peacekeeping 3(2) (1996) 123-140; Robert Egnell, ‘The Missing Link: Civil-Military Aspects of 
Effectiveness	in	Complex	Irregular	Warfare’	(PhD	Dissertation,	London	2007);	Angstrom,	‘The	Changing	Norms	of	Civil	and	
Military	and	Civil-Military	Relations	Theory’;	Chiara	Ruffa,	Christopher	Dandeker,	and	Pascal	Vennesson,	 ‘Soldiers	Drawn	
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2.4 Strategy as The Product of a Dialogue Between Politicians and Soldiers
The current debate about strategy draws largely on recent experiences in the field. The cases 
of both Afghanistan and Iraq have illustrated a trend in which the military has been shaping 
and formulating strategy before and during the campaign. Put differently, the operational 
level of the military is seen as filling the gap created by an absent strategy.65 Moreover, 
military courses of action of Western states are often based on a feeling that ‘something 
must be done’66 and are not necessarily grounded in a realistic evaluation of possibilities 
and costs.  As such, the constitutive act67 of strategy-making seems to be complicated by the 
absence of ends-based meaning or purpose, i.e. political responsibility. Hence, subjective 
intentions of state-actors seem to be prioritised above broader strategic or long-term policy-
making.68 This by and large can be attributed to the fact that states are often limited by the 
complexities of the demands they face and by the institutionalised with pressure to act 
appropriately, resulting in the ad hoc and non-instrumentalist policy-making characteristic 
of modern-day interventions.69 
The tension between what is militarily possible and politically desirable and vice versa, 
lies at the heart of civil-military relations when it comes to the use of military means. In 
other words, the dialogue between the two is vital for the drafting of policy, the possibility of 
its implementation,70 and, ultimately, the provision of (inter-) national security through the 
use of military means.71 In addition to linking political goals to the use of military means, 
strategy should also be seen as the link between official political ‘talk’, ‘decisions’, and 
‘actions’. The stronger the linkages, the better the strategy will be. If contradictions between 
official talk and subsequent actions of a respective government arise, the question should be 
asked if this in fact serves a purpose. A state could e.g. very well engage in international talks 
about the stabilisation of a potential region without actually being able to really commit 
itself with relevant resources. Thus, disparity between talk, decisions, and ultimately the 
actions of states can arise from inconsistent material and normative-ideational72 like for 
65 Strachan, ’Making strategy’, 60-61.
66 Desmond Bowen, ‘Something Must be Done-Military Intervention’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23(1) (2000) 1-19.
67 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (2nd ed. Minneapolis 1998); Thomas Diez, 
‘Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering Normative Power Europe’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 33(3) (2005) 613–36.
68 Laïdi, A World without Meaning, 11-13.
69 March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, International Organization 52(4) 
(1998) 943-69. Reprinted in: P.J. Katzenstein, R.O. Keohane and S.D. Krasner (eds.), Exploration and Contestation in the Study of 
World Politics (Cambridge, MA 1999) 303-329.
70 Simpson. War from the Ground Up, 111.
71 Strachan, ‘Making strategy’, 66.
72 Michael Lipson and Catherine Weaver, ‘Varieties of Organized Hypocrisy’, Paper delivered at the ISA 49th annual 
convention, San Francisco. See:	http://www.	allacademic.	com/meta/p252179_index.	html. (2008)  4-6.
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example the cases of Sudan and Liberia. Here, nations agreed that human suffering needed 
to be alleviated yet hardly anything was done. 
The harmonisation of the civil-military interface would ultimately be a product of 
interaction between politicians and soldiers: a dialectical relationship between desire and 
possibility. The core problem, however, seems to be ‘what comes first’? Ideally, the articulation 
of desire should be grounded in possibility in terms of resources and political will. In turn, 
the assessment of possibility requires a clear idea informing any analysis.73 In other words, a 
clear harmonisation of ways, ends, and means, i.e. strategy, is required in order to effectively 
employ military means. 
Traditionally, both in the domains of scholars and practitioners, the existence of strategy 
is believed to be a crucial determinant of military efficacy since it entails linking political 
objectives to military means. Thus, the state ought to have an interest in directing and 
controlling the deployment of its troops. To effectively match means to ends therefore, 
a state preferably begins by identifying clear [underlying] interests. Subsequently, theory 
prescribes that foreign policy ends advancing these interests should be identified, allowing 
an evaluation of the best available resources for the attainment of the stated ends.74 
Strategy in this study will be defined as the harmonisation of political goals with military 
means facilitated by a dialogue between civil and military decision-makers. This definition 
heavily draws on the work of Hew Strachan on strategy. 75
Most, if not all, of the traditional theoretical prescriptions of Western military strategy 
are founded upon the writings of Carl von Clausewitz. His definition of strategy as ‘the use 
of the engagement for the purpose of the war’ is probably the most cited, but also often 
misunderstood since he made a distinction between the concept Politik and strategy. In doing 
so, he emphasised the two are in fact interwoven.76 As delineated by military historians Hew 
Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘On War is the ‘prism through which we have come to 
look at war (…) military commentators have used this text as a departing point at least for their 
questions, if not for their answers’.77 
The ideas following from classic writings present the making of strategy as a linear 
process. After the nature of the conflict has been properly analysed, theory prescribes 
strategy to manage and direct the conflict. However, it cannot do so if it starts from an 
incorrect premise. In practice, strategy is more often than not pragmatic since it habitually 
73 Strachan, ‘Making Strategy’, 20, 60-61, 67; Simpson. War from the Ground Up, 116.
74	 David	Stevens	and	Matthew	S.	Winters,	‘When	the	Means	Become	the	Ends:	Two	Novel	Pathways	to	Foreign	Policy	Failure’,	
paper delivered at  International Studies Association Annual Conference. 2006, 10.
75 See: Strachan, Direction of  War.
76 Clausewitz cited in: Strachan, ’The lost meaning of strategy’, 34.
77 Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe , ‘Introduction’, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. Clausewitz in 
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derives from underlying assumptions and educated guesses about the situation at hand. For 
this very reason, most strategic theory was retrospective by design and was itself grounded 
in military history. By means of explaining events that had seemed unclear at the time, it 
provided interpretative and didactic tools for the future, as is the case with the writings of 
many strategists.78
Does the insight of strategy and strategic studies79 provide the roadmap for effectively 
employing military means? In theory it does. It prescribes a linear process, objectives driven 
and based on rationalist calculations made by the political elite. However, in practice the 
prescriptions for strategy have proven far more difficult to employ and to an extent are too 
unrealistic to be of use for present complex operations. Hence, the theory tends to downplay 
the dynamic interaction between the political and military levels, which cannot be described 
as a linear process based on rational calculation. In the current complex international order, 
threats, in particular, are no longer as static as during for example the Cold War and the 
attainment of political objectives no longer requires military victory in a traditional sense. 
The narrow interpretation of the Clausewitzian dictum of war to be an extension of 
policy by other means only recognises the actual use of force as the instrument by which war 
affects policy.80 As military writer Rupert Smith argues, military objectives must be chosen 
for their value in achieving the political objective, not merely because they are possible. As 
such, activity should not be confused with outcome. Furthermore, Smith stresses the need 
to understand the nature of the problem on its own terms, in order for force to have political 
utility. He points to the tendency in Western nations to analyse contemporary conflicts 
through dogmatically applied ideological or doctrinal81 lenses.82 
This touches upon a fundamental problem, namely that before one even considers the 
use of military means, the degree of intractability of the conflict should be understood. 
Before intervention can be considered, accurate assessments must be made and are crucial 
to understanding the development of the conflict at hand. Only by starting from the 
perspective of the conflict, its causes, and the factors affecting its continuation, can a proper 
78 Strachan, ‘Strategy and the Limitation of War’, 38; Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy’, 67.
79 The discipline of strategic studies has mainly engaged itself with studying world powers and their use of the military 
instrument.  As a result, their capability to solve security problems by armed force is an a priori for the entire conception of 
armed force in most studies of strategic issues. In focusing on the most military capable states, like the United States and 
China, one habitually focuses on the ability of military power to redress balances of power and world order. See: Mikkel 
Vedby Rasmussen, ‘What’s the Use of It?’: Danish Strategic Culture and the Utility of Armed Force’,  Cooperation and Conflict 
40(1) (2005) 67-89, 68.
80 Simpson, War from the Ground Up.
81 Western doctrinal guidance commands political primacy and civil-military cooperation but does not abundantly explain 
the	 central	 importance	 of	 the	 political	 process.	 It	 neither	 confines	 the	 potential	 peace	 building	 role	 of	 the	 military	 as	
explained by Ben Lovelock in his work about the military’s role in political processes during interventions. Richard B. 
Lovelock , The General as Statesman? Exploring the Professional Need for Commanders to Support viable Political Outcomes in Peace and 
Stability Operations as Typified by the UK military Approach (PhD	dissertation,	Cranfield	2010).
82 Smith, The Utility of Force, 374.
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set of instruments be developed to address it.83 The political context of the conflict, and less 
so the identity of those who are parties to it, seem to be the key characteristics.84 However, a 
thorough comprehension of the complexity of contemporary conflicts is quite demanding for 
the civil-military decision-makers who are required to draft the strategy. 
The lack of information and understanding85 of the political and social makeup of the 
societies that are to be stabilised and even more so, the persistent belief amongst Western 
nations in ‘their own ways of doing things’ complicates matters even more. This has also 
been alluded to by Matt Waldman, when reflecting on the underlying causes of deficiencies 
in American policy-making with regard to Afghanistan. The respondents in his study have 
identified organisational weaknesses in the acquisition, interpretation, processing of 
information and self-evaluation as main drivers for failing policy.86
In addition, the difficulties of formulating coherent strategy seem to be rooted in the fact 
that the well-ordered, policy-operational distinction, firmly rooted in both strategic thought 
and in states’ very constitutions, has proved to be untenable in modern conflicts.87 In current 
operations the operational level often fills the gap created by a lack of strategy. Difficulties 
with formulating how democracy or rule of law should be delivered in a (post-) conflict state 
regularly result in failing to define clear goals. Ideally, for military operations to be successful, 
the political objective should be defined in terms of a concrete, immediate-term outcome 
to be attained through the employment of military means. Subsequently, the political goals 
need to be operationalised by politicians in order to provide the military with a directive.88 In 
return, the military needs to learn and understand where war policy derives its purpose and 
to understand the role the military serves in terms of achieving political objectives.89  
The actual articulation of the objective that needs to be attained through the deployment 
of military means90 is, as mentioned earlier, often missing in contemporary missions. This 
83	 Colin	McInnes,	‘A	different	kind	of	war;	September	11	and	the	United	States’	Afghan	War’,	109-134	in	Isabelle	Duyvesteyn	and	
Jan Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature of War (Abingdon and New York 2005), 109 – 134, 124.
84 Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Strategic Theory’, in: John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, eds. Strategy in the contemporary 
world (third	edition,	2010))	67-83,	69;	Nat	J.	Colletta	and	Robert	Muggah,	‘Context	Matters:	Interim	Stabilisation	and	Second	
Generation Approaches to Security Promotion’, Conflict, Security & Development 9(4) (2009) 425-453, 427.
85	 The	phenomenon	of	drafting	strategy	in	complex	environments	with	too	much	or	a	limited	amount	of	information	and	the	
demands posed on those who are to develop strategy – in this case the senior civil and military decision-makers – served 
to cater the ‘science of muddling through’	introduced	by	Charles	Lindblom	to	the	field	of	organisational	theory.	See:	Charles	E.	
Lindblom, ‘The science of” muddling through’ Public administration review (1959).79-88.
86	 Matt	Waldman,	‘System	Failure:	the	Underlying	Causes	of	US	Policy-Making	Errors	in	Afghanistan’,		International Affairs	89(4) 	
(2013) 825–843,  839.
87 Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 111.
88 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War. Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 2013); Smith, The Utility of Force; 
Kaldor and Salmon, ‘Military Force and European strategy’; Patricia L Sullivan and Michael T. Koch, ‘Military Intervention by 
Powerful States, 1945—2003’, Journal of Peace Research 46 (5) (2009) 707-718.
89 Wilson, Thinking Beyond War; Lovelock , The General as Statesman?.
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could possibly be explained by the fact that Western nations have fallen out of the habit of 
strategy making and, arguably, may have never even been engaged in strategy-making as 
described in the textbooks. Whatever the reading of events may be, ever since the end of the 
Cold War, Western military powers have not engaged themselves much in the development 
of strategy, including the formulation of grand strategy and the drafting of strategic-level 
military appreciations. Classic strategy-making, dating back to the nuclear era, entailed 
threat-based planning whereas post-modern strategy-making entails capacity-based 
planning. Consequently, current strategy-making is much more about addressing issues 
of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unpredictability and often originates from the bottom up 
instead of the top down, which used to be the case during the Cold War.91
Nowadays, contingent strategic factors [political, geographical, economic, social, or 
military] are not adequately assessed before courses of action are designed and often, 
the defining of necessary strategy followed the decision to deploy military force rather 
than preceded it. In addition, Western foreign policy habitually views the use of force 
as an instrument to attain a political objective, but often seems – as addressed earlier – 
insufficiently understand the implications of its use.92
However, the lack of understanding of the nature of the problem at hand cannot be solely 
explained by a shortage of experience in strategy-making and lack of sufficient information. 
Acknowledging the importance of experienced strategists and understanding the problem 
at hand, there seems to be a more structural cause at play, seriously complicating the 
drafting of strategy for the stabilisation of (post-) conflict states, namely the normative 
disposition of stabilisation operations: the Western belief in bringing about stability 
through democratisation of (post-) conflict states. In the process of managing inconsistent 
and irreconcilable operational aims of stabilisation operations, decoupling of rhetoric, 
decisions, and activities seems to be both a political and organisational response.93 It allows 
states to maintain systemic stability and legitimacy by managing irreconcilable pressures 
that might otherwise force them to operate ineffectively.94
Put differently, senior civil and military decision-makers are required to reconcile 
normative external demands with internal demands or restrictions such as the desire not to 
91 Mungo Melvin, ‘Learning the Strategic Lessons from Afghanistan’, The RUSI Journal 157(2) (2012) 56-61, 58; Todor Tagarev 
and Petya Ivanova, ‘Classic, Modern, and Post-Modern Approaches to Making Security Strategy’ (2009) http://www.
gcmarshall.bg/KP/new/TT_PI_09.pdf , 7.
92 Melvin, ‘Learning the strategic lessons from Afghanistan’, 58; Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Strategic Illiteracy. The Art of 
Strategic Thinking in Modern Military Operations’, Inaugural lecture on the acceptance of her position of Special Chair in 
Strategic Studies at Leiden University (2013), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/	handle/1887/20944/Oratie%20
Duyvesteijn%20Eng.pdf	.
93 Nils Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Action in Organizations (New York 1989); Krasner, Sovereignty; 
Michael Lipson, ’Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’ European Journal of International Relations 13(1) (2007) 5-34.
94 Robert Egnell, ‘The Organized Hypocrisy of International State-building’, Conflict, Security & Development 10(4) (2010) 465-491, 
467.
47
 Chapter 2   Theoretical Foundations 
Part I     Theories, Concepts and M
ethods
engage in combat operations. Hence, the international community often only articulates a set 
of idealised aspirations instead of interests. These aspirations, however, are difficult to gauge 
in a strategically coherent manner. Consequently, a contradictory process where political 
elites seem keen to express the rhetoric of high moral responsibility in the international 
sphere, but are in fact rather reluctant to take responsibility for either policy-making or 
policy outcomes, is witnessed.95 Again, one only has to call to mind the various atrocities 
committed on the African continent in which Western nations decided not to intervene. 
As a result, the moral responsibility referred to by senior civil and military decision-
makers to justify the deployment of military troops is not necessarily founded in a political 
meaning or goal. However, policymaking entails taking responsibility for choices founded 
in the articulation of a political goal. The belief in political ends, stated in policy, enables 
governments to justify and legitimise the inevitable costs (money, soldiers/civilian lives, and 
other resources)96 of achieving these policy-ends through the deployment of forces. Yet, in 
current stabilisation operations, ends and means are often separated,97 thereby illustrating 
the aforementioned inconsistency between expressions of morality and the resulting 
actions.98 
However, the aforementioned lack of strategy did cause a rise in emergent strategies 
designed in the field instead of in capitals of the troop contributing nations. Even though this 
contradicts the traditional Clausewitzian logic, one could pose the question as to whether 
emergent strategies are as worrisome as expected. These bottom-up initiatives originating 
in the field did facilitate adaptive behaviour which is crucial in the complex environments 
of current operations. Instead of focusing on certain predefined desired effects, it allowed 
field operations to rely on the ability to respond to the unpredictable nature of the conflict.99 
It also allowed more room for a civil military dialogue on how best to use military means for 
contemporary operations.
 
95 David Chandler, ‘Hollow Hegemony’, 720.
96 Paul Williams, ‘How Can We Improve the Formulation and Implementation of UK Foreign Policy?’, paper for IPPR and LSE 
event on ‘Progressive Foreign Policy for the UK’, London School of Economics (2006).
97 Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’; Johnson, ’What are you prepared to do?; Rudra Chaudhuri and Theo Farrell, 
‘Campaign Disconnect: Operational Progress and Strategic Obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011’, International Affairs 87(2) 
(2011) 271-296.
98 Chandler, ‘Hollow Hegemony’, 720-721.
99	 Zoltán	Jobbagy,	From	Effects-based	Operations	to	Effects-based	Force:	on	Causality,	Complex	Adaptive	System	and	the	
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2.5 The Analytical Framework
The implication of having selected senior civil and military decision-makers as the main unit 
of analysis for this research project is to induce analytical inferences from actor-oriented 
approaches within the field of international relations. As such, the construction of the 
analytical lens applied to this study draws, but not solely, on the field of Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA)100 since this field of inquiry relies on an actor-specific focus. It focuses on 
‘agents of the state’ based on the argument that all that occurs in the international order is 
ultimately grounded in human decision-makers, acting in groups or alone. 
As pointed out by Joe Hagan, decision-making approaches are well suited to contribute 
to further advance international relations theory especially by enlightening inconsistencies 
in systemic explanations of state behaviour in conflict and war.101 
The main strength of FPA is its acknowledgement of human agency. It moves beyond the 
‘black boxing of states’ – approximating all decision-making units as rational, unitary actors 
or the equivalent of states – often done in the field of international relations.  The difficulty 
of attempting to define a group derives from the fact that agency [agency concerns events of 
which the individual is the perpetrator]102 often evolves and cannot always be predefined. 
Hence, empirical data often illustrates how agency emerges and follows a certain path that 
becomes instrumental to the outcome.103
As such, FPA develops an actor-specific theory that does not view decision-making 
units – individuals or groups – as rational, unitary actors equivalent to the state. It 
features six hallmarks, as identified by Valerie Hudson, namely multi-factorial, multilevel, 
interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific.104 The actor-based 
approaches within the field of FPA draw heavily on cognitive and psychological approaches, 
bureaucratic politics, and the interpretative actor perspective.105 The structural perspectives 
in the field – neo-realism, neo-liberalism/institutionalism and social constructivism106 –
100	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	derives	from	the	field	of	international	relations	which	is	grounded	in	the	same	ground	as	all	social	
sciences in the sense that it aims to understand ‘how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how 
humans	shape	and	are	shaped	by	the	world	around	them’.	Valerie	Hudson,	‘Foreign	Policy	Analysis:	Actor-	Specific	theory	
and the Ground of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1) (2005) 1-30.
101	 Hagan,	J.	D.,	‘Does	Decision-making	Matter?’,	International	Studies	Review	3	(2)	(2001)	5-	46:6.
102 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society Outline of a Theory of Structuration (Berkely and Los Angeles 1984) 4.
103	Markus	Kornprobst,	‘The	Agent’s	Logics	of	Action:	Defining	and	Mapping	Political	Judgement’,	International Theory 3(1) (2011) 
70-104.
104  Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’, 1.
105 Walter Carlsnaes, ‘Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis’, in Foreign Policy,	edited	by	Smith,	Hadfield	and	Dunne:	
118-123; Brian Ripley, ‘Psychology, Foreign Policy and International Relations Theory’, Political Psychology 14(3) (1993) 403-
416, 403.
106 Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’.
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predominantly focus on structural or systemic causes of agents’ behaviour and, in doing so, 
often offer a deterministic approach that neglects the creativity of agents.107
The major assumption of systemic explanations is that decision-makers straightforwardly 
respond to systemic international emergencies. Foreign policy problems are predominantly, 
but not solely, explained by the systemic logic of structural realism108.  Systemic explanations 
assume, and therefore only account for, decision-makers having information certainty, and 
a shared understanding of the goals and their possible maximisation, and are in essence 
unitary rational actors. The unitary rational actor model, however, does not hold up very well 
because it tends to downgrade the complexity and conditions in which decisions are taken. 
Historical analyses demonstrate that decision-makers are constantly confronted with trade-
offs across competing goals and operated in decision structures in which political authority 
was fragmented and dispersed. It follows from this that advancing the understanding of 
decision-making as a way to respond to international issues, is fundamental to explaining, 
possibly even predicting how decision-makers will respond.109
As the famous models of Irving Janis (Victims of Groupthink) 110 and Graham Allison (Essence of 
Decision)111, demonstrated how the dynamic character of the decision process can shape foreign 
policy behaviour.112 They have identified that, in complex foreign policy cases concerned with 
the use or non-use of military means, members of decision groups are central to the decision-
making process as they define the nature of the problem and present courses of action.113
107 See for example: Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, International 
organization 51(4) (1997) 513-553; David Patrick Houghton, ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision-making: 
Toward a Constructivist Approach’, Foreign Policy Analysis 3(1) (2007) 24-45; Joseph S. Nye, ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, 
World Politics 40(2) (1988) 235-251.
108 See for example: Waltz, K. N., Theory of international politics (Waveland Press, 2010); Keohane, R. O., ‘Theory of world 
politics: structural realism and beyond’, Neorealism and its Critics 158 (1986) 190-97; Krasner, S. D., ‘Structural causes and 
regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables’, International organization 36 (2) (1982) 185-205.
109	Hagan,	J.	D.,	‘Does	Decision-making	Matter?’,	International	Studies	Review	3	(2)	(2001)	5-	46:6-11.
110 Janis his insights into the dynamics of foreign policy were novel in the sense that they could explain policy failures. The case 
he	investigated	was	the	decision	made	by	John	F.	Kennedy	about	invading	the	Bays	of	Pigs	in	Cuba.		His	findings	illustrate	
suboptimal policy choices, limiting choices of the actors involved as a consequence of what he coined to be ‘groupthink’. 
This phenomenon is characterised by consensus seeking behaviour and intolerance of opposing viewpoints amongst 
members of a decision group. Janis Irving, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos (2nd 
edition, Boston 1982).
111 The work of Graham Allison about the workings of interaction within decision groups have become known as ‘bureaucratic 
politics’. He argues individuals to bargain also known as ‘pulling and hauling’ about decisions that need to be taken. See: 
Graham T. Alllison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston 1971). He further developed this line of 
thought with Morton H Halperin. See: Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and 
Some Policy Implications’, World Politics 24 (1972) 40-79. Morton Halperin himself advanced the work on bureaucratic 
politics in his work on the Johnson administration. See Morton H. Halperin, ’The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic 
and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration’, World Politics 25(1) (1972) 62-95. 
112 Jean A. Garrison, ‘Foreign Policymaking and Group Dynamics: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going’ International 
Studies Review 5(2) (2003) 155-202, 155.
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One of the most damaging claims made by these models against the dominant rational actor 
model [which views (human) action as the product of a cost-benefit analysis] is that decisions 
and actions within government are political in nature. It follows from this disposition that 
political competition between the various actors in government results in compromises 
that emerged out of bargaining between the actors 114 i.e. decisions are made on the basis of 
bargaining and in fact reflect no one’s specific and/or pre-defined interests.  
The actions of actors involved are constituted by their interests posited against anticipated 
consequences, and by the rules entrenched in their identities and political institutions. 
Consequently, they calculate consequences and follow rules often in a subtle tandem.115 
Throughout the whole process, the act of communication is ever present. The authenticity 
of actors and their charisma greatly influences the way their arguments are perceived and 
accepted or rejected within decision-making processes. Those who are most able to forward 
convincing lines of argument, or whose authority is broadly accepted, are very likely to have 
it ‘their way’.116
2.5.1 Institutional Setting and Roles of the Actors
The primary foundation for action in an organisational setting (the primary setting in 
which the actors under study operate) largely constitutes a cognitive concept [a process of 
interpretation] but it also contains a normative component.117  Hence, ‘actors seek to fulfil 
the obligation encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community 
or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a 
social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of 
situation’.118 
Moreover, the actions of decision-makers occur in the context of shared meanings and 
practices.119 These can be best described as expressions of what is acceptable and exemplary 
behaviour according to the (internalised) purposes, codes, and methods and techniques 
of the principal group and the self. Accordingly, actions within organisational settings are 
believed to commence from these rules, identities, and roles and less so from consequences 
114 Graham Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, The American Political Science Review 63(3) (1969) 689-718, 
708.
115 James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, American Political 
Science Review 78(3) (1983) 734-749.
116 See: Thomas Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’,  International Organization 54(1) (2000) 1-39.
117 James G March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York 1989); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 
‘Institutional Perspectives on Governance’ in: H.U. Derlien, U. Gerhardt and F.W. Scharpf (eds.), Systemrationalitat und 
Partialinteresse.	Festschrift	fur	Renate	Mayntz	(Baden-Baden	1994)	249-270	cited	in:	James	G.	March	and	Johan	P.	Olsen,	
‘Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions’,  Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 9(3) (1996) 
247-64, 252.
118 March and Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, 689.
119 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York 1989).
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and preferences,120 in contrast to of the rationalist approach to explaining human behaviour, 
which starts from the premise that collective or individual action is based on material gain 
only.121  
Hence, the prescriptions of civil-military relations theory and strategic thought have 
developed into roles122 and identities, rules, and codes, acquired by senior civil and military 
decision-makers in Western democratic societies. This reflexive part of their reasoning often 
derives from habits [uninten tional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless, actions]123 and 
allows for rapid, but not necessarily accurate, classification of people and events.124 
However, senior civil and military decision-makers are not simply confined to acting 
according to their roles125 (rule-based behaviour), but may actively be involved in the 
reconstruction of their roles through their interaction with other (inter-) national actors 
(communicative action). In addition, they often have to mediate between various – often 
competing – demands that arise from different institutional contexts.126 Hence, the ‘art 
120 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (rev. ed. Boston, MA 1950) cited in: March and Oleson, ‘Institutional 
Perspectives on Political Institutions’,  251-252.
121	 For	 a	 rational	 choice	 account	 on	 this	 matter	 see:	 Michael	 Hechter	 and	 Satoshi	 Kanazawa,	 ‘Sociological	 Rational	 Choice	
Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology  23 (1997) 191-214; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions’, Journal of Business 59(4.2) (1986) S251-S278; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, ‘Moral and Legal 
Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective’, The Journal of Legal Studies	31(S1)	(2002)	S115-S139;	Jeffrey	
Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered No. 1-2 (rev. ed., New Haven 1996). Or 
for discussions on its use: Donald P. Green et all. Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science 
(New Haven 1994).
122	Decision-makers	 	 employ	 own	 definitions	 of	 general	 kinds	 of	 decisions,	 commitments,	 rules,	 and	 actions	 suitable	 to	
their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in 
subordinate regional systems. See: Kalevi J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’ International 
Studies Quarterly 14(3) (1970) 233-309.
123 That is, they do not consume limited cogni tive processing capacity. See: Ted Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit in International 
Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 16(4) (2010) 539-561, 541. See also: Paul ’t Hart and Anchrit Wille, 
‘Ministers	and	Top	Officials	in	the	Dutch	Core	Executive:	Living	Together,	Growing	Apart?’,	Public Administration 84(1) (2006) 
121-146, 125.
124 Henk Aarts and Ap Dijksterhuis, ‘Habits as Knowledge Structures: Automaticity in Goal-directed Behavior’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 78(1) (2000) 53-63, 60; C.N.  Macrae, A.B .Milne, and G.V. Bodenhausen ‘Stereotypes as 
Energy-Saving Devices’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66(1) (1994) 37- 47; D.M. Wegner and J.A. Bargh, ‘Control 
and Automaticity in Social Life’, in: Gilbert D.L., Fiske S.T., and Lindzey G. (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology I (Boston 1998) 
446-497, 472–473 cited in: Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit in International Relations’. 541
125 The concept of role was initially developed within the disciplines of sociology and social psychology to indicate agent´s 
characteristic	patterns	of	behaviour	provided	by	a	certain	position.	The	role	performance	of	actors	includes	their	behaviour	
in	terms	of	decisions	and	actions	undertaken.	Within	this	behaviour	they	often	act	on	the	role	they	are	expected	to	play,	
anticipating on roles of their counterparts are expected to portray. See Liesbeth Aggestam, ´Role Conceptions and the 
Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy ,́ ARENA Working Papers, WP 99/8, (1999) 12. See http://www.deutscheaussenpolitik.
de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/ wp99_8.html
126 Aggestam, ´Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, 10. This process constitutes the intersection 
of structure and agency and inclines or disposes actors to do certain things. Its premise being that a set of individual 
dispositions is in fact profoundly social. Pierre Bourdieu captured habit with the concept of doxa: an ‘automatic, unthinking, 
and	unreflective	responses	of	actors	in	their	interpretation	of	the	world’.	See:	Pierre	Bourdieu,	Outline of a Theory of Practice 
(Cambridge 1977) 164–170. In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu claims that ‘habitus engenders all the thoughts, all 
the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with [the particular conditions in which it was constituted] and no others’. 
The habitus itself ‘could be considered a system of inter nalised structures, schemes of perception, conception, and 
action common to all members of the same group’. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 86- 95. His work is criticised 
by, amongst others, Anthony King who argues that Bourdieu mistakes the nature of human society. He postulates that 
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of inventing’ that introduces contingency in social action: the same dispositions could 
potentially lead to different practices depending on the social context.127  
Furthermore, in their analysis, be it in terms of the goal or the use of applicable means, 
the beliefs of senior civil and military decision-makers on which basis they are prepared to 
act, are positioned in their minds128 and constitute, as indicated in many studies, a great 
normative force.129 
Moreover, much of their behaviour is – as mentioned earlier – more often than not 
caught up in habitual behaviour rather than reflection.130 This does not withstand the 
fact that actors are socialised into playing roles through interaction within domestic and 
international institutional contexts, yet their practices are also caught in so-called position 
roles allowing less scope for interpretation.131 
The role (perception) of these actors constitutes a mixture of values and descriptions of a 
reality that may be partial or general and more or less manifest. It does not, however, imply 
that actors passively act in accordance with a script. Instead, they are actively involved in 
the categorisation of themselves.132 Indeed, the fulfilling of an identity or a role constitutes 
matching ‘a changing (and often ambiguous) set of contingent rules to a changing (and often 
ambiguous) set of situations’.133 
in	terms	of	social	interaction.	King	defines	this	interaction	as	webs	of	social	relations	in	which	humans	mutually	develop	
shared understandings and co-operate in collective ventures. See: Anthony King, ‘The Habitus Process: A Sociological 
Conception’, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35(4) (2005) 463-468, 467.
127 As postulated by Vincent Pouliot: ‘While social scientists have all the time to rationalise action post hoc, agents are 
confronted with practical problems that they must urgently solve. Hence, one cannot reduce practice to the execution 
of a model. Social action is not necessarily preceded by a premeditated design. A practice can be oriented toward a goal 
without	being	consciously	informed	by	it.	In	addition,	in	the	heat	of	practice,	hunches	and	habits	often	take	precedence	
over rational calculations’. Vincent Pouliot, ’The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities’, 
International Organization 62(2) (2008) 257-288, 262, 274.
128 It is the essence of constructivist research to study the acts of social agents. Ultimately, observation is interpretation: social 
reality constitutes meanings and cannot be studied in any ‘objective’ manner. However, the impossibility of objective 
observation should by no means justify not trying to pragmatically interpret social reality with as much detachment as 
possible.	Finally,	‘to	know	if	social	reality	is	really	real	makes	no	analytical	difference:	the	whole	point	is	to	observe	whether	
agents take it to be real, and to draw the social and political implications that result’ See: Vincent Pouliot, ‘The Essence 
of Constructivism’, Journal of International Relations and Development 7(2) (2004) 319-336, 328-329; Nicolas Onuf, ‘The Politics 
of Constructivism’ in: Karen Fierke and Knud Eric Jorgensen (eds.), Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, 
(Armonk NY 2001) 236-254.
129 Marijke Breuning,, ‘Words and Deeds: Foreign Assistance Rhetoric and Policy Behavior in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and the United Kingdom’, International Studies Quarterly 39(2) (1995) 235-254; Cameron G. Thies and Marijke Breuning, 
‘Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations through Role Theory’,  Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1)  (2012) 1-4; 
Cameron G Thies, ‘Role Theory and Foreign Policy’, The International Studies Encyclopedia 10 (2010): 6-335; Cristian Cantir and 
Juliet	Kaarbo,’Contested	Roles	and	Domestic	Politics:	Reflections	on	Role	Theory	in	Foreign	Policy	Analysis	and	IR	Theory’,	
Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1) (2012) 5-24.
130 Hopf, ‘The Logic of Habit in International Relations’, 548.
131	 Michael	Barnett,	‘Institutions,	Roles,	and	Disorder:	The	Case	of	the	Arab	States	System’,	International Studies Quarterly (1993) 
271-296 cited in: Aggestam, ´Role conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy ,́ 10.
132 Aggestam, ´Role conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy ,́ 12.	See:	http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.
de/resources/seminars/gb/approach/document/wp99_8.htm
133 Bruce J. Biddle, ‘Recent Development in Role Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology 12 (1986) 67-92; Ellen Berscheid, 
‘Interpersonal relationships’, Annual Review of Psychology 45(1) (1994) 79-129, cited in: March and Olsen, ‘Institutional 
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Consequently, role conceptions134 structure the behaviour of their agents, as is most apparent 
when employed in domestic discourse over contested roles.135 In both the Danish and Dutch 
debates about Afghanistan, studied by Juliet Kaarbo and Christian Cantir, role conflicts were 
evident and influenced by domestic processes, involving particular political actors and their 
institu tional contexts. In the Dutch case, domestically contested roles even became the 
centre of the international community’s attention as world leaders sought to influence the 
internal debate,136 hoping the Netherlands would conform to external expectations.137
Throughout the process of making decisions, actors interpret and debate about 
the problem that requires a decision.138 In doing so, they try to figure out in ‘a collective 
communicative process whether their assumptions about the world and about cause-
and-effect relationships in the world are correct (the realm of theoretical discourses); or 
whether norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified, and which norms apply under 
given circumstances (the realm of practical discourses)’.139 Hence, they seek to reach 
communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications 
for the principles and norms guiding their action. 
By itself, the actions in the decision-making are largely mediated by language: individuals 
figure out what to do by exchanging arguments with one another.140 At first glance, this seems 
to be a habitual practice. However, the very act in itself requires actors to develop trust in the 
authenticity of each other’s’ speech acts. In this process, actors implicitly raise three types 
perspectives on political institutions’, 251-252.
134 Holsti, ’National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’; Stephen G. Walker (ed.), Role Theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis (Durham NC 1987); Breuning, ´Words and Deeds’; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Cantir and Kaarbo, 
Contested Roles and Domestic Politics’, 19; Stephen G Walker, Ed. Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis. (1987 Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press).
135 Cantir and Kaarbo, ‘Contested Roles and Domestic Politics’. The concept of role was initially developed within the 
disciplines	of	sociology	and	social	psychology	to	indicate	agent´s	characteristic	patterns	of	behaviour	provided	a	certain	
position. The role performance of actors includes their behaviour in terms of decisions and actions undertaken. Within this 
behaviour	they	often	act	on	the	role	they	are	expected	to	play,	anticipating	on	roles	of	their	counterparts	are	expected	to	
portray. See Aggestam, ´Role conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, 12.
136	This	debate	will	be	attended	to	in	chapter	5:	the	Dutch	case.	
137	 Juliet	 Kaarbo	 and	 Cristian	 Cantir,	 ‘Role	 conflict	 in	 recent	 wars:	 Danish	 and	 Dutch	 debates	 over	 Iraq	 and	 Afghanistan’,	
Cooperation and Conflict, published online 7 August 2013, 2 See also: March and Olsen, ‘The institutional dynamics of 
international political orders’. 
138 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 6.
139 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 7. 
140	Most	theorising	about	argumentation	within	the	field	of	international	relations,	see:	Harald	Müller,	‘Arguing,	Bargaining	
and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist Theory and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations’, 
European Journal of International Relations 10(3) (2004) 395-435; Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’ is informed by the Theory of Communicative 
Action	of	Jürgen	Habermas.	See:	Jurgen	Habermas,	The Theory of Communicative Action	I	(Boston	1984);	Habermas,	Jürgen,	The 
Theory of Communicative Action II: Lifeword and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Boston 1985). The main line of thought 
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of validity claims141: the propositional truth of speech acts, the moral rightness, and the 
authenticity of the speakers. As long as these claims remain unchallenged, communicative 
action displays itself as a habitual practice. Once these claims are challenged, ‘normal’ 
communication becomes problematic and the outcome remains undecided. Consequently, 
a more reflective form of communication will occur since the problematic validity claim will 
be evaluated with reference to shared norms and principles.142
The logic mediating communicative action is not to attain certain fixed preferences, but 
to seek a reasoned consensus. Hence, where argumentative rationality prevails, actors do 
not seek to maximise or satisfy their given interests and preferences, but instead challenge 
and justify the validity claims inherent in them. This in itself, reveals the willingness of actors 
to change their views of the world in light of the better argument, despite their respective 
interests.143
It is within this collective, interactive decision process, in which all members that are 
required to make authoritative commitments participate. However, the ability to commit or 
withhold resources does not require group members themselves to actually implement the 
decision. This, in fact, creates the possibility of potential discrepancies between choice and 
action.144
2.5.2 Decision Units and Decision Paths 
The senior civil and military decision-makers are – as explained earlier on in chapter, 
conceptualised as a ‘decision unit’. The concept of a decision units allows a focus on how a 
group of actors acquires agency, its primary feature being the ability to commit government 
resources. The concept of a decision unit moves beyond the dominant understanding of 
unitary rational actors and allows for a more comprehensive and dynamic understanding 
of decision-making and decision-makers. The work of Margaret Hermann on decision units 
builds upon the afore mentioned extant body of research on foreign policy decision-making 
that has traditionally focussed on bureaucratic politics, group dynamics, and presidential 
advisory systems. The research on decision-making units aims to facilitate an understanding 
141 These claims relate to the corresponding presuppositions of participants engaged  in a communicative dialogue: that they 
share the same objective ‘world’ of facts, feel compelled by the same social context of norms, and – approximately – 
share	similar	subjective	‘worlds’	of	feelings	and	emotions.	See:	Nicole	Deitelhoff	and	Harald	Müller,	‘Theoretical	Paradise–	
Empirically Lost? Arguing with Habermas’, Review of International Studies 31(1) (2005) 167-179, 168.
142		Deitelhoff	and	Müller,	‘Theoretical	Paradise	–	Empirically	Lost?’,	168,	171.
143 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 7, 34.
144 Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’, 
International Studies Quarterly 33(4) (1989) 361-387, 363.
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of foreign policymaking by offering an explanation of the essence of decision incorporating 
existing insights in a complementary framework.145 
Furthermore, it takes into account the variety of ways in which those involved in 
policymaking can shape events instead of focusing on constraints that limit what decision 
units can do. Hence, decision units are often active participants in the making of foreign 
policy. Lastly, the model of a decision unit facilitates research on foreign policy decisions 
beyond the current models, focussed largely on the American political system, which allows 
for a more inclusive and comparative approach to studying how decisions are made in and 
between other political systems.146
Most importantly, especially for this particular study, the model allows a systematic 
analysis of sequential decisions whereby the decision unit potentially changes and/or shifts 
back to the initial configuration, depending on the type of decision within space and time. The 
contingency-based logic of the model facilitates a dynamic analysis of the series of decisions 
that are made.147 Furthermore, this level of analysis bridges the individual and organisation 
level, facilitating switching between levels.148  
Within the specific institutional setting in which the actors operate, as described above, 
a collection of rules, roles, and practices are embedded in structures of resources that allow 
action.149 These notions are taken into consideration whilst employing the framework 
[explicated below] as advanced by Hermann in order to reconstruct the actions and decisions 
of the group under study.150
145 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 48.
146 Ibid., 48.
147 Ibid., 76
148 Garrison, ‘Foreign Policymaking and Group Dynamics:’, 155. See also: Paul ´t Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius (eds.), 
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (Ann Arbor 1997), 6.
149 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New 1995); March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions.
150 The following paragraphs are taken from the work of Margaret Hermann on decision units. See: Hermann, ‘How Decision 
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I The Foreign Policy Problem 
The foreign policy problem – a perceived discrepancy between present conditions and what 
is desired151–  is, by definition, subjective and dependent on the perception of the decision-
makers involved. They can either pose opportunities or difficulties for the decision-makers 
and their respective governments. The ‘problem’ is a trigger or the reason for engaging the 
decision-making framework since it allows for the identification of who will be able to com-
mit government resources and how that individual or set of individuals will, in fact, make 
that decision.152
II The Occasion for Decision 
A problem calling for foreign policy action generally tends to get structured into a series 
of decisions that involve different segments of government. Occasions for decisions are 
moments when those involved feel they need to act even if the action itself is inaction or to 
acquire more information. Consequently, there might be various occasions for the decision 
that may be addressed across time by the same decision unit or by different decision units. 
The specific occasions studied are strategic actions that lead to authoritative actions on the 
part of governments.153
III Emergence of Decision Unit 
Three types of decision units can be distinguished: the predominant leader, the single 
group, or the coalition. The presence of relevant actors outside government can potentially 
change the nature of the decision unit. At this point, the formal structures of the respective 
government, whether a predominant leader, or a single group, becomes less explanatory in 
terms of the nature of the decision unit.154
IV Decision Unit Dynamics 
The process of interpretation of what problem is actually at hand and how it should be dealt 
with very much depends on the nature of the decision unit. The unit will often proceed 
according to institutionalised practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, habitual tacit un-
derstanding of what is considered to be reasonable.155  However, the actors within the unit 
are limited by the complexities of the demands imposed upon them, by the regulations and 
distribution of resources and their competencies and organising capacities.156 
151 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 53.
152 Ibid., 53-54.
153 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 54.
154	For	a	more	detailed	outline	on	 the	different	 types	of	decision	units,	 see:	Hermann,	 ‘How	Decision	Units	Shape	Foreign	
Policy’, 56-57; Hermann and Hermann, ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How’.
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Furthermore, information about the domestic and international environment shapes the 
definition of the problem at hand as well as the formulation of feasible alternatives. The decision 
unit is structured according to the way in which decision-makers seek information from outside 
the unit to understand where important constituencies stand. Consequently, they determine 
their options, deduce a certain responsibility to these external forces and bring them into the 
decision process.157 
In the interpretation and the framing of the problem, cultural and political norms come into 
play. They give rise not only to the roles of the actors involved, but also to the expectations of 
the decision unit about the role its nation is to play on the international stage in relation to the 
problem they are addressing. It may take time to re-frame the problem once policymakers lock 
onto an initial perception of what is occurring.158
The matching of identities of those in the unit, with the situation and the aforementioned 
behavioural rules will very likely be based on experience, expert knowledge, or intuition. 
It entails the pairing of the problem at hand with a problem-solving action.159 Hence, 
the process of interpretation requires assigning rules to situations and is mediated by 
language. The process upholds consistency of action predominantly through establishing 
typologies of similarity rather than through deriving action from stable interests or wants.160 
V Process Outcome 
The decision-making process produces two outcomes: the outcome of the process itself, and the 
actual foreign policy action (which will be addressed below).  The outcome of the process itself 
indicates what happened in the course of the decision unit’s deliberations. Six possible outcomes 
are distinguished: concurrence, mutual compromise/consensus, lopsided compromise, deadlock, 
and fragmented symbolic action.161 The outcome of the process is indicative of the preferences of 
those involved. The process outcome can vary in terms of different degrees of ownership of the 
choice that is made and different ways of monitoring the consequences of the decision.162  
 
VI Foreign Policy Action  
The foreign policy action is what the government ultimately decides to do as a response to the 
occasion that called for a decision. Put differently, the content of the decision that resulted 
from the choice process and engendered the response.163 
157 Beasley et al., ‘People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking’, 223.
158 Ibid., 232-234.
159 March and Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, 690.
160 March and Olsen, ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’ , 690, 694; Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’.
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The dynamic nature of decision-making and the dynamic and often changing nature of the 
decision group is very well encapsulated in Herman’s model. Studying both the decision 
units engaged with the potential use of military means and their decision paths, is necessary 
and central to the field of international relations in order to be better able to understand, 
predict and maybe even control the use of military means as a response to instability within 
international relations.
2.5.3 The Propositions
The integration of the decision unit framework with the main concepts of civil-military 
relations and strategy results into the following propositions – based on the ‘ideal type’ as 
put forward in the theory discussed in this chapter:
PI.  The inputs into the DMP are instigated by political guidance on a foreign policy 
problem;
PII.   The decision-making dynamics reveal a process of interpretation in which the senior 
civil and military decision-makers perceive and deduce constraints and pressures 
imposed on them by the domestic and international environment;
PIII.  The output of the decision-making process is a strategy articulating the purpose of 
the use of the military means.
These propositions will guide the data gathering and analysis as will be described in the next 
chapter. The extent to which these propositions are, in fact, in line with the practices and 
decisions made by the group under study, will be dealt with in the concluding chapter. 
To conclude, this chapter presented the major theoretical foundations of the three 
concepts foundational to this study: contemporary military interventions, civil- military 
relations and strategy. The unit of analysis, the civil and military decision-makers, were 
conceptualised as a decision unit. The analytical framework that will be applied in this 
study  to reconstruct the activities and respective decisions of these decision-makers, largely 
builds on Margaret Hermann’s work on decision units and foreign policy decision-making. It 
furthermore includes the conditioning mechanisms that derive from the institutional setting 
in which these actors are to come to a decision. The sequential phasing of the decision paths 
as outlined in the model is applied to structure the case studies. The theoretically informed 
propositions derived from the model and the concepts as discussed in this chapter, are put to 
the test when confronted with the data as put forward in the case studies. 
3
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Chapter 3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction: From Distinctions to Generalisations
The research objective of this dissertation entails focussing on a systematic comparison of 
the actions of the senior civil and military decision-makers whilst deciding to deploy their 
military forces. This study thus asks why and how these agents engaged in the use of military 
means for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan; if it was an anticipated response; what 
political objective(s) needed to be attained and how these objectives were converted into a 
military operation. Systematically reconstructing and comparing the activities of the senior 
civil and military decision-makers will allow us to reach a sound judgment with respect to 
whether the stated propositions presented in the previous chapter account for a convincing 
logic.
A contextualised approach is employed appreciating the idea that scientific knowledge 
about social phenomenon cannot be gained separately from the context in which the 
phenomenon occurs. Therefore, to unravel the mechanisms at play, the method of structured 
focused comparison is used, allowing an in depth analysis of the cases at hand. This chapter 
outlines the methodological aspects of the study. First of all, the unit of analysis is embarked 
upon, after which the multiple case study as a research strategy is explained, followed by 
a description of the applied method ‘structured focussed comparison’. Subsequently, an 
overview of the techniques for the collection and analysis of the data is presented. The last 
section discusses the reliability, validity, and to what extent the study can be generalised. The 
chapter is concluded with an overview of the limitations of the study. 
 
3.2 The Unit of Analysis 
The act of deciding if and how military forces will be deployed lies at the heart of what is 
known as the strategic civil military interface. In this interface1, the design and direction of the 
military operations is constructed by a group of senior civil and military decision-makers. 
The group of senior civil and military decision-makers under study in this research have been 
conceptualised as a decision unit. As described in the previous chapter, the primary feature 
1 The term civil military interface is used to describe the strategic level. It does not only include a level in the chain of command, 
but it also provides the funds, as well as the physical and conceptual directions that are necessary to implement the 
decisions of the political leadership. In this arena decisions are taken regarding the size, organization, materiel and 
deployments of the military are made. It is at this level where the campaign plans are created and implemented.  See: 
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of a decision unit is its ability to commit government resources. The conceptualisation 
allows a focus on how this group of actors acquired agency despite the different political 
arrangements in the nations under study.  
The group of senior civil and military decision-makers in the Netherlands is best captured 
as an intergovernmental single group decision unit.2 To be precise, the actors involved 
are: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister for International 
Cooperation, the Minister of Defence and the members of the Steering Group Military 
Operations: the political counsellor of the MP3 the director general Political Affairs (MFA), 
the director general International Cooperation (MFA), the director general Security Policy 
(MFA), the director general Stability and Human Rights (MFA), the director General Policy 
(MOD), the Chief of Defence (MOD) and the Director Operations (MOD. Depending on the 
topic additional backbenchers from the respective ministries will sit in.4 
The group of senior civil and military decision-makers in the United Kingdom is best 
described as a single group decision unit with a dominant leader. The Prime Minister holds 
a very dominant position and personally appoints his trustees and ad hoc groups. In the 
case under study, the Reid Group mandated by the Prime Minister, can be best described as a 
single group with a dominant leader.5 The group is referred to as an interdepartmental group 
entrusted to oversee the employment of British forces to South Afghanistan. The Secretary 
of State for Defence is in charge of the group who comprises of the Secretary of State for 
International Development, the Minister of State at the Foreign and Common Wealth Office, 
and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. Depending on the topic additional backbenchers 
from the respective ministries will sit in. 
It is worth noting that in both groups often – depending on the situation or topic on 
the agenda – special advisors, civil servants or military personnel would sit in and provide 
their advice or input to the decision-making process. Furthermore, throughout the decision- 
making the configuration of the units shifted as a consequence of the sequential decisions 
that were made to deploy the respective military forces, which required at times the inclusion 
or exclusion of other actors to safeguard a decision.
Nevertheless, the group of senior civil and military decision-makers that advanced the 
initial decisions by doing so initiating the deployment of military means remain to be the 
prima unit of analysis. The added value of closing in on this particular group of actors, 
highlights an informal decision-making process that conditions, shapes, and maybe even 
2 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’.
3	 This	person	is	delegated	from	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	to	the	Ministry	of	General	Affairs	to	assist	the	Prime	Minister	
as his personal counsellor. 
4 Information provided by the former secretary of the SMO, Pieter - Henk Schroor. Email correspondence 11-12 June 2013.
5 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 57.
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lures the ultimate decision. The application of the framework to the different occasions 
for decisions linked to the ultimate action, namely the deployment of forces, allows a 
perspective on the twists and turns the senior civil and military decision-makers engaged 
in whilst they were trying to cope with the problem6 facing them. The multiple occasions 
for decision demonstrate the viability of the dynamics by focusing on the series of choices 
that are contained in many foreign policy problems. Understanding how results from one 
occasion for decision influence and/or intertwine with information from the (inter) national 
environment and as such shapes the nature of the next occasion for decision, offers insights 
about the decision-making process across time. Studying the decision paths of the senior 
civil and military decision-makers, enables an understanding about a government’s strategy 
and ways of coping with the deployment of military forces at large.7
This approach is believed to reconstruct and provide insights into the decision paths 
of the civil and military decision-makers in a more detailed manner than by testing the 
relevance of theoretically informed hypotheses. Paraphrasing Norman Denzin, slightly 
extends the argument made here that traditional, post positivism, in terms of applying a 
soft quantitative grid (confirmability, hypotheses, credibility) to qualitative research does 
not in itself result in better scientific results.8  The premise here is that the explorative nature 
of this study intends to facilitate a better insight into the decision-making of senior civil 
and military decision-makers by carefully reconstructing their decision paths that led to the 
use of their military means. Consequently the applied model in itself will not be tested but 
will be employed as a useful vehicle for the reconstruction of events, decisions and for the 
conceptualisation of the senior civilian military decision-makers.
 
3.3 A Multiple Case Study
This study is a comparative case study, a research strategy which is often used in the field 
of political science and international relations.9 The research strategy contains similarities 
6	 A	foreign	policy	problem	is	best	defined	as	a	specific	occasion	for	decision	that	requires	action.	Beasley	et	al.,	‘People	and	
Processes in Foreign Policymaking’, 226.
7 Beasley et al., ‘People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking’, 227.
8 Denzin N. K., ‘The elephant in the living room: or extending the conversation about the politics of evidence’, Qualitative 
Research,  9 (2) (2009) 139-160: 149. See also: Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln Y. S.,  ‘The discipline and practice of qualitative 
research’, Handbook of qualitative research 2 (2000) 1-28.
9 Dvora Yanow, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Maria José Freitas, ‘Case Study Research in Political Science’ in: A.J. Mills, G. 
Durepos & E. Wiebe (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Case Study Research (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi and Singapore 2008) 
108-114; Alexander L George, and Timothy J. McKeown, ‘Case studies and theories of organizational decision-making’, 
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with both historical and experimental forms of research since it provides answers to ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions.  These all deal with operational links which need to be traced over time, 
rather than mere frequencies or incidence.10 However, it differs from these methods as well, 
since the case-study method studies a contemporary set of events (contrary to historical 
research) over which the researcher has little or no control (contrary to experiments).11
An important benefit of this research strategy is its ability to study the events in-depth. 
Conducting a case study and searching for and identifying sources of variation in outcomes 
can potentially lead to richer models than a quantitative research strategy that ‘can easily 
use controls and randomization to build a wall separating a larger causal mechanism from a 
small number of variables of immediate interest’.12 
The primary criterion for the case selection is its relevance to the research objective 
of the study.13 For this study the least- likely case selection was applied. This decision was 
founded with preliminary knowledge of the cases at hand, thereby allowing a stronger 
research design.14 In addition, least-likely cases are most appropriate for the verification of 
propositions.15
The two selected countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, represent two 
important Western European states and NATO members when it comes to providing troops 
for stabilisation missions but differ to one another to a great extent, especially with regard 
to their political system and with regard to their security posture within the international 
arena. While the British are often criticised or applauded  for their ‘warrior proneness’, the 
Dutch are often criticised or applauded  for their ‘soft’ and ‘a-military’ appearance. Generally 
put, one can distinguish a difference between Atlantic and European views about the purpose 
of the military, especially with regard to their role in foreign policy. The principal realist 
assumption that states use armed force to advance their security interests 16 has been more 
appealing to major and medium military powers such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Small states like for example Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have doubted 
whether armed force is a useful means for achieving security.17 
10 Yin, Case Study Research, 9.
11 Yin, Case Study Research, 13
12 Timothy J McKeown, ’Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba’s Designing Social 
Inquiry:	Scientific	Inference	in	Qualitative	Research’,	International organization 53(1) (1999) 161-190, 174.
13 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge 2005).
14 Ibid, 24
15 Bent Flyvbjerg, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, Qualitative Inquiry, 12 (2) 2006, 219-245. 234
16 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations 
(Oxford 2010) 3.
17	 This	 discourse	 on	 the	 utility	 of	 military	 means	 does	 have	 pacifist	 elements,	 but,	 as	 Mikkel	 Rasmussen	 has	 put	 it,	 it	 is	
basically	a	discussion	about	utility	rather	than	morality.	He	claims	the	difference	should	be	sought	in	how	military	force	
is understood, rather than the opportunities to use it. See: Rasmussen, ‘What’s the Use of It?’, 67. See also: Jan Angstom 
and	Jan	Willem	Honig	infer	the	strategic	choice	of	small	powers	to	be	more	diversified	than	usually	assumed.	In	particular,	
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The major difference with regard to the political systems of these states effecting the use 
of military means. The Netherlands is a so-called multi-party system more often than not 
ruled by a coalition government. Coalition governments by definition need very much to 
work on consensus building within their cabinet and in parliament and the senate in order 
to be effective. The Prime Minister is primus interparis (first among equals) and the role of 
government and the use of military means is laid down in the constitution.18  The United 
Kingdom is a so-called majority system, also known as the Westminster model named 
after the palace of Westminster in London, the location of the British parliament. The main 
characteristic of the model is that the Queen, the head of state is the nominal or de jure source 
of executive power while the de facto head of the executive is the Prime Minister. He exercises 
executive authority on behalf of the head of state. This system of government originated 
with parliamentary convention, practices and precedents and has never been formally laid 
out in a written constitution’.19
An aspect closely related to the different political systems of these states  is the set of 
procedures underpinning the deployment of their troops. These differences are founded in 
the differences in their political systems. As where in the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister 
is endorsed with great powers to employ his military means, in the Netherlands, Parliament 
had acquired itself quite a prominent role in the endorsement of deploying military means.20
Moreover, in the Netherlands, the use of the military is a sensitive and often debated 
issue in the Dutch parliament especially after the events that had evolved in Srebrenica.21 As a 
result, an assessment framework and consequently a parliamentary procedure was developed 
and implemented. The framework, as will be explicated in chapter five, consists of a series 
of political and military criteria that are used to consider the desirability and feasibility of 
contributing military resources to an international military operation.22 When applied, 
the Dutch government prepares an Article 100 Letter. On the basis of this letter, parliament 
can debate the issues involving the deployment.  In order for the government to deploy its 
military forces, the majority of parliament members must endorse the proposal. Without 
a majority in parliament, the government could decide to deploy its forces anyhow but 
Dutch and Danish internationalism is seems to reconcile the use of force in the national and international domains in 
contrast to Sweden and Norway where a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism perseveres. 
Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 35(5) (2012) 663-687, 684.
18 See Arend  Lijphart, ‘Democratic Political Systems Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (1) 
(1989) 33- 48.
19 ‘Ministerial Responsibility Under The Westminster System’, the Nassau Institute. See: http://www.nassauinstitute.org/
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this is not viewed to be desirable.23 The United Kingdom does not possess such a thorough 
and formal set of procedures when it comes to deploying their troops, which adds to the 
comparative advantage of the two cases.  
An additional difference between the two states is the fact that the United Kingdom 
institutionalised a comprehensive approach to operations in its Post Conflict and 
Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) (now referred to as Stabilisation Unit). The interdepartmental 
unit jointly serves the Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign Common 
Wealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). PCRU is to plan missions to fragile 
states, according to a single British aim and strategic framework. Consequently, they deploy 
civilian experts as well as military forces. The Netherlands has not institutionalised its 
interdepartmental cooperation, but coordinates the planning and execution of its military 
missions through the Steering Group Military Operations (SMO).  
3.3.1  Process Tracing and Structured Focused Comparison:  
Linking Outcomes and Conditions
The data collected from the two cases will be analysed using the qualitative methods of 
śtructured focused comparison´ and process tracing. The propositions as described in the 
previous chapter are theoretically informed and guide the data collection and analysis and 
provide the focus of the study. The structure is provided through ́ semi structured´ interviews 
in which the theoretical focus resonates but it also allows room for  the interviewees to provide 
information on matters unique to their experience and matters they view to be important. 
In case study research, a ‘structured and focused comparison’ stressing the systematic 
collection of data is a very useful method. The method is ‘structured’ by posing general 
theoretically founded questions that reflect the research objective. These questions are 
to guide each case under study and standardise the data collection, facilitating systematic 
comparison and accumulation of the findings. The method is ‘focused’ because it deals 
with, and scrutinises, particular aspects of the cases (the informal and formal decision- 
making of the senior civil and military decision-makers and their respective activities). A 
merely formalistic adherence to the format of structured focused comparison will negatively 
influence the results since the important device of formulating a set of standardised, general 
questions is grounded in both the theoretical and research objective of the study.24
The case studies are structured in the following way: first of all, the context, largely 
describing why the senior civil and military decision-makers have chosen to engage their 
armed forces for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan. Secondly, the actions and events 
23	 This	process	will	be	described	in	great	detail	in	chapter	five.	
24 See: Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge 2005) 67-71.
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featuring the complex political military interplay of launching a military operation and the 
articulation of its purpose, will be outlined. The cases are concluded when political approval 
for the operations was granted and the plans for the operations were delivered. As such, the 
timeframe of the case studies is limited to the duration of the military and political decision-
making process which started in 2004 and was concluded in the first quarter of 2006.  
3.3.2 Process Tracing
The data collected from the two cases will be analysed using the qualitative method of 
‘process tracing’. Within qualitative research, the process tracing method is quite regularly 
employed. Its goal is to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and 
processes.25 The most profound proponents of the method of process tracing are Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennet.26 They continually fine-tuned this method, since the conduct of 
qualitative research was often criticised for its presumed lack of reliability.27 Process tracing 
as a tool in particular, has been criticised for its use within a recursive setting.28 If one is to 
use process tracing within an interpretative approach, it should be separated from discursive 
and narrative techniques.29
The most distinctive feature of process-tracing styles of research is what John Gerring 
refers to as ‘non comparability of adjacent pieces of evidence’: all pieces are relevant to the 
central argument but they do not comprise observations in a larger sample. They are more 
correctly understood as a series of N=1 observations.  It is the quality of the observations and 
how they are analysed, not the quantity that matters.30
The framework of the decision unit is particularly suited for process tracing purposes since 
it facilitates isolating and examining the sequence of decisions that are made by breaking the 
sequence into parts. In the reconstruction of the flow of decisions and who was involved in 
which decision with what consequences to the decision process, actual choice comes to light.31 
25 Tansey, Oisín, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: a Case for Non-Probability Sampling’, PS: Political Science & Politics 
40(4) (2007) 765-772, 766-768.
26	 The	method	of	process	tracing	was	first	introduced	in	1979	by	Alexander	George	and	Andrew	Bennet.	See:	Alexander	L.	
George, ‘The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The ‘‘Operational Code’’ Belief 
System’, in: Lawrence S. Falkowski,(ed.), Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, CO 1979) 95–124; Alexander L. 
George and Timothy J. McKeown, ‘Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-making’, in: Robert F. Coulam and 
Richard A. Smith (eds.), Advances in Information Processing in Organizations II (Greenwich, CT 1985) 21-58. For the most recent 
insights see: George and Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.
27 See: Benoît Rihoux, ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Systematic Comparative Methods Recent 
Advances and Remaining Challenges for Social Science Research’, International Sociology 21 (5) (2006) 679-706.
28	 See:	Jeffrey	Checkel,	‘Tracing	Causal	Mechanisms’,	International Studies Review 8(2) (2006) 362-370.
29 Checkel, ‘Tracing Causal Mechanisms’, 363.
30 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge 2007) 178-180.
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3.4 Data Collection and Analysis
 
As this study seeks to shed light on the decisions made the senior civil and military decision-
makers that led to the use of military means, data on these actions has been collected through 
the earlier explained qualitative method. The data gathered for this study is composed of a 
large amount of primary and secondary documents and over a hundred semi-structured elite 
interviews with senior civil and military decision-makers. Document analysis, interviewing 
and observation, are structured by means of a set of broad topics and general questions 
reflecting the theoretical focus of this study. 
The analysis of the cases employs both a deductive and an inductive method since existing 
theories on human action, decision-making, civil military relations, and strategy are guiding 
the propositions formulated for the collection of the data. However, possible explanations as 
to what accounts for current developments in the translation of political goals into a military 
operation follows an inductive logic – informed by combining the theoretical insights with 
the empirical findings.
3.4.1 Elite Interviews
The data collection for the reconstruction of the series of actions that resulted in the use 
of British and Dutch military means in South Afghanistan relies heavily on the technique 
of elite interviewing. Particularly in political science, process tracing frequently involves 
the analysis of developments at the highest level of government.32 Consequently, elite 
interviews can, through direct and focused questioning, shed light on decisions and actions 
that lay behind an event or series of events. Through the interviewing of key actors (the 
elites) detailed information about the process in question can be gathered since accounts 
are obtained from the actors involved in the events under study. The nature of interviewing 
also allows interviewers to probe their subjects and gather information about the underlying 
context and events that have cumulated into the decisions that were made.33 
By interviewing key players in the decision-making process, data about the debates and 
deliberations that preceded decision-making and action taking can potentially supplement 
official accounts with first-hand testimonies.34 Hence, the most appropriate sampling 
procedures are those that identify key actors that have had most or important involvement 
with the decision-making process. As such, one is not to draw a representative sample of larger 
population actors that can be used as the basis to make generalisations about the population 
32 Tansey Oisín. ‘Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling’,  PS: Political Science & Politics 
40.04 (2007). PP 768-769.
33 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 768-769.
34 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 773
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as a whole, but to draw a sample that includes the most important or active players that have 
participated in the events under study. Consequently, random sampling runs against the 
logic of the process tracing method, as it creates a risk of excluding important respondents 
from the sample purely by chance.35
Instead, the goal with process tracing is to reduce randomness as much as possible.  The most 
important actors need to be identified and approached directly.36 As opposed to surveys, 
interviewing allows researchers to ask open-ended questions and enables the respondent to 
talk freely, without the constraint of having to answer according to fixed categories. In this 
way one can gather rich details about the thoughts and attitudes of key actors concerning 
the actions under study.37 By allowing researchers to communicate with key players directly, 
and by enabling them to frame that communication according to theoretical interests and 
priorities, interviews can facilitate the collection of data that is highly relevant and specific 
to the research objectives being pursued.38
Moreover, elite interviews relate to particular gaps in archival documents, as interviews 
can compensate for both the lack and limitations of documentary evidence. Important 
decision-making processes often lack an accompanying body of documentation, for various 
reasons such as that written materials were not created due to a perceived lack of importance 
in documenting the actions or because certain action were seen to be too sensitive to 
document in written form. In addition, important documents may also be lost, as they are 
unintentionally discarded or classification regulations can also warrant that key documents 
are withheld from public analysis.39 
While interviews may compensate for possible distortions in written sources, the 
interviewees themselves can misrepresent their own positions in ways that raise questions 
over the reliability of their statements. In particular, senior decision-makers may attempt to 
slant their accounts, and inflate or minimise their own role in an event or process depending 
on whether or not there is anything at stake.40 In addition, as observed by Alexander George 
and Andrew Bennett policy-makers often have an incentive to skew their accounts in order to 
portray a ‘careful, multi-dimensioned process of policymaking’ to the public.41
35 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 766-768. More on sampling for elite interviews see: Joel D. Aberbach and 
Bert A. Rockman, ‘Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews’, PS: Political Science and Politics 35(4) (2002) 673-676; Kenneth 
Goldstein,	‘Getting	in	the	Door:	Sampling	and	Completing	Elite	Interviews’,	PS: Political Science and Politics 35(4) (2002) 669-
672.
36 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 781.
37 Ibid., 768-769.
38 Ibid., 788.
39 Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the Study of the 
Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics 21(1) (2001) 73-80 cited in: Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 774.
40 Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 774.
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It follows from this observation that one of the most employed critiques of the method of 
(elite) interviewing refers to the objectivity and reliability of the provided information by 
the interviewees. In particular, interviews are often conducted in retrospect. Consequently, 
lapses of memory can limit the utility of these interviews.42 In order to critically evaluate 
the data collected by these interviews, four questions, as listed by George and Bennet, were 
employed for the evaluation of the information: who is speaking, who are they speaking to, 
for what purpose are they speaking, and under what circumstances? 43
An important point of caution when conducting elite interviews is that the interviewer 
should consider the ways in which possible power relations  between interviewer and 
interviewee can shape the production of the interview data.44 This is particularly important 
for this research, since many of the military respondents in the Dutch case are superior 
officers higher up the chain of command in relation to the interviewer. However, the most 
important military actors in the Dutch case have retired from active duty. As such, a power 
relation between them and the interviewer did not exist. As far as the active duty military 
respondents are concerned, they in no way exercised their potential power. Some superior 
officers, frustrated with the events that had unfolded in the run up to the deployment to 
Uruzgan, voiced some emotional accounts. At times, the interviewer went back to them and 
showed the impact of their provided response and the great degree of frustration, often 
voiced towards persons. Since it is not the intention of this research to get into personal 
fights and the settling of scores, the interviewer did caution against including inappropriate 
accounts and provided the respondents with the possibility of nuancing their comments. 
In-depth (semi-structured) interviews with the focus group of senior civil and military 
decision-makers listed below were executed. This decision unit is the main level of analysis 
since it is their task to provide guidance for the execution of military operations.  The opinions 
of the interviewees are not only an important source for reconstructing the process, but their 
experience and beliefs about how and why military means were used for the stabilisation 
effort in South Afghanistan are crucial to this research as well. Their behaviour is supposedly 
based on their ideas on what would be acceptable to the constituents. Orientations such as 
internationalism or pacifism relate to public notions of national roles, and build upon the 
structuring of the publics’ views by underlying core values.45 
Moreover, these strategically engaged agents must construct inferences about their 
counterparts in order to decide what best suits the achievement of their ends. Their own 
commitments, beliefs on the basis of which they are prepared to act, are located in the 
42 See: Mark Kramer, ‘Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?’, International Security 15(1) 
(1990) 212-218 cited in: Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing’, 775.
43	 George	and	Bennett,	Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 99.
44 See: Andras Bozoki, ‘Elite Interviews’, http://eurospheres.org/files/2011/04/10_Bozoki_Elite-interviews.pdf
45 Cantir and Kaarbo, ‘Contested Roles and Domestic Politics’, 11.
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minds of these agents.46 As Alexander Macleod points out, black-boxing senior decision-
makers would be perfidious since their communication is usually the outcome of a collective 
process, involving power struggles, policy disagreements and partisan infighting.47 As such, 
it is believed that the selection of this group of actors as the primary unit of analysis will best 
serve the possibility of reconstructing the events and activities. 
The Interviews 
General interviews were held during a pilot study which was executed to determine the focus 
and selection of cases. This pilot study was executed in September 2010 in Kandahar, South 
Afghanistan. Initially, the four countries operating in this region: Canada, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and the United States and their experiences converting their political 
ambition to contribute to the stabilisation of the Southern provinces were to be included in 
the study. The outcome of the pilot however indicated the desired in – depth reconstruction 
of the activities and events to only be possible if the case studies were limited to two cases 
(see case selection).  However, the interviews conducted during this pilot study have served 
for contextual purposes of the study.
The case related interviews were carried out with a selected group of actors within the 
senior civil and military decision-makers of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Generally speaking, the majority of them are working at the strategic level at either the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defence. This does not withstand that for specific 
parts of the reconstruction, such as the writing of the plan, actors that were employed at 
other levels within the respective organisations were interviewed. 
General Interviews (Context)
1. Scholars
2. Politicians and military 
Case related interviews
1. Politicians
2. Special advisors/political assistants
3.  Military planners (strategic and operational level)
4.  Diplomats
5.  Military commanders (operational and tactical level) 
46 Nicholas Onuf, ‘Speaking of Policy’, in: Vendulka Kubálková (ed.), Foreign Policy in a Constructed World (Armonk, NY 2001) 77-
95, 79-80.
47 Alex Macleod, ‘Just Defending National Interests? Understanding French Policy Towards Iraq Since the End of the Gulf War’, 
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The interviews conducted for contextual purposes were primarily used in chapter five that 
discusses the foreign and security policy and the civil military relations in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom as where the case related interviews evidently served to reconstruct 
the cases (chapter six and seven).  A list of all respondents is attached as an appendix to this 
dissertation. 
3.4.2 Document Analysis
Document analysis was used to acquire detailed information on why and how the military 
instruments of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were used for the stabilisation of 
South Afghanistan. This study relies on primary sources such as operational debriefs and 
reports, parliamentary reports, policy papers and secondary sources such as media coverage 
and academic publications. 
Access was granted to the Defence archives in Rijswijk, the Netherlands by the Ministry 
of Defence. In close coordination with one of their primary researchers, Rokus van den 
Bout, the required information was sought and selected both from their digital and printed 
archives. Classified information was used as means of verification and/or informing 
additional questions to the interviewees as will be addressed below. 
 
3.5 Reliability, Validity and Generalisability
Linking concepts to observations: connecting ideas with facts is a complex undertaking. 
During this process, an important question needs to be answered with regard to the 
measurement of validity about the concepts and facts, namely: ‘do the observations 
meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the concepts?’. This question addresses whether 
operationalisation and the scoring of cases sufficiently reflect the concept the researcher 
seeks to measure and as a result addresses both reliability and validity.48
Although measurement of validity is interconnected with causal inference, it also 
concerns the relation between measurement validity and disputes about the meaning of 
concepts:  ‘The clarification and refinement of concepts is a fundamental task in political 
science, and carefully developed concepts are, in turn, a major prerequisite for meaningful 
discussions of measurement validity. Contextual specificity of measurement validity—an 
issue that arises when a measure that is valid in one context is invalid in another’.49 
48 Robert Adcock, ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research’, American Political 
Science Association 95(3) (2001) 529-546, 529.
49 Adcock, ‘Measurement Validity’, 529.
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The conceptualisation of inquiry of data by definition includes a frame as to what is in fact 
the proper way to generate scientific insights. Taking into consideration that explorative 
qualitative research is habitually viewed to be of less standing than quantitative research 
the argument made here is that qualitative research does in fact fulfil a profound role in the 
process of requiring scientific knowledge. It should be noted that even though explorative 
research in itself does not evolve in ‘definitive’ knowledge nor does the testing of hypotheses. 
The testing of hypotheses is aimed at tentatively accepting or rejecting certain theoretical 
explanations of phenomena, not definite by nature.50 
The potential for generalisable results – albeit modest - for Western European states is 
believed to be included in the case study selection: both countries represent two important 




The study does contain certain limitations. First of all, access to classified data – as has been 
allowed for the Dutch case - could not be arranged for the British case. Archive material was 
important for the triangulation of the gathered data through the interviews. However, many 
studies and reports about the decision-making process on the deployment to Helmand have 
appeared in the United Kingdom and public hearings have been conducted. As such, much 
secondary data could be collected allowing triangulation purposes for the British case as 
well.
Secondly, this study heavily relies on elite interviews and, as such, on the memories of the 
interviewees. In retrospect, the facts present in their minds might not be accurate or might 
even have been manipulated for self-serving purposes. By means of cross checking the data 
from these interviewees with other involved actors who were interviewed and by means of 
triangulation with archive material and other secondary data, the data collected with these 
interviews were carefully selected before being presented. This does not withstand a certain 
level of subjectivity present in the facts recollected from these interviews but the level of this 
potential subjectivity is believed to be validated by, as mentioned earlier, triangulation with 
other sources. 
Thirdly, it is the essence of interpretive research to study the acts of social agents. 
Ultimately, observation is interpretation: social reality constitutes meanings and they 
cannot be studied in any ‘objective’ manner. This could be viewed as a limitation to this 
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study.   However, the impossibility of objective observation should by no means justify not 
trying to pragmatically interpret social reality with as much detachment as possible. Finally, 
‘to know if social reality is really real makes no analytical difference: the whole point is to 
observe whether agents take it to be real and to draw the social and political implications 
that result’.51
Lastly, the fact that the author is an active duty officer comes with advantages and 
disadvantages. The chief advantage of being an active duty officer is her field experience and 
being in the privileged position of getting access to various (classified) operational documents 
and reports. This also constitutes the disadvantages of her position, namely she is ‘part’ of 
the instrument under study and much of the data she is allowed access to, is classified. By 
being aware that she already has some preconceived ideas based on her experience, she tried 
to keep distance and whenever needed received feedback from her supervisors. The classified 
information about both the planning and the execution of the mission and operational 
debriefs she gained access to, served to formulate the questions for the semi-structured 
interview lists as designed for the structured and focussed comparison. The information has 
been triangulated with the information gathered through the interviews and has served as a 
reliability test of the gathered qualitative data. 
51  Pouliot, ‘The Essence of Constructivism’, 328-329.
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Intervention of (Western) powers has a long history in Afghanistan. It is not without a great 
degree of pride and dignity that Afghans can refer to a history in which no occupying power 
has successfully conquered Afghan soil and its people for a long period in time. Throughout 
history, only some1 have come close to claiming a long lasting victory over the Afghans, but 
military experiences of more recent times all resulted in disenchantments.2 Against the 
background of these disillusioned military endeavours, one would have expected a certain 
degree of modesty with regard to what can be achieved. 
Yet, many Western nations and their respective (military) organisations entertained 
ambitious goals in terms of changing the regime, beliefs and habits of the inhabitants of 
Afghanistan.3 In turn, the majority of the Afghans were not in favour of the imposition 
of foreign models of, amongst others, governance and development. As posited in 
Jonathan Steele’s book, Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths, the Afghan people 
predominantly want to be left alone, leaving the presence of foreign troops likely to be one 
of the major causes of current instability.4 
This chapter serves merely to set out the developments in Afghanistan since the 
intervention of the ‘coalition of the willing’: a formation of Western military powers led by 
the United States that invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 until NATO’s expansion to the 
South of Afghanistan in the summer of 2006.  As such, this chapter is designed to provide an 
understanding of the environment in which the Netherlands and the United Kingdom felt 
they needed to engage by contributing to NATO’s expansion in this country.  
 
1 Alexander the Great in fact reached a high degree of popularity in Afghanistan. In his quest for the country he did not 
experience a high degree of resistance. See: Jonathan Steele, Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths (London 
2011). But also the Arabs, Mongols, and Persians have established long-lasting empires in Afghanistan. A point raised by 
Afghanistan expert Robert Johnson, personal conversation with author, Oxford, July 2014.
2	 See:	 Thomas	 Barfield,	 Afghanistan: a Cultural and Political History (Princeton 2010); Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military 
History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Philadelphia 2009); Robert Johnson, The Afghan Way of War: Culture 
and Pragmatism: A Critical History (London 2011); William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York 2009).
3 Astri Suhrke, When More is Less: the International Project in Afghanistan (London 2011).



































































The pursuit of stabilisation of Afghanistan has been hindered by the number of strategic 
goals set for the mission, as well as in the shift of priorities. The initial goal was defeating 
Al-Qaida and Taliban and by doing so eradicating their ability to threaten the West as well 
as regional neighbors (2001); this then changed to the development of the Afghan economy 
– the security and development agenda (2002 onwards); the building of good governance 
(2005); the creation of stability, possibly via deals or negotiation with the Taliban (2008), 
resulting in a reconsideration of the strategic priorities5 and, recently, to the planning of a 
way out without having achieved any of these goals. 
As articulated in most writings about the current instability in Afghanistan, the ongoing 
insurgency is mostly addressed as the main hindrance to a lasting (political) settlement. 
When looking at Afghanistan, one can actually distinguish four of the strongest statistical 
predictors required for a successful insurgency: for one, large parts of the population are 
excluded from politics and estranged from the state authority; secondly, an unresponsive, 
inept, and corrupt government; thirdly, various militant groups of people (mainly referred to 
as insurgents) committed to destroying such government; and fourthly, a significant popular 
sympathy for the insurgents6, often engendered by either ethnical ties or unemployment.7
The insurgents in Afghanistan are comprised of various groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-
Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters, criminal groups (often drug related) and 
various tribal militias, and, lastly, one should not overlook a large group of frustrated citizens 
who join insurgent groups hoping to ensure or to improve the quality of their lives, or defend 
particular, and sometimes nefarious, ‘interests’. Sometimes the actions of the insurgents are 
coordinated but usually they are isolated.8 
The distinction between these insurgent groups is that the Taliban is seeking political 
power, groups like Hezb-i Islami, the Haqqani network and the foreign fighters - such as 
Al Qaeda - are mainly there to fight the Western ‘infidels’, and the criminal groups and the 
militia are fighting to maintain the status quo in order to ensure their income and power 
base. According to Taliban expert Antonio Giustozzi, the Taliban has transformed itself into 
5 Christopher Dandekker. ‘From Victory to Success’ in: Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), Modern War and the Utility 
of Force: Challenges, Methods and Strategy (New York 2010) 16-38, 26.
6 David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV, War by Other Means, Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency: 
RAND Counterinsurgency Study- Final Report	(Santa	Monica,	Arlington	and	Pittsburgh	2008)	13-14.			
7 See: James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war’,  American political science review 97 (1) (2003) 75-
90; James D. Fearon, Kimuli Kasara and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnic minority rule and civil war onset’,  American Political Science 
Review 101 (1) (2007) 187-193.
8 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study	 IV	 (Santa	 Monica,	 Arlington	 and	 Pittsburgh	
2008). The point of defending particular nefarious interests was a point raised by Robert Johnson in a personal conversation 
with	the	author	about	the	background	of	the	conflict	(Oxford,	July	2014).
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what he coins a ‘neo Taliban’ movement successfully aligning the clergy, the militants, and 
the populace as a result of abusive and factionalised local authorities.9 However, Cyrus Hodes 
and Mark Sedra refute the use of the term neo-Taliban. According to them, it is not accurate to 
talk about ‘neo-Taliban’, as the Taliban never disappeared but simply blended into the wider 
population and regrouped. As such, the Taliban-led insurgency is not so much a monolith 
but rather an amalgam of various groups with different motivations, from peasants fighting 
for a decent wage to madrassa-indoctrinated youths or villagers following the directions of 
tribal or clan elders, or even foreign fighters and Afghan exiles.10 Whether or not the Taliban 
has renewed itself, it has been very successful in establishing temporary coalitions between 
several deprived groups and powerbrokers threatened by the authorities and foreign forces. 
Consequently, the heterogeneity of the ‘spoilers’ challenging the Afghan state complicates 
the design of the counterinsurgency strategy, since various groups and issues need to be 
addressed.11 
In the Afghan insurgency, the competence - and, in some areas, incompetence - of the 
indigenous government and its security forces have been critical factors. Also, the legitimacy 
of the state has been questioned by many Afghans (especially the insurgents) due to the 
direct intervention by foreign forces who have installed the central government in Kabul. 
The weakness of state administration, excessive tribal-based government patronage and the 
varying levels of corruption among the Afghan police and military forces, other government 
institutions and administrators, has alienated large segments of the population and provided 
a breach for the Taliban to penetrate.12 Moreover, the Taliban has been able to adapt quite 
fast and has become a learning organisation. Its adaptability has enabled it to gain the upper 
hand among the population in a number of key provinces.13 The fact that major Western 
military organisations have not been able to learn and adapt as fast as insurgents such as the 
Taliban creates a major disadvantage in their counterinsurgency operations. This does not 
withstand the fact, that in their response to the insurgent activities, the Western militaries 
adapted their tactics as well.14
The whole undertaking has been complicated further by the absence of an effective 
political strategy that envisaged at least the possibility of political accommodation with 
9 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York 2008) 231.
10 Cyrus Rhodes and Mark Sedra, ‘Chapter Two: Spoiler Groups and the Anti-government Insurgency’ in: Idem, The Search for 
Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. The Adelphi Papers 391 (Londen 2007) 17-34, 25. The point of Afghan exiles was a point raised 
by	Robert	Johnson	in	a	personal	conversation	with	the	author	about	the	background	of	the	conflict	(Oxford,	July	2014).
11 Mirjam Grandia Mantas, ‘The 3D Approach and Counterinsurgency. A Mix of Defence, Diplomacy and Development. The 
Case of Uruzgan’ (Master thesis, Leiden 2009).
12 Austen Long, On ‘Other War’, Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, Arlington and 
Pittsburgh	2002);	Giustozzi,	Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 11-29.
13 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 97-139.


































































insurgents thereby treating military power as but one instrument among others for 
achieving strategic goals. Such an approach would have identified the obstacles to such an 
outcome, especially mutual mistrust and potential spoilers, and the available sources of 
leverage to establish a structured, multiparty dialogue. Yet, apart from the reintegration and 
reconciliation program, no such international efforts were made until 201115, and a timetable 
for the withdrawal of American forces - the key Taliban demand - was instituted unilaterally, 
without any attempt to use it as leverage for a political settlement.16
Some argue the current instability, rather than being due to local traditions, is more 
the result of decades of conflict and the intentional dismantling of traditional structures in 
conflict, thereby leaving extremist groups to fill the social, political and security vacuum.17 
However, most accounts of the battles fought in Afghanistan and about their ‘ways of war’, 
are troubled with stereo types and more often than not portray a Western perspective.18
 
4.3 Intervening in Afghanistan in Pursuit of Osama: The Coalition of the Willing (2001)
The initial intervention in Afghanistan was designed to retaliate for the attack on the Twin 
Towers and the Pentagon on American soil. The United States had asked NATO to invoke 
article five – which prescribes a joint effort of all NATO member states to regard an attack 
on one of its allies as an attack on all.19 Soon thereafter, a ‘coalition of the willing’20 was 
composed and started its joint (predominantly air) operations against Al Qaeda and its host, 
the Taliban. Using the Northern Alliance as its primary agent to take up most of the ground 
fighting, international special forces were operating in the bordering areas with Pakistan 
(Baluchistan) trying to locate and eliminate Al Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden. Both 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands provided personnel and equipment to support the 
mission albeit in different shapes and sizes. 
15 Talatbek Masadykov, Antonio Giustozzi, and James Michael Page, ‘Negotiating with the Taliban: Toward a Solution for 
the	Afghan	Conflict’,	Crisis	States	Research	Centre	Working	Papers	66	(London	2010);	Steven	A.	Zyck,	‘Former	Combatant	
Reintegration and Fragmentation in Contemporary Afghanistan: Analysis’, Conflict, Security & Development 9(1) (2009) 111-
131;	Deedee	Derksen,	‘Peace	from	the	Bottom-Up?	The	Afghanistan	Peace	and		Reintegration	Program’,	PRIO	Paper,	Oslo,	
PRIO, 2011.
16 Waldman, ‘System Failure’, 835.
17 Masadykov and Giustozzi, ‘Negotiating with the Taliban’, 1-2.
18 Johnson, The Afghan Way of War, 1-2.
19 Waldman, ‘System Failure’.
20	 This	initially	was	a	coalition	between	American	and	British	forces	and	Afghan	militias,	but	soon	thereafter	reinforced	with	
Special Forces elements from Norway, Canada, Germany, Australia and New Zealand.  
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Soon after the Taliban government was toppled at the end of 2001, the United Nations had 
convened a relatively diverse but unrepresentative group of Afghans in Bonn to agree on 
a power-sharing arrangement that would bring different Afghan factions into an interim 
administration led by Hamid Karzai. The Bonn Agreement was to facilitate the establishment 
of a centralised and democratic state and advance a more representative and legitimate 
administration. However, it ‘imposed a victor’s peace’ on the country and excluded key Pashtun 
figures and Taliban supporters from any (political) role in Afghanistan.21 Furthermore, the 
modernisation goals as formulated by Western (donor) nations were highly ambitious and 
lacked the inclusion of the local perspective and understanding of the power politics at play.22
Also, the reconstruction efforts of the international community were often poorly 
coordinated and in addition the financial assistance provided for various projects were 
frequently exploited by local power-holders. Hence, the financial resources provided by the 
foreign forces, especially the American funds that were made available, unintentionally 
engendered corruption and also reinforced criminal, patronage and insurgent networks.23
The materialisation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and a UN Special 
Political Assistance Mission (UNAMA) emerged out of the United Nation’s Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 1386) in 2001. This resolution provided Western powers the mandate to 
engage politically and militarily in Afghanistan.24
In 2001, the United Nations desired a comprehensive nation building effort in order 
to reconstruct the country. By doing so, they insisted the foreign forces would assist with 
expanding the influence of the central government in Kabul throughout the rest of the 
country.25  In fact, shortly after Hamid Karzai had been installed as the interim president of 
Afghanistan, UN officials, and others, called for ISAF to expand its operations beyond the 
central capital. However, American officials believed a traditional peacekeeping approach 
would be ineffective in Afghanistan. In addition, their European allies were unwilling to 
deploy large numbers of troops throughout Afghanistan. Thus, an alternative was provided 
by the Americans in the summer of 2002 as a response to the desire as voiced by the United 
Nations and the Afghan president to expand the legitimacy of the central governance; 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).26 
21 James F. Dobbins, ’America’s Role in Nation-Nuilding: From Germany to Iraq’, Survival 45(4) (2003) 87-110.
22	 Rubin	Barnett	and	Humayun	Hamidzada,	‘From	Bonn	to	London:	Governance	Challenges	and	the	Future	of	State	Building	in	
Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 14(1) (2007) 8-25, 8; Suhrke, When More is Less.
23 Waldman, ‘System Failure’, 827.
24 Masadykov and Giustozzi, ‘Negotiating with the Taliban’, 1.
25 Robert Johnson, The Afghan Way of War, 277.
26 These teams were originally named Joint Regional Teams. On the request of President Karzai they were renamed into PRTs since 
he wanted to emphasise the importance of reconstruction. See: Michael J. McNerney, ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction in 


































































The task for the PRTs was to expand the legitimacy of the central government of Kabul.27 
The first three PRTs were deployed by the United States between the end of 2002 and March 
2003.28 The PRT Working Principles, issued in February 2003, identified three areas of 
activity: security, central government support and reconstruction.29 The teams consisted of 
60 to 100 soldiers and Afghan advisors and representatives from civilian agencies like the 
State Department, the US Agency for International Development, and the US Department of 
Agriculture.30
The international interest in Afghanistan and consequently the commitment of military 
forces quickly diminished as the United States and the United Kingdom were preparing 
themselves to invade Iraq in the first quarter of 2003. Suddenly, the earlier rhetoric that 
Afghanistan needed to be reconstructed in order to prevent another terrorist attack had 
become unpopular. The new threat was believed to have emerged in Iraq, and as such 
diverted all attention to Bagdad. 
 
4.4 A Collective Effort Towards Building Peace: NATO’s Arrival (2003)
Up until 2003, ISAF primarily operated in and around Kabul. The American-led mission 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the rest of the country was aimed at countering 
terrorists. However, at the end of 2003, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG), Lakhdar Brahimi, requested ISAF to move beyond Kabul and in fact assume 
responsibility for the whole of Afghanistan, be it in a phased manner. This request was also 
heavily influenced by the American need to relieve military troops for their operations in 
Iraq.31
27 A central point remains to be whether the central government of Kabul was granted with legitimacy amongst its 
constituents	in	the	first	place.	This	debate	however	carries	well	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	
28	 The	first	three	pilot	PRTs	were	established	in	Gardez,	Bamiyan	and	Kunduz	in	early	2003.	Three	more	were	then	established	
in Mazar-i-Sharif (British-led), Parwan and Herat. See: Gerard Mc Hugh and Lola Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
and Humanitarian– Military Relations in Afghanistan. Save the Children 2004 London, 21.
29 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but not Sufficient. Danish Institute for International Studies (2005 
Copenhagen) 11.
30 Michael J McNerney, ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, 32. As described by McNerney: ‘The initial PRT 
organizational	chart	focused	on	the	military	structure,	with	a	dotted	line	connecting	to	“Afghan	Government,	government	
organizations (e.g. USAID), State Department, NGOs, and UN’. Later charts proposed integrating State and USAID, as 
well as the US Departments of Justice, Education, Agriculture, and other agencies. For many months, competing PRT 
organizational	 charts	 floated	 around	 Washington,	 US	 Central	 Command	 and	 Coalition	 headquarters’.	 See:	 McNerney,	
‘Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, 36.
31 Astri Suhrke, ‘A contradictory mission? NATO from stabilization to combat in Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 15.2 
(2008): 214-236
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Hence, on 11 August  2003, NATO assumed command and coordination of ISAF. Two months 
later, the Security Council authorised Resolution 1510 (UNSC 2003) allowing the expansion 
of ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. Consequently, the First German Netherlands 
Corps was sent to Afghanistan to prepare the ground for NATO’s arrival.32 ISAF’s expansion 
in terms of both geography and function advanced so gradually, unfolding into a particularly 
complex command structure, that the qualitative transformation of the mission went largely 
unnoticed.33
The objectives of NATO as articulated in their plan were first and foremost to stabilise and 
reconstruct Afghanistan. Their tasks had derived from UN resolution 1386 which called upon 
NATO to disarm militias, reform the justice system, train a national police force and army, 
provide security for elections, and lastly, combat the narcotics industry.34
These various different objectives however were not clearly delineated. Consequently, 
their inter-relationship and priority remained vague and had not been operationalised. In 
addition, the ISAF plan contained what Matt Cavanagh described to be, ‘the classic strategic 
mistake of being neither one thing nor the other; neither light-touch and pragmatic nor full-
blooded and properly resourced’.35
The primary vehicle for NATO to achieve its stated ambition of extending its operations 
further throughout the country, were the PRTs. As such, in 2003, NATO adopted the American 
developed PRT concept36.  NATO’s expansion was initiated by taking over command of the 
military component of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz37 in 
December 2003. Six months later, at the NATO summit meeting in Istanbul, NATO announced 
32 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003) see: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/
resolution_1510.pdf (last accessed 10.05.14).
33 Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’.
34 See: Paul Gallis and Vincent Morelli, NATO in Afghanistan: a Test of the Transatlantic Alliance. Congressional Research Service 
(2008 Washington DC).
35	 Matt	Cavanagh,	‘Ministerial	Decision-Making	in	the	Run-Up	to	the	Helmand	Deployment’,	The RUSI Journal 157(2) (2012) 48-
54, 49.
36 There is no blue print for the PRTs in terms of size, composition and operational style but they do however share a number 
of common features: they are joint teams of civilian and military personnel consisting of 50-300 personnel, they are 
generally made up by military personnel (90-95 per cent of total), political advisors and development experts. The civil 
military	configuration	of	the	teams	was	designed	to	 improve	civil	military	coordination	and	enhance	the	quality	of	the	
military ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns by drawing on civilian expertise and facilitating the dispersal of government funds 
for relief and reconstruction projects and security sector reform. The level of civil-military integration varies between 
the PRTs and each PRT has been tailored to the mission requirements in their respective regions to ensure that they have 
the capabilities suited to the local situation. The purpose of the PRTs is to expand the legitimacy of the Afghan central 
authority to the various provinces and rural areas of Afghanistan. In order to achieve this goal the PRTs have to improve the 
security	in	the	provinces	by	promoting	the	rule	of	law	and	to	facilitate	and	support	the	(re)construction	process.	The	first	
three PRTs were launched between December 2002 and March 2003. See: Jakobsen,. PRTs in Afghanistan, 11-12.



































































it would establish PRTs in North Afghanistan. This process was accomplished in October 
2004, marking the conclusion of the first phase of NATO’s expansion.38
The positioning of PRTs to the north and west of Afghanistan had occurred within the 
framework of the formal expansion of NATO’s command to areas outside Kabul – respectively, 
Stage 1 (to the north), and 2 (to the west).39 However, the expansion of NATO-ISAF through a 
PRT network generated a new dichotomy in the sense that two different ‘types’ of PRTs with 
different mandates were operating in Afghanistan: US/Coalition-led PRTs with the support 
of (but no explicit mandate from) the international community and in fact at the request of 
the Afghan government and NATO-ISAF PRTs mandated through ISAF’s mandate from the UN 
Security Council. This distinction reflects two separate legal ‘regimes’ for the different types 
of PRT (Coalition-led, and ISAF-led).40
A further dichotomy advanced between the US lead operation Enduring Freedom and the 
ISAF operations led by NATO, since the American forces present in Afghanistan were primarily 
engaged with counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. This seemed to drive a wedge 
between the two from the outset since the American style of operations was perceived to be 
working against the trust of the ISAF mission. Furthermore, the international community had 
been preoccupied with the events in Iraq and so the requirement of stabilising Afghanistan 
had lost momentum.41 
However, the PTRs remained a primary vehicle for NATO nations to contribute to the 
stabilisation effort in Afghanistan. Countries like Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 
Netherlands, viewed their PRT operations in North Afghanistan as relatively successful.42 
In March 2005, NATO announced its plans for Stage 3 of its operations in Afghanistan. 
This phase entailed assuming command over the most notorious regions: the Southern 
provinces, home to the Pashtuns and the Taliban. By this time, as will be evidenced in the 
following chapters, detailed planning concerning the deployment of military forces to South 
Afghanistan were well underway in Ottawa, London and The Hague. 
38 See: International Security and Assistance Force,  ‘About ISAF, History’, http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (last 
accesses 10.06.2014).
39 Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’.
40 Gerard Mc Hugh and Lola Gostelow, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian– Military Relations in Afghanistan. Save the 
Children (2004 London) 22.
41 Michael Clarke, ‘The Helmand Decision’, Whitehall Papers 77(1) (2011) 5-29, 10-11; Ali A. Jalali, ‘Afghanistan: Regaining 
Momentum’, Parameters 37(4) (2007) 5-29.
42 Mirjam Grandia Mantas, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, Militaire Spectator  179(10) (2010) 480-492.
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4.5 Disillusionment: From Assisting to Fighting (2006)
The attention of the international community was directed towards Afghanistan yet again, by 
the time NATO decided to assume responsibility – as explained earlier - for the stabilisation 
of the whole country in a phased manner. In addition, the earlier voiced [2001] ideological 
concerns about Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists [directly positioning the country 
in the struggle against global terrorism] were reiterated. Also, there seemed to be an 
international sense of obligation to help reconstruct the war torn country. This engendered 
the resource to the use of military force to establish the required preconditions for economic 
reconstruction in line with evolving UN and NATO doctrines of peacebuilding. 43 
Next to these ideological motivations, another less alluring but nevertheless very clear 
interest-based motivation surfaced: the credibility of the Alliance. The rationale of it entailed 
the credibility and future of NATO itself. Hence, the credibility argument was greatly used by 
governments that had already sent troops to the South and wanted other NATO members to 
reinforce their efforts as well. By publicly declaring NATO’s expansion to the South to be the 
ultimate test of the Alliance’s credibility and relevance, and consequently acquiring a combat 
role, NATO members were seen to provide the argument a self-fulfilling character.44
NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan had instigated a debate about whether NATO was 
up to the job of conducting combat operations. It had taken on a complex mission of which 
the original mandate was vaguely defined as ‘security assistance’. However, by dispatching 
combat troops and expanding its command to the Southern provinces, NATO had taken on 
the additional task of defeating the Taliban. This was in fact the first ‘out of area’ mission and, 
in addition to that, the first ground combat mission of the Alliance since its establishment.45 
However, the force contributing nations, committing their military troops for NATO’s 
expansion to the South chose – perhaps unconsciously - to downplay the fact that they 
were going to war. This in itself was not surprising since after the Iraq invasion combat 
missions, initiated and requested by the United States, had become domestically sensitive 
in most European nations. Therefore the rationale for yet another battle, again in the Afghan 
theatre, was not as persuasive as it had been in the aftermath of 9/11. Moreover, the planned 
operations in the South were assessed to include a significant risk of casualties.46
Since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, the situation in Southern Afghanistan had 
remained relatively quiet. At least up until 2004, limited insurgent activity mirrored by a 
43 Carl Robichaud, Remember Afghanistan? A Glass Half Full, on the Titanic’, World Policy Journal 23(1)  (2006) 17-24; Suhrke, ‘A 
Contradictory Mission?’; Ali A. Jalali, ‘The Future of Afghanistan’, Parameters 36(1) (2006) 4-19.
44 Clarke, ‘The Helmand Decision’, 11-12 Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’.
45 Gallis and Morelli, NATO in Afghanistan: a Test of the Transatlantic Alliance; Suhrke, ‘A Contradictory Mission?’.


































































very light Afghan government and American military presence best describes the situation. 
The region had, however, been the heartland of the Taliban from its emergence in 1994. The 
conservative Pashtun and rural nature of the region, dominated by the Tajiks and Uzbeks of 
the Northern Alliance, meant that its inhabitants were culturally and politically opposed to 
President Karzai’s Kabul-based government. In fact, the foreign presence had intervened into 
an ongoing civil war between the Taliban and Northern Alliance, which although quiescent 
between late 2001 and 2003, had not been ended. On top of that, the severe economic 
underdevelopment and chronic neglect by central government of the region ever since 2001 
had worsened the situation even more. 47  
Perhaps naïve or maybe ignorant, the international military forces present in Afghanistan 
underestimated the Taliban’s resurgence in the Southern provinces. Moreover, hardly any 
effective steps were taken to address regional dynamics that perpetuated the conflict, 
especially the sanctuary and support provided to the Afghan Taliban by Pakistan.48 NATO 
had communicated that it expected to encounter resistance to its expansion to the South 
but believed it would be able to pacify the region through an integrated stabilisation effort. 
This concept, now known as the comprehensive approach, at the time became the 
dominant approach within the field of stabilising (post) conflict states. It encompassed an 
integration of diplomatic, military and developmental efforts directed towards creating a 
sustainable stable state.49 The concept adhered to various dominant normative beliefs about 
how Western states are to transform fragile states and promote democracy as stabilising 
cement.50 It informed the way Afghanistan’s future was discussed at the international 
conference ‘Afghanistan Compact’ held in London (31 January – 1 February 2006). At the 
47 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 60; Adam  Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival 51(1) (2009) 29-
60, 30-31.
48 See e.g. the leaked ISAF report, State of the Taliban: Detainee Perspectives. International Security and Assistance Force (2012 
Kabul), which describes ‘the Government of Pakistan’s persistent and fundamental role in the Afghan insurgency’ and 
records that ‘senior Taliban leaders meet regularly with ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence] personnel, who advise 
on	strategy’.	See	also	the	leaked	US	cable	of	23.09.2009	from	Ann	Patterson,	US	ambassador	in	Islamabad:	‘There	is	no	
chance	that	Pakistan	will	view	enhanced	assistance	levels	in	any	field	as	sufficient	compensation	for	abandoning	support	
to these groups [the Taliban and others], which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India. 
Despite this, the US has given Pakistan a total of US$24 billion of assistance since 2001’ , cited from Waldman, ‘System 
Failure’,  827; Seth G. Jones, ‘Averting failure in Afghanistan’, Survival 48(1) (2006) 111-128.
49 Mirjam Grandia Mantas, ‘Shafer Revisited–The Three Great Oughts of Winning the Hearts and Minds: Analysing the 
Assumptions Underpinning the British and Dutch COIN Approach in Helmand and Uruzgan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 24(4) 
(2013) 731-750.
50	 Astri	 Suhrke,	 ‘Reconstruction	 as	 Modernisation:	 the	 ‘Post-Conflict’	 Project	 in	 Afghanistan’,	 Third World Quarterly 28(7) 
(2007) 1291-1308; Michael J. Williams, ‘Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-building in 
Afghanistan’, International Peacekeeping 18(1) (2011) 64-78; Karsten Friis, The Politics of the Comprehensive Approach: The Military, 
Humanitarian and State-building Discourses in Afghanistan. NUPI Working Paper 773 (Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs,	2010).	
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conference, the donor countries committed themselves to the stabilisation of Afghanistan, 
outlined in a plan with a five year timeframe.51 
ISAF implemented the final stage of its expansion in October 2006, by taking over 
command of the international military forces present in East Afghanistan from the American 
led operation Enduring Freedom52 It introduced a comprehensive approach to stabilisation, 
operationalised through the establishment of ‘Afghan Development Zones’.53 The purpose of 
the ADZs is to connect security with development and vice versa, providing a visible sign to 
the Afghans that the international forces and the Afghan government actually are delivering 
improvement in their daily lives.  However, despite NATO’s revised operational plan, advancing 
a greater role for ISAF throughout the country aiming to achieve stability in a comprehensive 
manner, it could not make up for the already flawed international engagement.  This was 
primarily due to the fact that it had, yet again, not concerned itself with a political settlement 
of the problem.54 
 
4.6 Conclusion
The security and political situation in Afghanistan at the time when the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom decided to reinforce their military effort was deteriorating. After initial 
enthusiasm of both the efforts of coalition forces, and, later on, of NATO forces to stabilise 
and reconstruct the country, momentum had been lost. This was compounded with a shift 
of attention of the international community towards Iraq. A reinforcement of international 
troops and resources in Afghanistan was communicated by 2005. At that time, NATO was 
preparing itself to further expand its presence throughout Afghanistan. In fact, its ability 
to do so was perceived the ultimate test for the Alliance. Their renewed approach to the 
stabilisation of Afghanistan had been informed by a comprehensive plan to bring about 
equilibrium through the establishment of the Afghan Development Zones.
51	 Mike	Capstick,	‘The	Civil–Military	Effort	in	Afghanistan:	A	Strategic	Perspective’,	Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10(1) 
(2007).
52 See: http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (last accessed 10 June, 2014). However, as postulated by Rob Johnson OEF 
remained to have its own command and control structure until 2009 (Oxford, July 2014). 
53	 The	ADZ	concept	is	built	on	the	assumption	that,	if	a	geographically	defined	area	is	made	secure	for	the	local	population	
to live in providing time large-scale development projects and good governance,  those  residing  outside  the  ADZ  would 
also like to be part of a development zone. The focus lies on creating conditions in which the local population will cooperate 
with,	or	at	least	not	fight	against,	the	local	government	and	the	foreign	forces.	The	ultimate	aim	of	the	strategy	is	to	win	
hearts and minds and consequently undermining the basis for insurgent support. The means required to advance these 
objectives	are	not	available	in	theatre,	nor		are		they		being		made		available		in		sufficient		quantities		to		create		success	
within a  reasonable  time-frame. See: Grandia Mantas, ‘Shafer Revisited’; Peter D. Thruelsen, NATO in Afghanistan - What 
Lessons Are We Learning and Are We Willing to Adjust?. Danish Institute for International Studies (2007 Copenhagen) 10.  


































































However, a lasting political settlement had not been part of the initial efforts of the 
international community when it drafted the Bonn agreement. In fact, by excluding the 
most important party to the (national) conflict, the Taliban, the foundations for a potential 
insurgency were sowed. It is against this background that the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom were contemplating committing themselves to NATO’s expansion to the Southern 
provinces of Afghanistan: a region that had been troubled for many years, and had no 
appetite for another foreign intrusion.
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Chapter 5 The Strategic Context
 
5.1 Introduction
Once a state engages its armed servants into operations abroad, the assumption is that they 
are to attain a certain goal. A certain political objective, preferably deduced from the state’s 
foreign and security policy, is to guide the effort. However, policy visions do not exist in a 
vacuum. Rather, policies need to be interpreted by official agents and implemented. This 
turns out to be a fairly complex endeavour, especially in an interdependent world. Hence, 
foreign and security policy is an area of government where ‘delivery’ is particularly difficult 
often resulting in situations whereby formal decision-making structures are bypassed1 or 
become highly intricate. 
In this chapter, a short overview of the foreign and security policy behavior of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom will be presented, mostly in reference to actions 
regarding the deployment to South Afghanistan since this is the period under study. 
Subsequently, the relations between senior civil and military decision-makers of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom will be introduced. All in all, this chapter serves 
as an introduction to the context in which the decisions were taken to engage in South 
Afghanistan. 
 
5.2 The Netherlands: A Small Power with a Desire to Make a Difference
The Netherlands can be best characterised as a small power with limited military capabilities. 
Its economic relations benefit from stable international relations, and as such it strongly 
promotes the international rule of law, which is believed to be foundational for international 
stability. Consequently, the strategic cultural tenets present in Dutch security politics are to 
advance the international rule of law, project stability and use the military as an instrument 
to boost Dutch international significance, often in support of the major player in the 
international order: the United States.2
Even though it is problematic to identify a perpetual denominator in Dutch foreign 
politics, three pillars can be distinguished: Atlanticism, Europeanism, and multilateral 
1 William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain (London 1975) cited in: Paul Williams, ‘Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy?’ 
International Affairs 80(5) (2004) 909-929, 929.


































activities in support of the international legal order as the common denominators on which 
Dutch foreign and security politics are founded.3 
Some however argue not enough scientific evidence has been produced to be able to talk 
about a continuum in Dutch foreign policy.4 This could be explained by the fact that the 
earlier described aspects of Dutch foreign policy often lead to a ‘hedging strategy’.5 It allows 
the Netherlands not to be concrete about its choices and to neglect setting priorities.6 Or, as 
put by others, Dutch security politics are rather pragmatic, á la carte: whenever needed an 
idealistic argument is made but in turn all options are kept open.7
However, the one common thread throughout this á la carte behavior during the last 
subsequent Cabinets that ruled the Netherlands is that they all have unconditionally 
prioritised fulfilling the commitments of being a reliable NATO partner, also referred to as 
the ‘Atlantic Reflex’.8 Other alternatives like bolstering a collective security regime within 
the United Nations, or the European Union, were declined or mattered less to the political 
elite.9
Although the Netherlands has favored peace support operations, it has also accepted 
the need for high-intensity operations in order to remain relevant to the United States. This 
allowed the Netherlands to have a security policy acceptable both to Atlanticists as well as 
Europeans.10 Compounded with an increased role of the media and public opinion driven 
by moral considerations, the Dutch government often appears to be entrapped in its self-
chosen rhetoric of international justice.11
In a study addressing the behavior of the Netherlands political elite in the international 
arena when it comes to the distribution of foreign aid (from the perspective of the decision-
makers), it is viewed to be ‘activist’ (43.4 %). The study also points to another role of the 
3 Jan Rood and Marieke Doolaard, ‘Activisme als risico: buitenlands beleid onder Balkenende’,  Internationale Spectator 64(11) 
(2010) 567-571.
4 Yvonne Kleistra, Hollen of stilstaan : beleidsverandering bij het Nederlandse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken  (Delft 2002).
5 Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally, 300.
6 Aan het Buitenland gehecht. Over verankering en strategie van Nederlands buitenlandbeleid. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid (2010 Den Haag) 47, 55; Kleistra, Hollen of stilstaan.
7 Fred van Staden, ‘Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid en het Atlantische primaat. Over beknelde ambities en slijtende 
grondslagen’ in: Segers, M.L.L., Hellema, D.A. & Rood, J.Q.Th. (eds.), Bezinning op het buitenland. Het Nederlands buitenlands 
beleid in een onzekere wereld (Den Haag 2011) 9-30, 28.
8 Commissie Davids, Rapport commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak (Amersfoort 2010) via http://www.rijksoverheid.
nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids.html, 119; Staden, ‘Nederlands 
veiligheidsbeleid en het Atlantische primaat’, 9; Thomas Gijswijt, ‘De trans-Atlantische elite en de Nederlandse 
buitenlandse politiek sinds 1945’ in: Segers, M.L.L., Hellema, D.A. & Rood, J.Q.Th. (eds.), Bezinning op het buitenland. Het 
Nederlands buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld (Den Haag 2011) 31-46.
9 Staden, “Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid en het Atlantische primaat’, 9.
10 Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally, 300.
11 Bert Jan Verbeek and A. van der Vleuten,’The Domesticization of the Foreign Policy of the Nether lands (1989–2007): the 
Paradoxical Result of Europeanization and Internalization’, Acta Polit ica 43 (2008) 357–377, 365.
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Netherlands, namely a ‘powerbroker’ role (29.4 %).12 The activist role, defined as perception 
of opportunity in an orderly environment, does seem to be an overall feature in Dutch 
foreign politics.  
However, the activist role the Netherlands desires to play in the international arena is 
often ambitious but not necessarily an outcome of articulated goals in foreign and security 
policy. Apparently, the Netherlands is seen to lack a tradition to engage in farsighted policy 
making with regard to international politics seemingly resulting in tacit habitual reflexes 
and blind spots. Hence, there seems to be a profound belief amongst foreign policy makers 
that foreign policy is to be ad hoc and reactive by definition. In consequence, it would not 
require thoughtful analysis with a long term view. As such, one is unable to distinguish core 
values and interests in recent foreign and security policy papers. Only general terminology 
such as fostering international peace and security and the rule of law is found, but is not 
specifically related to a clear goal or objective or choice for that matter.13 
In addition, the change of a set order of topics on the international agenda into a dynamic 
constantly changing series of events has seriously complicated the activity of policy making. 
The use of military means especially became less obvious because a clearly defined enemy 
and a comprehensible bi-polar system had ceased to exist since the end of the Cold War. This 
allowed for a stretching of the concept ‘security’ which enabled organisations like NATO to 
maintain their relevance.14 Consequently, senior civil and military decision-makers in the 
Netherlands started to readjust their view on the use of military means into a structure-
focused understanding of interventions and a military emphasis on stability projection. The 
military would prefer not be deployed to fight wars, but rather contribute to stability in order 
to enable liberal institutions to take root.15 
In the early nineties, the Netherlands started participating in UN-mandated peace 
operations, and afterwards all expeditionary missions were justified on the basis of its 
contribution to stability. It has led to an aversion to ´waging wars ’, preferring to term 
deployments  ‘peace support’,  ‘stabilisation’ or ‘policing’ operations instead. It has also 
contributed to ‘stability’ being an overarching objective of Dutch security policy rather than 
decisively removing threats.16 In 2004, a so called ‘Stabilisation Fund’ was founded by the 
12	 The	study	identifies	four	role	nations	can	assume	with	regard	to	the	provision	of	foreign	aid	assistance:	1.	Good	neighbor:	
combines perception of constraint in an orderly environment; 2. Merchant role: combines perceptions of constraint with 
those of an anarchic international environment: 3. Power broker role: combines perception of opportunity in an anarchic 
environment: 4. Activist role: combines perception of opportunity in an orderly environment. Both the rhetoric and actions 
of the Netherlands is studied from 1975 until 1991. Breuning, ´Words and Deeds’.
13 Yvonne Kleistra, ‘Nederlands buitenlandbeleid als een donut’ in: Segers, M.L.L., Hellema, D.A. & Rood, J.Q.Th. (eds.), 
Bezinning op het buitenland. Het Nederlands buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld (Den Haag 2011) 123-150,  123, 137.
14 Kleistra, ‘Nederlands buitenlandbeleid als een donut’, 127, 141.
15 Korteweg, The Superpower, the Bridge-Builder and the Hesitant Ally, 291-292.

































Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its main goal is to fund activities that lie at the cross roads of 
peace, security, and, development and additionally invests in a variety of countries that are 
either in conflict or threatened by it.17   
The above mentioned characterisations seem to be confirmed by the government’s 
strong tendency to frame its international military operations as moral undertakings, with 
reference to the Netherlands’ constitutional aim of promoting the international legal order.18 
The use of euphemistic idiom in order not to employ the term ‘war’ is a trend throughout 
Dutch history. In colonial times, the Dutch framed conventional offensives in Indonesia as 
‘police actions’ and their objective was labelled as ‘bringing justice and security’.19 For recent 
missions, like Iraq but also Afghanistan, stabilisation seemed to be the most employed idiom 
and was further exploited for the mission to Uruzgan20 combined with the employment 
of terminology as ‘the Dutch approach’, a term commonly exercised ever since the Dutch 
mission to Iraq.21
It entails, as described by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘a vaguely defined idea of a better, 
subtle, comprehensive and culturally aware national approach – a ‘national way of war’’.22 
The concept has, as indicated by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot, been employed in 
the political arena to seek parliamentary approval and public commitment for the dangerous 
and controversial deployment to South Afghanistan’.23
All in all, the security posture of the Netherlands, both nationally and internationally, is 
best captured as a medium power, pursuing good relations with the United States through, 
among other things, being a trustworthy member of NATO and projecting the international 
17 Kleistra, ‘Nederlands buitenlandbeleid als een donut’, 131
18	 Anamarija	Kristić,	De	Staten-Generaal	en	de	inzet	van	de	Nederlandse	krijgsmacht.	Een	onderzoek	naar	de	parlementaire	
betrokkenheid bij de besluitvorming over deelname aan internationale militaire operaties (PhD dissertation, Tilburg 2012) 
202.
19 Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 
36(6) (2013) 867-897.
20 Brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en van Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken 
II, vergaderjaar 2005–2006. Dossier 27925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, Kamerbrief 221.
21 See Soeters et al., ‘Epilogue’ in Jan van der Meulen, Ad Vogelaar, Robert Beeres and Joseph Soeters (eds), Mission Uruzgan. 
Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam UP 2012), 329–30; Joseph L. Soeters, ‘Afghanistan Talks: 
Experiential	Isomorphism	in	Afghanistan’,	in	G.	Caforio,	G.	Kümmel	and	B.	Purkayastha	(eds),	Armed	Forces	and	Conflict	
Resolution:	 Sociological	 Perspectives	 (Bingley:	 Emerald	 Group	 Publishing	 2008);	 Joseph	 L.	 Soeters,	 Ethnic	 Conflict	
and Terrorism: The Origins and Dynamics of Civil Wars (Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2005). For an overview 
contradicting the image of the Netherlands as a consensus-seeking, internationally legalistic, peaceful nation see  Thijs 
Brocades Zaalberg and Arthur ten Cate, ‘A Gentle Occupation: Unravelling the Dutch Approach in Iraq, 2003–2005’, Small 
Wars and Insurgencies 23/1 (March 2012); Thijs Brocades Zaalberg, ‘The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-
Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2013; Petra Groen, ‘Colonial Warfare and Military Ethics’, 277–97; Willem Klinkert, 
Van Waterloo to Uruzgan and the contributions by Hans Blom, Martin Bossenbroek, Ben Schoenmaker and Arthur ten Cate 
in	Jan	Hoffenaar	(ed.),	Nederland	en	zijn	Militaire	Traditie	(The	Hague:	 Instituut	voor	Military	Geschiedenis	2003).	For	a	
perspective	of	military	practioners	on	the	matter,	see	:		Mirjam	Grandia	Mantas,‘The	3D	Approach	and	Counterinsurgency.	
A Mix of Defence, Diplomacy and Development. The Case of Uruzgan’. Master thesis (2009) University of Leiden.
22 Brocades Zaalberg, The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counter-Insurgency, 3. 
23 Interview Bot.
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stability needed for its economic position. Its military instrument is one facet of pursuing 
this goal but its use is by no means easily decided upon as will be explained later on in this 
chapter. 
5.2.1 The Senior Civil and Military Decision-Makers and Their Relations
The most prominent senior civil and military decision-makers at the strategic level in the 
Netherlands are the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence and his director of operations, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his director of Political Affairs, and the respective 
(political) advisors of the Prime Minister. These actors are all aided by their respective civil 
or military staff officers. The role of the Prime Minister himself rather depends on his own 
interest in the matter, more than a predefined role to which he is to adhere. The Prime 
Minister at the time, Jan Peter Balkenende, did not seem acquire an active role in setting the 
agenda or guiding the decision-making with regard to Dutch military endeavours.24  Like 
witnessed during decision-making events for military involvement in Iraq, he refrained from 
direct involvement and entrusted his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to plan the 
operation.25
The relationships between the Dutch senior civil and military decision-makers has been 
heavily influenced by the events of Srebrenica. In a study conducted by René Moelker, civil 
military relations during the decision-making process of the deployment of Dutch forces 
to Srebrenica were scrutinised.26  Ethics supposedly had the upper hand as the rationale or 
motive. Among the politicians, ‘Gesinnungsethik’27 was prevalent. These ethics - driven by 
good intentions and the wish to intervene in order to address humanitarian necessity - were 
dominant amongst the politicians whereas among the military a large group of persons was 
inclined to look at the consequences of possible outcomes of decisions. As such, they had 
24	 The	Davids	Comittee	was	entrusted	to	investigate	how	and	why	the	Dutch	government	had	come	to	support	the	American-
British invasion into Iraq. Amongst other things it concluded that the prime minister had not been in the lead during the 
decision-making process and had not concerned himself with the consequences of the decision: ‘The Prime Minister took 
little	or	no	lead	in	debates	on	the	Iraq	question;	he	left	the	matter	of	Iraq	entirely	to	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs.	Only	
after	January	2003,	did	the	Prime	Minister	take	a	strong	interest	in	this	issue.	However,	by	that	time,	the	stance	defined	by	
the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	was	firmly	established	as	government	policy’.	See:	Commissie	Davids,	Rapport commissie van 
onderzoek besluitvorming Irak, 529; the respondents, as will be shown in the next chapter, have indicated that in the case of 
Afghanistan, the Prime Minister had also refrained from acquiring an active role in the decision- making. 
25	 The	Prime	Minister	took	little	or	no	lead	in	debates	on	the	Iraq	question;	he	left	the	matter	of	Iraq	entirely	to	the	Minister	
of	Foreign	Affairs.	See:	Commissie	Davids,	Rapport commissie van onderzoek besluitvorming Irak, 529.
26 Moelker, ´Culture’s Backlash on Decision-making .́
27	 The	research	report	of	NIOD,	one	of	the	sources	used	for	the	study	by	Moelker,	 refers	to	Weber	and	his	differentiation	
between the two kinds of ethics exercised by civil and military agents. According to Max Weber, there are two kinds of 
ethics operating with bureaucracies: ‘Gesinnungsethik’ and ‘Verantwortungsethik’. Agents acting on ‘Gesinnungsethik’ 
(ethic of intentions) presumably do not take the consequences of their decisions or actions into consideration but act on 
good intentions.  Those agents who act on ‘Verantworungsethik’ (ethic of responsibility) consider the consequences of 


































voiced their grave concerns against the deployment of forces.28 Yet, ever since the end of 
the last century, the relations between the civil and military senior decision-makers have 
evolved - especially since integrated missions to Iraq and Afghanistan - into quite a robust 
and professional level. 
Decision-Making Process for the Use of Military Means
The use of military means has by no means been easily decided upon ever since the fall of 
the enclave of Srebrenica.29 This was a defining moment for the Netherlands when it comes 
to the use of military means for international missions.  In July 1995, thousands of Muslims, 
officially under the protection of the United Nations and its Dutch peacekeepers, were killed 
by Serbian militaries. The inability of the Dutch forces to prevent the massacre of these men 
has structured the Dutch views on use of force 30 and military interventions to a great extent.31 
Ever since, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence have tried to carve 
out a new role for the Netherlands on the world stage and for their military.32 This recourse 
to rules and standard operating procedures is likely when consequential calculations have 
produced prior catastrophes33 as has been the case with the deployment of Dutch forces 
to Srebrenica. The Netherlands wanted to contribute its forces – also showing off its newly 
established air mobile brigade – to restoring peace in the Balkans.34 This was a decision in 
which costs and benefits were reflectively calculated, but it turned out to be disastrous. 
28 Moelker,. ´Culture’s Backlash on Decision-making ,́ 16.
29	 For	 the	official	 report	about	 the	 fall	of	 the	enclave	see:	http://www.srebrenica.nl/Pages/OOR/23/379.bGFuZz1OTA.html	
(last accessed 12.08.2013) and studies about the fall of the enclave: Erna Rijsdijk, ‘Lost in Srebrenica: Responsibility and 
Subjectivity in the Reconstructions of a Failed Peacekeeping Mission’ (PhD dissertation, Amsterdam 2012); Christ Klep, 
‘Somalië, Rwanda,	Srebrenica.	De	nasleep	van	drie	ontspoorde	vredesmissies’	(PhD	Dissertation,	Utrecht	2008).
30 Jan van der Meulen and  Joseph Soeters, ´Dutch Courage: The Politics of Acceptable Risks ,́  Armed Forces & Society 31(4) 
(2005)  537-558.
31 The decision to become one of the main suppliers of troops for a peace mission moved many at the time. Dutch 
politics were dominated by the call to intervene on moral grounds. This humanitarian motivation, coupled with 
the	 ambition	 to	 improve	 Dutch	 credibility	 and	 prestige	 in	 the	 world,	 led	 the	 Netherlands	 to	 offer	 to	 dispatch	
the Air Mobile Brigade. By playing down the possible risks of the behaviour of the warring parties so much, a 
large circle of those involved in this policy, and in particular its advocates, took on a large responsibility for it. 
In practice, Dutchbat was dispatched: on a mission with a very unclear mandate; to a zone described as a ‘safe area’ although 
there	was	no	clear	definition	of	what	that	meant;	to	keep	the	peace	where	there	was	no	peace;	without	obtaining	in-depth	
information	 from	the	Canadian	predecessors	 in	 the	enclave	 (Canbat);without	adequate	 training	 for	 this	specific	 task	 in	
those	specific	circumstances;	virtually	without	military	and	political	intelligence	work	to	gauge	the	political	and	military	
intentions	of	the	warring	parties;	with	misplaced	confidence	in	the	readiness	to	deploy	air	strikes	if	problems	arose,	and	
without any clear strategy for leaving. http://www.srebrenica.nl/Pages/OOR/23/384.html (last accessed 12.08.2013)
32 Verbeek and Vleuten, ‘The Domesticization of the Foreign Policy of the Nether lands’, 365.
33 March and Olsen, ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’.
34	 As	outlined	by	Christ	Klep	and	Donna	Winslow:	 ´The	Netherlands	became	 involved	 in	 the	peacekeeping	efforts	 in	 the	
Bosnian	War	at	an	early	stage.	The	Dutch	sent	observers,	a	communications	battalion	and	a	transport	and	logistics	battalion	
in	1992.	During	1993	discussions	centred	on	the	matter	of	sending	a	combat	unit.	Initially	both	the	Minister	of	Defence	and	
the	Army	Staff	had	strong	reservations	about	the	risks	and	usefulness	of	deploying	a	combat unit to a country still caught up 
in a major civil war. Also, the Netherlands Armed Forces were in the process of large-scale reductions and reorganisations 
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Hence, concrete standards on the basis of which government decides on the deployment of 
military means, are laid down in the so called Ássessment Framework’. The framework consists 
of a series of political and military benchmarks that are used to consider the desirability 
and feasibility of Dutch participation in an international crisis control operation. The 
political facets of the framework take into consideration whether the purpose of a military 
operation is to create the conditions for reconstruction and/or delivering development aid. 
If so, then the analysis will take the provision of development aid into account. Secondly, the 
mandate is an important aspect of the political facets especially taking into consideration 
that deployment of Dutch military units has to be in accordance with international law. 
If the operation is not carried out at the request of the country involved, then it has to be 
based on a clear, preferably United Nation’s security council’s, mandate.35 The mandate must 
therefore include the political and military objectives of the operation, and should clarify 
if the operation is being conducted under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. Also, the political aspects include a description of other participating countries and 
their role.36
The introduction of this assessment framework is an addition to the framework for the 
decision-making process on the deployment of military forces as laid down in article 100 
of the Constitution.37  This notification procedure includes sending a so called Árticle 100 
letteŕ  to Parliament. In essence, the letter signifies Cabinet – after it has been probed by an 
international organisation or state – to notify Parliament about their intention to explore 
possibilities for a new military mission or to change an existing military mission in a drastic 
manner. By doing so, one can denote - at a relatively early stage – if the foreseen mission is 
to receive broad political support and by doing so prevent the genesis of all sorts of rumours 
and speculations about a mission playing into the hands of the opposition. On the basis of 
this letter, parliament debates the issues involving the deployment.  In order for government 
to deploy its military forces, at least fifty percent of parliament has to endorse the proposal. 
Government could decide to deploy its forces without parliamentary approval but this is not 
viewed as desirable.38
following the 1993 ‘Defence Priorities Review’. However, these objections were put aside by parliament, press and public 
opinion, all of whom demanded quick and decisive humanitarian intervention in the Bosnian War. This interventionism 
was strongly fuelled by very disturbing pictures from prison camps in Bosnia and scenes of ethnic cleansing .́ See: Chris 
Klep and Donna Winslow, ‘Learning Lessons the hard Way - Somalia and Srebrenica Compared’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 
10(2) (1999) 93-137, 96.
35 Operation Allied Force contained the bombing of Serbian targets in order to refrain them from carrying out more hostilities 
against the Albanian Kosovars is an exception to this prescription. 
36 Kristiç, ‘De Staten-Generaal en de inzet van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht’, 177-180.
37 Ramses A. Wessel, ‘The Netherlands and NATO’ in: Juha Rainne, Legal Implications of NATO Membership: Focus on Finland and 
Five Allied States (Helsinki 2008) 137-161.
38 See: Kristiç, ‘De Staten-Generaal en de inzet van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht’; Christ Klep, Uruzgan. De Nederlandse Militairen 

































The assessment framework was developed with the best of intentions to prevent another 
(military) debacle. However, one could remain sceptical regarding its utility in practice. The 
framework is often referred to as a checklist not necessarily resulting in a deep analysis of 
the use of military means in pursuit of achieving political goals, nor does it itself seem to 
guarantee a constructive and rational decision-making process39 or imply that a military 
mission will only be conducted if all components of the framework are efficiently dealt with.
The sensitivity with regard to military missions has, over the course of the years, resulted 
in an increase of parliamentary involvement with military missions. As such, Parliament 
has gained quite some additional but informal influence on military operations. In fact, the 
parliamentary involvement through the Article 100 letter encapsulates the diffusion between 
authority and accountability of deploying military forces.40  The level of detail with which 
Parliament involves itself seems to be a consequence of the tendency present at the strategic 
civil military level to mainly describe tactical and technical activities in their advice about a 
possible mission instead of the objectives that need to be attained. In other words, not the 
why but the how – describing the kinds of activities that are to be executed - is explicated, 
providing no analysis on a strategic level, or even operational level for that matter.41 This is 
compounded by the same level of input provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which 
also focuses primarily on what kind of developmental and governmental projects it will 
finance, instead of outlining the political objectives that need to be attained. 
Parliamentary involvement does trigger another component affecting coalition politics 
characteristic of the Dutch political system. This is the institutionally created position of 
junior parties within coalitions that offers a potential for lopsided influence with regard to 
the framing of the foreign policy action. Recent insights in political decision-making suggest 
that the ways in which individuals and groups represent a problem is key to understanding 
the policy choices that are considered and eventually chosen.42 In Dutch deliberations over 
sending troops to South Afghanistan, the junior coalition party, D66, attempted to frame 
a potential military contribution to the stabilisation of South Afghanistan as in fact a 
contribution to the American Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) which many Europeans 
associated with unlawful acts of torture and rendition. They argued that the military would 
39	 Interviews	 Hartog	 and	 Bot;	 Marloes	 ten	 Dam,	 ‘Uruzgan,	 Het	 CNN	 effect’	 (Master	 thesis,	 Utrecht	 2012);	 Klep,	 Uruzgan; 
Moelker, ´Culture´s Backlash on Decision-making’, 33.
40	 As	indicated	by	Anamarija	Kristiç:	‘parliament	can	play	its	own	game	and	exercise	influence	on	governments	decision	[…]	
knowing	that	government	will	appreciate	wide	political	support	for	these	very	important	and	far-reaching	conclusions	[…]	
The political relationship between government and parliament appears to be of a much greater impact on parliamentary 
involvement than the constitutional framework and the exchange of information: Kristiç, ‘De Staten-Generaal en de inzet 
van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht’, 233- 235.
41 Interviews Keij, Huiben, Klaarbergen, Noom. 
42 Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Coalition Cabinet Decision-making: Institutional and Psychological Factors’, International Studies Review 10(1) 
(2008) 57-86, 67-68.
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be forced to fight the Taliban and would end up in a war that was supposed to be the domain 
of OEF. Senior parties in the Cabinet tried to counter this by framing the decision in terms of 
international responsibility and being a good ally and tried to disentangle the NATO mission 
from OEF.43
Also, coalition cabinets have proven vulnerable to the strategies of junior parties in 
influencing the decision-making processes.44 Again, as will be showcased in the next 
chapter, the junior party of the coalition (D66) anticipated it could halt the desire of the 
major governing parties to deploy troops. Even though they did not manage to impede the 
deployment, they certainly managed to delay the decision-making process to a significant 
degree, causing a lot of nuisance both nationally and internationally. 
Steering Group Military Operations 
The official forum in which the senior civil and military decision-makers in the Netherlands 
meet and discusses the planning and conduct of military operations is the ´Steering Group 
Military Operations’ (SMO).45 The emphasis of this forum is directed towards fostering a 
dialogue on military missions between (initially) the departments of Foreign Affairs, and 
Defence. Later on, the group was extended to include representatives from the Ministry 
of General Affairs (to be compared with the Cabinet Office in the United Kingdom) and the 
Ministry of Development Cooperation. 
With regard to the mission to Uruzgan, the group successfully encouraged a joint 
approach to the Dutch effort in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, judging from the views as 
provided by the respondents, the relations between the civil and military actors in this group 
can be described as rather good. However, their cultural differences in terms of habits - such 
as the military need for clear goals and objectives versus the civilian desire for vagueness – 
surfaced every now and then and were such as to require political space for manoeuvre. 
The common ground between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs seemed to 
be their dedication to providing military troops and resources for NATO’s expansion to the 
South of Afghanistan. The policy adopted by both ministries in 2006 was based on the belief 
of integrating defence, diplomacy and development. This concept – contrary to claims made 
43 Kaarbo, ‘Coalition Cabinet Decision-making’, 67-68; Jan van der Meulen and Mirjam Grandia, ´Brussels Calling: Domestic 
Politics under International Pressure´ in: Jan van der Meulen, Ad Vogelaar, Robert Beeres and Joseph Soeters (eds.), Mission 
Uruzgan. Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam 2012).
44 Kaarbo, ‘Coalition Cabinet Decision-making’, 67- 68; Hans J.P. Vollaard and Niels J.G. van Willigen, ‘Binnenlandse steun 
voor buitenlands beleid’  in: Duco Hellema, Mathieu Segers and Jan Rood (eds.) Bezinning op het buitenland: Het Nederlands 
buitenlands beleid in een onzekere wereld (Den Haag 2010), 193-216



































in the media46- was already at the heart of both British and Canadian policy with regard to 
(post) conflict states.47 
The events that unfolded in Srebrenica very much influenced the relationship between 
the civil and military senior decision-makers. Only after the appearance of the NIOD48 report 
commissioned by the Dutch government, which came out seven years after the fall of the 
enclave, were the politicians accused of having deployed their military without a proper 
mandate and without appropriate equipment. Until then, it had been the military who were 
primarily blamed for the fiasco which impacted the relationship between the two in the 
sense that the military felt left in the cold by the politicians who should have provided the 
preconditions. In turn, the politicians had become very careful with the deployment of the 
military. Hence, their enthusiasm had been tempered and ever since military deployments 
have been a result of critical analysis.49
In conclusion, Dutch foreign and security politics are to a great extent focused on its trans- 
Atlantic pillar. The desire to be a trustworthy NATO ally has resonated throughout the last 
two decades, most prominently in its support of military undertakings in the Balkans, Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The initiation of military missions and the consequent decisions required 
primarily evolve in the Steering Group Military Operations. This forum has proven beneficial 
for the relations of the Dutch senior civil and military decision-makers. The steering group 
has shown to be a useful tool for keeping one another informed.  
However, the use of the military in the Netherlands is by no means easily decided upon. 
First and foremost, this is attributed to the processes and decision-making tools as designed 
and implemented after Srebrenica and secondly, coalition politics by definition requires 
consensus. The need for this consensus consequently determines the political agendas of 
the political parties, as such potentially leaving the advancement of the decision-making 
process to a great extent in the hands of party politics. 
46 Jay Solomon, ‘US takes Dutch military as role model in Afghanistan’, Wall Street Journal, 30 April 2009; ‘Nederlandse ‘watjes’ 
hadden succes in Irak’, Trouw, 12 April 2007; ‘Overleven in Uruzgan’, NRC Next, 10 April 2007; ‘Uruzgan, na vier jaar’, NRC 
Handelsblad,	31	July	2010;	‘The	Dutch	model:	flower	strewers	partly	vindicated’,	The Economist, 12 March 2009.
47 For Canadian policy see: Martin, Paul, ´Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin on occasion of his visit to Washington 
D.C ,́ Washington, D.C, April 29, 2004; A Role of Pride and Influence in the World.	Canadian	Department	of		Foreign	Affairs	and	
International	Trade	(2005	Ottawa)	20.	For	British	policy	on	the	matter	see:	The Comprehensive Approach. Joint Discussion Note 
4/05. Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre, UK Ministry of Defence (2006 Shrivenham)
48	 In	 November	 1996,	 the  	 NIOD	 Institute	 for	 War,	 Holocaust	 and	 Genocide	 Studies	 (then:	 Netherlands	 Institute	 for	 War	
Documentation)	was	 instructed	by	the	Dutch	Government	to	carry	out	a	study	of	 ‘the	events	prior	to,	during	and	after	
the fall of Srebrenica’. On 10 April 2002, this report was made public and consequently both the political and military 
establishment resigned acknowledging the great mistakes that had been made and had now been presented in this report. 
For	a	complete	reading	of	the	findings	of	the	report	see:	http://www.niod.nl/nl/projecten/srebrenicarapport
49 An inheritance of the Srebrenica debacle was the eminence of air support. The lack of it had seriously complicated the 
ability	of	the	Dutch	forces	to	properly	respond	against	the	atrocities	committed	by	the	Serbian	forces.	The	blurred	lines	
within	 the	 chains	 of	 command	 through	 the	 UN	 and	 differences	 in	 opinion	 about	 mandate	 resulted	 in	 failing	 close	 air	
support. The legacy of Srebrenica has consequently resulted in the ever present strong national air component operating 
alongside the ground forces to prevent a recurrence of the tragic events in former Yugoslavia. 
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5.3 The United Kingdom: The Grandeur of a Great Power
The United Kingdom can be best described as a medium power with substantial military 
capabilities. A player in the major league of nations, the United Kingdom not only engages 
in operations as a loyal partner of the United States, but also tends to view itself as a ‘force 
for good’.  Ever since the First World War, a relative decline in British economic and military 
power can be observed. They nevertheless maintained their relevance on the international 
stage through the mobilisation of ‘soft power’ [diplomatic] resources.50 The foreign policy 
rhetoric and policy behaviour of the United Kingdom is predominantly guided by a ṕower 
broker´ conception of their state ś role in the international arena.51
Three traditional pillars can be distinguished in British foreign policy: multilateralism, 
Atlanticism and neo-liberalism.52 Multilateralism was not only consistent with the 
adherence of the governing party [Labour] to international institutions and their respective 
liberal values, but it also provided a chance to utilise the soft power capability to shape the 
rule-based international order.53 In practice, Prime Minister Blair’s consecutive Cabinets 
have utilised a combination of both formal and informal multilateralism: either a formal 
kind through established international organisations or through informal coalitions of the 
willing.54
Atlanticism, or the often claimed ‘special relationship’55 with the United States, as 
the dominant approach within chosen foreign policy actions resonates in many studies 
analysing British foreign and security policy.56 For many years, especially at the operational 
level, the British and American relationship featured degrees of intimacy and trust which has 
informed the notion that their bond is indeed special. Their political elites have continued 
to share a common internationalist worldview and cooperate diplomatically to advance a 
joint view of the global order of relations. Their collaboration, especially on defence policy 
[within NATO and bilaterally] and the integration of their intelligence operations has gone 
further than with any other state, unprecedented in its scale and trust.57
50 Joseph S.  Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York 2004).
51 Breuning, ´Words and Deeds’, 235-254.
52 Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain cited in: Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’, 929.
53	 Tim	Dunne,	 ‘Blair’s	Britain	and	the	Road	to	War	 in	 Iraq’,	 in:	Steve	Smith,	Amelia	Hadfield	and	Tim	Dunne	(eds.),	Foreign 
Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2nd edition, Oxford 2012) 419-440, 423.
54 Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’, 926.
55 See: John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (2nd revised edition, Basingstoke 
2006).
56 Steve Marsh and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: the Lazarus of International Relations’, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 17(1) (2006) 173-211.


































In December 2003, both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence published White 
Papers highlighting Britain’s dependence on the United States in relation to defence, security, 
and foreign policy. Influenced by the conflicts that had transpired in the Balkans in recent 
history, the geopolitical framework for the British had expanded. However, the documents 
only addressed the means rather than the ends of British foreign policy.58 To illustrate: the 
White Paper produced by the FCO, UK International Priorities described Britain’s relationship 
with the United States as a ‘vital asset…essential to achieving many of our objectives, 
especially in ensuring our security’.59 The Defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing 
World, stated that ‘the most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention 
against state adversaries, can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged, either 
leading a coalition or in NATO.60
Moreover, Prime Minister Blair believed he could be the ‘bridge builder’ between the 
European continent and the United States. This was a political balancing act in which he 
sought to be America’s closest ally, and a committed European partner attempting to deliver 
Europe as a beneficial party to the table.61 Some have nuanced the ‘special relationship’ and 
‘bridge builder’ view arguing that since the end of the Cold War, British governments have 
exercised little influence over American administrations and their respective ‘shared values’. 
Also, the proclaimed British position as a bridge builder between the United States and 
Europe had been contested since European countries refused to have their relationship with 
Washington channelled through London.62
The neo-liberal pillar in British foreign and security policy was most prominently 
discernable in its positions on trade, economic development, and international 
(development) aid by organisations such as the World Bank.63 Also, the liberal views were 
prominently articulated as values that needed to be upheld to safeguard a stable international 
community.64 In the late nineties, a so called ‘ethical foreign policy’ was introduced, 
concurrently with designing military forces ready for rapid and decisive action.65 As 
articulated in the Labour party manifesto (communicated four years before the intervention 
58 Hew Strachan, ‘Conclusion’ in: Jonathan Bailey, Richard Iron, and Hew Strachan (eds.),  British Generals in Blair’s Wars (London 
2013) 327-346, 328, 332.
59	 ‘UK	 International	 Priorities’,	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office	 (2003).	 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200304/cmselect/cmfaff/745/74507.htm
60 Delivering Security in a Changing World, UK Ministry of Defence (2003). http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/
whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf. 
61	 Hastings	Dunn,	‘UK–US	Relations	After	the	Three	Bs’,	6.
62 William Wallace and Tim Oliver, ‘A Bridge too far: the United Kingdom and the Transatlantic Relationship’ in: David M. 
Andrews (ed.), The Atlantic Alliance under Stress: US-European Relations after Iraq (Cambridge 2005) 152-176, 152-156; Wallace, The 
Foreign Policy Process in Britain cited in: Paul Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’’, 55.
63 Dunne, ‘Blair’s Britain and the Road to War in Iraq’, 425.
64	 Jason	Ralph,	‘After	Chilcot:	the	‘Doctrine	of	International	Community’	and	the	UK	Decision	to	Invade	Iraq’,	The British Journal 
of Politics &International Relations 13(3) (2011) 304-325, 309.
65 Jonathan Bailey, ‘The Political Context: Why We Went to War and the Mismatch of Ends, Ways and Means’, in: Jonathan 
Bailey, Richard Iron, and Hew Strachan (eds.),  British Generals in Blair’s Wars (London 2013) 5-26, 6.
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in Afghanistan): ‘Labour wants Britain to be respected in the world for the integrity with 
which it conducts its foreign relations’ and it wants to ‘restore Britain’s pride and influence 
as a leading force for good in the world’.66 
During the decade in which Prime Minister Blair was in power, a doctrine of ‘liberal 
interventionism’ was developed in a quest for moral progress in a world facing many 
opponents of liberalism.67 Consequently, the prominence of values in British foreign and 
security policy appeared to be validated in the emerging military threats against what was 
perceived as the ‘Western way of life’.68 Blair’s liberal interventionism, publicly introduced 
in his famous Chicago speech,69 evolved in various military engagements all over the world 
[Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan], all under the banner of ‘doing good’.70
The ethical rhetoric of British security policy also resonated in the ideological framework 
of liberal internationalism applied to Afghanistan. National security objectives related 
to combating international terrorism were informed by a broader understanding of the 
significance of a normative international order in which countries like Afghanistan would 
be able to flourish and by doing so no longer provide assistance for terrorist groups. The 
British aim to seek for a greater balance between military, social, and, political objectives 
for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, was novel and perhaps even foundational for NATO in 
developing a ‘comprehensive’ approach.71
In conclusion, British foreign and security politics, especially as it emerged under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Blair, became well known for its ‘ethical’ components. 
Nevertheless, the transatlantic bond has remained a consistent feature in its strategic 
posture. 
5.3.1 The Senior Civil and Military Decision-Makers and Their Relations
The most prominent senior civil and military decision-makers at strategic level in the United 
Kingdom are the Prime Minister and his staff; the civilian Ministers of the Ministry of 
Defence; and the members of the military Chiefs of Staffs Committee, principally the Chief 
of Ministry Staff (CDS). Supposedly, as posited in recent research, civilian officials from the 
Civil and Diplomatic Services in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Cabinet Office, Foreign & 
66 Labour Party manifesto 1997. New Labour: Because Britain deserves better. Labour Party (1997 London); See also ‘Robin Cook’s 
speech on the government’s ethical foreign policy. The speech by Cook that started it all’, Guardian Unlimited, 12 May 1997.
67 Dunne, ‘Blair’s Britain and the Road to War in Iraq’, 421.
68 Bailey, ‘The Political Context’, 7.
69 Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, delivered at the Economic Club, Chicago, 22 April 1999, http://www.
number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp, (last accessed 28.04.2014).
70 Oliver Daddow, ‘Tony’s War’? Blair, Kosovo and the Interventionist Impulse in British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs 
85(3) (2009) 547-560.

































Commonwealth Office (FCO) and other government departments have a less evident and 
often underrated role than their military counter parts.72 
The roles and responsibilities of senior civil and military decision-makers are subject to 
bureaucratic intricacies, often not formalised in a widely accepted set of regulations. This 
in itself is a characteristic feature of the British constitutional and legal system, in which 
basic principles are formulated, expressed and adjusted less through fundamental texts than 
through precedent, practice and (especially) process. As put forward in the report Depending 
on the Right People: British Political-Military Relations 2001-2010: 
Some key military decisions were also taken with insufficient political oversight. […] 
These problems were the result of a situation in which there was no well-understood 
model for how Ministers, senior military officers and civil servants should work together. 
All interpreted their roles in different ways, with effectiveness depending on the quality 
of individuals and the personal relationships between them. In the phrase of Jonathan 
Powell, Tony Blair’s chief of staff, good decisions depended on ‘the right people’ being 
involved and behaving in the right way. Although in theory the British model could be 
flexible and fast-acting, it brought incoherence, inconsistency and opacity. It was not 
resilient enough to deal with the extraordinary pressures of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
crises. It contributed to a continuing breakdown of trust between politicians and senior 
military officers, and disunity and division of purpose within the government.73 
In his book, High Command, in which many of the involved actors commented on the 
intricacies of the decision-making for the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, Christopher 
Eliot has put forward the suggestion offered by some of his sources that on occasions an 
‘executive of two’ [consisting of Prime Minister Blair and his Chief of Defence Staff Walker] 
was running the decision-making. However, General Sir Michael Walker commented on this 
as an exaggeration whilst explaining that it was in fact the Secretary of State for Defence 
Reid who habitually led discussions with the Prime Minister.  The confusion present both 
amongst senior civil and military decision-makers as to who actually had authorised a 
particular course of action was indeed endemic for the (lack of ) accountability within the 
decision-making process.74
 As indicated above, relations between senior level military and civilian actors in the 
United Kingdom have been damaged in recent operations, Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. 
Flaws in the decision-making process to intervene in both countries have been the topic of 
72 James de Waal, Depending on the Right People. British Political-Military Relations, 2001-2010. Chatham House Report (2013 
London) 9.
73 Ibid, VI.
74 Christopher Elliot, High Command (Hurst forthcoming) 267.
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blaming either one of the two groups.75  Some respondents argued that there seems to be an 
institutional overreliance on the military’.76 Others claimed civilian decision-makers were 
intimidated by the military. The author of the book Losing Small Wars, Frank Ledwidge, does 
believe the army to have been calling the shots when it came to the deployment to Helmand. 
‘The politicians were standing behind. The tactical structure was dictating the planning 
instead of the other way around.’77
Former diplomat, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles,78 who has been both British ambassador in 
Afghanistan and British special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, takes this line 
of argument a bit further as he states: ‘the military are stuck and cannot stand criticism. 
People have not been very critical towards the military and politicians are afraid of military. 
No politicians have military experience’.79 
This is, according to some, exactly the reason why there is friction amongst civil and 
military actors. As explained by General MacKay: ‘Complex civil military relations, a lot of 
friction. […] The supremacy of civilians in the decision for the use of force has eroded’ […] 
most politicians do not have military experience and knowledge. However, the system needs 
to advise the politicians but there is a limited ability to understand the military process’. 80
Decision-Making Process for the Use of Military Means
Some of the inherent features of British politics rooted in their ´Westminster model 8́1 
are the majority rule, the prerogative powers of the executive power and the absence 
75 Michael Clarke (ed.) The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06. White Hall Paper 77 (London 2011); Waal, 
‘Depending on the Right People. British Political-Military Relations, 2001-2010’.
76 Interviews Korski, McKay. 
77 Interview Ledwidge.
78	 Sir	Sherard	Cowper	Coles	has	heavily	criticized	the	military	for	 its	attitude	and	behaviour	with	regard	the	planning	and	
execution of operations in Afghanistan. ‘Many of the military think they are brighter than they really are. Look at their COIN 
campaign:	are	we	working	for	good	governance	without	a	national	(Afghan)	political	settlement?’	Interview	Cowper	Coles.
79 Interview Cowper Coles.
80 Interview McKay.
81 The Westminster model ‘is a short cut for the majoritarian democratic parliamentary system as used in the United 
Kingdom	and	the	Common	Wealth	countries.	It	is	named	after	the	palace	of	Westminster	in	London,	the	location	of	the	
British parliament. The main characteristic of the model is that the Queen, the head of state is the nominal or de jure 
source of executive power while the de facto head of the executive is the Prime Minister. Historically, the Prime Minister 
was seen as primus interparis	(first	among	equals)	but	in	modern	times	in	fact	leads	a	Cabinet	of	ministers	which	exercises	
executive authority on behalf of the head of state. Thus, the sovereign, who reigns but does not rule, is the focal point for 
the nation while the prime minister and his colleagues undertake executive decisions. In the United Kingdom, this system 
of government originated with parliamentary convention, practices and precedents but has never been formally laid out 
in	 a	 written	 constitution’.	 See:	 http://www.nassauinstitute.org/articles/article652.php?view=print.  As Arend Lijphart 
has argued in his famous book Patterns of Democracy [in which he compares government forms and performance of thirty 
six countries] majoritarian democracies can potentially create sharp divisions between those in power and those who 
are	not	in	power.	This	primarily	derives	from	the	fact	that	the	model	does	not	allow	much	influence	for	opposition	over	
government	policy:	‘In	the	most	deeply	divided	societies…majority	rule	spells	majority	dictatorship	and	civil	strife	rather	
than democracy. What such societies need is not a democratic regime that emphasises consensus instead of opposition, 
that includes rather than excludes’. See: Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-

































of a constitution. Given the fact that no constitution is in place, British politics are very 
much informed by traditions. As outlined by Mark Bevir and Roderick Rhodes in their 
interpretation of British governance: ‘when unpacking the idea of tradition we must not reify 
traditions. Tradition is a starting point not something that fixes or limits future actions (…) 
are contingent, produced by the actions of individuals. The carriers of traditions bring it to 
life. They settle its content and variations by developing their beliefs and practices, adapting 
it to new circumstances, while passing it on to the next generation’.82 
This is an important aspect since it helps explain that actions of those engaged in the 
decision-making on the use of military means are likely to act in accordance with traditions, 
beliefs and habits. The use of military force in itself can be decided upon by the Prime 
Minister. His powers with regard to the use of military means are described in the Royal 
Prerogative Powers.83 These are a series of powers officially held by the Queen that have been 
passed to the government of the day. They enable decisions to be taken without the backing 
of, or consultation with parliament. Yet, it is common for Cabinet to keep Parliament well 
informed on decisions that entail the use of force and about the progress of the military 
campaigns. This is achieved primarily through statements in the House of Commons 
and debates.84 In practice, the active agreement of senior Ministers, and eventually the 
endorsement of parliament are viewed to be desirable.85 
The Royal Prerogative and lack of involvement of the British parliament in approving the 
deployment of armed forces has long been criticised for what is perceived to be an absence 
of democratic accountability of the use of force. In other words: a democratic deficit. The 
conflict in Iraq and subsequent arguments over the legality of military intervention, have 
contributed significantly to raising the political profile of this issue. Recently, there have 
been several attempts to establish an obligation for Cabinet to obtain parliamentary approval 
for the deployment of military forces.86 
The perceived lack of democratic accountability when it comes to the use of force also 
transpires in the secrecy that has traditionally masked the cabinet system and it surplus of 
subcommittees. Moreover, the basis of politics on conventions rather than strict rules made 
the use of force vulnerable to the vagaries of the respective Prime Ministers. Nevertheless, 
the members of Cabinet are expected to display collective responsibility and present a united 
Whitehall: the Sub-Central Governments of Britain (London 1992); David Marsh, ‘Understanding British Government: Analysing 
Competing Models’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10(2) (2008) 251-268.
82 Mark Bevir and Roderick Rhodes, Interpreting British Governance (London and New York 2003) 33-34.
83 See: Richard	Heffernan,	‘Prime	Ministerial	Predominance?	Core	Executive	Politics	in	the	UK’,	The British Journal of Politics & 
International Relations 5(3) (2003) 347-372, 357-358.
84 See: Paul Bowers and D. Annex. ‘Parliament and the use of force’, World War II 5 (2003) 2.
85	 Heffernan,	‘Prime	Ministerial	Predominance?’,	357-358.
86 Claire Taylor and Richard Kelly, Parliamentary Approval for Deploying the Armed Forces: An Introduction to the Issues. 
Research Paper 08/88 House of Commons Library (2008 London). See: http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/
lib/research/rp2008/rp08-088.pdf.
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front. In order to do so, historically Cabinets have habitually attempted to reconcile internal 
divisions on their own terms before embarking upon a particular course of action.87
In line with this tradition, Prime Minister Blair, like his predecessors, preferred to work 
in small ad hoc committees88 composed of his most trusted civil servants, Ministers and 
advisers rather than with the cabinet as a whole.89  His presidential style of policy-making 
generated rigorous criticism, with it even being dubbed as overly secretive, ad hoc, informal 
and susceptible to groupthink.90  This will be further outlined below in the description of 
the Reid Group and its role in the decisions made with regard to the deployment to Helmand.
The Reid Group 
In the particular case of Helmand, the Prime Minister chose to exercise his powers in terms 
of setting out a clear road regarding British involvement in Afghanistan but soon thereafter 
delegated the particulars to the Reid Group. Secretary of State for Defence John Reid was 
asked by Tony Blair to form a senior cross-departmental group, which was to supervise the 
planning for the deployment to South of Afghanistan. As such, the role of this particular group 
was to deal with the decisions that needed to be made with regard to British involvement in 
South Afghanistan. 
As commented on by the Secretary of State for Defence John Reid himself: ‘We had 
established a group, learning the lessons from Iraq, which I chaired, unusually. It would 
normally been a Foreign Office lead but the Prime Minister asked me to lead it to bring 
together DfID, the Foreign Office, Treasury, MOD and so on, to work down from the concept, 
the strategic concept91, right down to the operational level .́92
Across government, most Ministers and their efforts for the deployment to South 
Afghanistan were guided by either Blair or Reid. Only a few Ministers, like the chief of 
the Treasury, were sceptical, most were broadly in favour since Afghanistan was generally 
viewed as the ‘good war’ as opposed to Iraq. The argument which is believed to have swayed 
Ministers most was that Afghanistan was a job the international community had started and 
87 Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’.
88	 As	described	by	Williams:	‘Britain’s	cabinet	system	and	its	plethora	of	subcommittees	has	traditionally	been	cloaked	in	
secrecy	and	based	on	conventions	rather	than	strict	rules.	As	a	consequence,	cabinet	behaves	differently	under	different	
Prime	Ministers	and	 it	 is	difficult	 for	outsiders	 to	gain	reliable	 information	about	how	and	where	specific	decisions	are	
taken. On the other hand, regardless of whose cabinet we are analysing, its members are expected to display collective 
responsibility and present a united front to the outside world’, Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’, 917.  
89	 Anthony	Seldon	dubbed	these	groups	as	‘denocracy’	because	they	tended	to	conduct	their	meetings	in	Blair’s	office	‘The	
Den’. Anthony Seldon, Blair (London 2004) 692. Cited in: Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?, 916.
90 Williams, ‘Who’s making UK Foreign Policy?’, 917.
91 It is not clear to what strategic concept John Reid refers. His advisor Josh Arnold Foster could not recall such a concept 
either. John Reid had been approached twice for an interview for this study to present his views. He however declined the 
requests.


































should finish by consolidating the progress made so far, ensuring the investment was not 
wasted.93 
According to special advisor to the labour government, Matt Cavanagh94, little debate 
had taken place. He described that in the beginning of the discussions about the deployment 
there was relatively little debate at Ministerial level, in the Reid Group or anywhere else for 
that matter, about the detail of the plan or troop numbers .́95 Special advisor to John Reid, 
Josh Arnold Foster96, like Cavanagh, remembered very little debate about the mission as such 
since the Prime Minister wanted it to happen.97 Foster in fact referred to the words of Lord 
Hailsham, who coined the phrase ‘elective dictatorship’98 to describe the United Kingdom.
The lack of debate in the initial phase of the decision-making might have been instigated 
by not addressing the right questions whilst conducting the assessment of the task at hand. 
As pointed out by many respondents but also clearly articulated by Reid’s private secretary 
in his writings about the decision-making process: ‘Key questions were unanswered: Where 
was the grand strategy that previous Afghanistan campaigns had been fought on? What 
were the strategic objectives that could be honed into a convincing narrative worth fighting 
for? That was not for the military to define, and without a proper sense of what long-term 
influence we wanted in the region, we had little reference to measure our response’.99
Special advisor to the Defence Minister Arnold Foster described his concern at the time 
to have been about the top-down approach. He believed the interdepartmental group could 
have been used by departments as a platform rather than genuinely working together. He 
describes most papers considered by the group as being referred to as DfID, Foreign Office, 
or Ministry of Defence papers.100
93 Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment’, 50.
94	 Matt	Cavanagh	was	a	special	adviser	in	the	last	Labour	government	from	2003,	and	worked	on	Afghanistan	from	2005.	
95 The discussion about the troop numbers will be dealt with in the UK case chapter 7. 
96 Josh Arnold Foster was a special advisor to Defence Secretary John Reid from 2005- 2006.
97 Josh Arnold-Forster, ´Cross-Government Planning and the Helmand Decision, 2005–06 ,́ The RUSI Journal 157(2) (2012) 44-47.
98 Elective dictatorship is a phrase popularised by the former Lord Chancellor of the United Kingdom, Lord Hailsham, in a 
Richard Dimbleby Lecture at the BBC in 1976. It refers to the fact that the legislative programme of Parliament is determined 
by the government, and government bills virtually always pass the House of Commons because of the nature of the 
majoritarian	first-past-the-post	electoral	system,	which	almost	always	produces	strong	government,	in	combination	with	
the imposition of party discipline on the governing party’s majority, which almost always ensures loyalty. In the absence 
of	a	codified	constitution,	this	tendency	toward	executive	dominance	is	compounded	by	the	Parliament	Acts	and	Salisbury	
Convention which circumscribe the House of Lords and their ability to block government initiatives.  See:  Lord Hailsham, 
‘Elective Dictatorship’, The Listener, 21 October 1976. 496-500.
99  Nick Beadle, ´Afghanistan and the Context of Iraq ,́ Whitehall Paper 77(1) (2011) 73-80, 73,74.
100  Arnold-Forster, ´Cross-Government Planning and the Helmand Decision’, 45. 
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The Post Conflict and Reconstruction Unit
Although the Reid group was formed to oversee the planning of the stabilisation effort, 
another more permanent institutional construct had emerged with the aim of planning 
and coordinating comprehensive missions to (post) conflict states: the Post Conflict and 
Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).101  The unit was created in 2004 as a result of the absence of a 
civilian reconstruction and development capability in Iraq.  However, the aspirations for the 
role of the PCRU were rapidly reduced since they were answerable to the Foreign Office, the 
Ministries of Defence and International Development, instead of the Cabinet Office. This 
weakened their mandate and influence since the Permanent Undersecretaries refused PCRU 
an operational role beyond being an inter-departmental facilitator and supplier of personnel 
for missions.102
Furthermore, the PCRU was to facilitate cross -Whitehall divisions of labour, but this 
turned out to be complex since it did not play to departmental strengths. The impression of 
special advisor to the Defence Minister of the different groups of officials within the various 
departments was one of ‘all working on the same issue, but not necessarily going in exactly 
the same direction (…) while working-level officials seemed to cooperate well, more senior 
officials within all departments may not have been as joined up as they needed to be. Of 
course, it is all too easy for political figures to blame the failure to achieve truly joined-up 
government on bureaucratic in-fighting. The relationships between different officials will 
frequently reflect the relationship between their Ministerial masters.’103
As such, the role of the PCRU was limited to providing stabilisation advisers and it 
provided, only upon invitation from its parent departments (FCO, DFID and the MOD), 
periodic planning support or facilitation.104  Thus, in essence the unit was more engaged 
with the provision of personnel instead of truly planning and coordinating the stabilisation 
effort for Helmand. 
In conclusion, British foreign and security politics, especially as it emerged under 
the leadership of Prime Minister Blair became well known for its ‘ethical’ components. 
Nevertheless, the transatlantic bond has remained a consistent feature in its strategic 
posture. The initiation of military missions and the consequent decisions required are by 
and large guided by the Prime Minister, notwithstanding a great role that was allowed for 
the military within the process. For this particular mission, a strategic group that was to 
101  In 2007, the unit was renamed to Stabilisation Unit (SU). 
102 Tom Rodwell, ‘Between Idea and the Reality: the Evolution and Application of the Comprehensive Approach. Hollow Men 
and Doctrine in Helmand?’ (MA Dissertation, London 2010) 11.
103  Arnold-Forster, ´Cross-Government Planning and the Helmand Decision’, 45.
104 Gordon Stuart, ‘The United Kingdom’s Stabilisation Model and Afghanistan: the Impact on Humanitarian Actors’, Disasters 


































guide the deployment of military forces was ordered by Blair. A close trustee, his Secretary 
of State for Defence, was to chair the group. However, no coordinated effort embodied by an 
interdepartmental strategy materialised.  All this illustrates that the use of military means 
is not bound by formal procedures. In fact, officially the Prime Minister by the rule of the 
Prerogative Powers can decide to employ military forces by himself. However, in practice, he 
often choses to compose ad hoc committees and consensus is sought in Cabinet meetings 
prior to deciding on the actual act of deploying military means.
 
5.4 Conclusion
While describing the foreign and security policy of the two nations, outlining the relations 
between the senior civil and military decision-makers, and consequently describing the 
decision-making with regard to the use of military forces, the contours of why these actors 
decided to engage their forces in South Afghanistan surface. The motivations underlying the 
reasoning of the senior civil and military decision-makers of both nations have been named 
to be the most prominent and most consistent pillars of British and Dutch foreign and 
security policies: the desire to be both a trustworthy Alliance member and reliable partner 
to the United States. 
At first glance, one can best define this desire to be rooted in a rationalist calculation 
of interest, namely maintaining relevance as a partner. However, taking a second look at 
the behaviour in the international arena by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with 
regard to both NATO and the United States, the rationale appears to be more of a shared 
belief, at times even a habitual reflex. By themselves, the actions of the senior civil and 
military decision-makers were in line with these traditional pillars of foreign and security 
policy. 
The foreign and security policy of both nations also contains a rather normative 
component, albeit more profoundly articulated in the United Kingdom consistently 
throughout the time Prime Minister Blair was in office. Ever since Labour had come to power 
in the United Kingdom the ´forces for good´ became a driving force in their foreign policy 
not only rhetorically but in practice as well in the sense that their military forces were used to 
bring about security in places such as Kosovo and Sierra Leone.  Also, the Netherlands, albeit 
less prominently, attained the posture of an active contributor to international stability 
through the deployment of military forces. Hence, both nations strongly adhered to an 
imposition of liberal values and frameworks in the belief this would bring about a safe and 
secure international community. 
The relations between the senior civil and military decision-makers in the two countries 
differed in quality. Whereas in the Netherlands most of the senior civil and military decision-
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makers commented on their relations as being rather good and professional, there seemed 
to be more mistrust between the British senior civil and military decision-makers. To 
a certain degree this can be explained by the failures of civil military cooperation in Iraq 
and the disappointing results of the operation overall. Prime Minister Blair ś preference to 
´wheel and deal´ with the military caused quite some annoyance as well in the sense that the 
senior civilian decision-makers felt their opinion was of less importance. 
The institutional differences between the two countries resulted in, amongst other 
things, different settings in which the actors met. In the United Kingdom mostly ad hoc 
committees were set up primarily featuring like-minded advisors or trustees of the Prime 
Minister; in the Netherlands the forum in which the senior civil and military actors meet is 
institutionalised. One could argue this official forum to better facilitate the development 
and implementation of military operations in the sense that a permanent dialogue at the 
civil military interface is guaranteed. However, that the PCRU could have performed the 
function of ensuring an institutionalised cooperation and hence dialogue between the 
senior civil and military decision-makers. However, the unit is more seen as a provider of 
civilian personnel for deployments and not so much as facilitating cooperation and dialogue, 
let alone providing strategic guidance. 
Also, institutional settings have been proven to provide vocabularies that frame 
thought and understandings and define what are legitimate arguments and standards of 
justification.105 Whereas a coalition system, by definition, requires a great deal of negotiation 
and communicative acts, this is less the case in a majoritarian system. As such, the language 
exercised by the senior civil and military decision-makers in the Dutch coalition system is 
seen to better portray the beliefs of the group as a whole. This is in opposition to the language 
exercised by the group of decision-makers in the British Westminster system. They habitually 
use the language that has been imposed upon them by their Prime Minister. 
Now that the strategic context and the respective relations between the senior civil and 
military decision-makers in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have been outlined, 
the actions of these actors that ultimately resulted in the deployment of their military forces 
to South Afghanistan will be reconstructed in the following chapters.
105  Charles Wright Mills, ‘Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive’, American Sociological Review 5(6) (1940) 904-913.
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Chapter 6 The Dutch Case 
6.1 Introduction: Setting the Stage
The context in which the decision was taken to commit Dutch forces to South Afghanistan 
should largely be seen in relation to NATO ś expansion to the South and the Dutch desire to 
acquire a greater role as a reliable NATO partner. The ‘defining moments’ of the reconstruction 
of the Dutch case were principally found in the determination of the director of operations 
(MOD), General Pieter Cobelens, in close cooperation with the director political affairs 
(MOF), Hugo Siblesz, to forge a prominent role for Dutch forces within NATO’s expansion to 
South Afghanistan.  
Throughout the whole process of deciding if and how the Dutch forces were to contribute 
to the stabilisation of South Afghanistan, several strategic decisions were not taken without 
being articulated at the political level. For one, the objective that needed to be attained, 
secondly, the selection of the province and thirdly, the number of troops. These decisions were 
taken at the military level, as such implicitly questioning the primacy of politics in the matter. 
NATO’s stabilisation operations and the Alliance’s desire to expand its footprint is the 
setting in which the senior civil and military decision-makers anticipated and developed the 
activities that led to the use of military means for the stabilisation of Uruzgan. 
6.2  The Foreign Policy Problem: The Logic of Participating in NATO’s Expansion to  
the South of Afghanistan
The political context of NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan in a counter clockwise 
manner was decided upon in October 2003 through the adoption of UN Resolution 1510.1 
There was true desire to advance further stabilisation efforts through an expanding ISAF 
presence whereby the counter terrorist operations of the United States would be reduced. 
Not fully aware at that time about an upcoming insurgency in the South, most member states 
did envisage the Southern provinces to be less permissive than other regions in Afghanistan. 
It was evident that NATO needed to show its muscle in order to allow the United States to 
focus its attention on Iraq. Dutch foreign politics has, as described earlier, always placed a 
great emphasis on good relations with the United States and through being a trustworthy 
NATO member it would be able to display its dedication. 
1  Resolution 1510 United Nations Security Council (13 October 2003), S/RES/1510 (2003).
113
Chapter 6   The D
utch Case
Part  2     Context, Cases and Analysis
From the perspective of most of the military and civil respondents of this study, both the 
relationship with the United States and ‘responsible alliance behavior’ were foundational 
for their respective choices with regard to the deployment of Dutch forces to Uruzgan. 
Some respondents indicated they believed the Netherlands was dedicated to making a true 
difference in Afghanistan and wanted to enhance its commitment to the facilitation of a 
stable Afghan state. Others pointed to the fact that the foreign policy of the Netherlands was 
indecisive about the posture it envisioned, complicating the formulation of goals when it 
came to employing its military instrument.2 
With regard to the ambition to contribute military forces for NATO’s expansion to South 
Afghanistan, another issue surfaced, namely the desire to use the Dutch military in a high risk 
area and showing their ability to ´do the job´ a desire very much rooted in the performance 
of the Dutch military during the fall of the enclave of Srebrenica.3  Furthermore, an implicit 
desire of the Netherlands to be a key player in the international arena could be fulfilled. By 
providing troops and other resources for the stabilisation of South Afghanistan, the Dutch 
were yet again a serious partner for important allies such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom. A feature which has constantly been underlined by the Dutch NATO secretary, 
general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer: ‘One needs to step up and take responsibility in order to be 
taken seriously within the international arena. The Alliance expects its members to act when 
needed and when they do so, they will experience a difference in treatment in general and by 
the United States in particular’.4
The observations of De Hoop Scheffer were emphasised by various military and political 
respondents who claim to have experienced that they ‘mattered’ to their international 
counterparts and, as a result, received a ‘seat at the table’.5 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben 
Bot, remembered: ‘Back in the days of Uruzgan, we were players in the major league […] We 
truly belonged to the club of important nations and were invited to everything.  We have 
clearly and painfully experienced the difference in treatment once it became clear we would 
end our mission in Uruzgan. We dropped somewhere to the last spot on the international 
rating list’.6
Most politicians and diplomats, and some military respondents as well, referred to the 
‘responsibility’ of the Netherlands to contribute to a safer and better world.  One of them was 
Minister of Defence, Henk Kamp. He felt very responsible as he explained: ‘There is a lot of 
2 Interviews Nijssen, Swartbol, Noom , Van Oosterom 
3 This event has been extensively described in chapter 5. 
4	 Interview	De	Hoop	Scheffer	Translated from Dutch 
5 Interview Schaper, Godderij, Berlijn, Nijssen, Siblez, Cobelens, Swartbol. 































suffering in the world. We have to act against those who cause this suffering and despair. By 
definition, intervention includes military means […] we are obliged to contribute’.7
The director of the directorate general policy of the Ministry of Defence, Co Casteleijn, 
identifies the so-called ‘burden sharing’ factor within the NATO alliance as the primary 
reason for the Dutch participation in Phase III of NATO’s expansion in Afghanistan. ‘If NATO 
views the Netherlands as a serious contributor of troops for NATO missions, than we should 
provide our troops like a true committed ally. As such, we demonstrate our political leverage. 
Of course, being a reliable NATO partner is closely related to maintaining good relationships 
with the United States […] At the time however, they were not at all exercising political 
pressure on us to commit our forces, that happened much later’.8
On the whole, respondents [civil and military] underlined the general tendency present in 
the Netherlands to downplay the existence of national interest in relation to the deployment 
of troops. Jack de Vries, political advisor to Balkenende, explains ‘in the Netherlands it is 
quite hard to define our national interest because it is heavily entangled with party politics 
and a coalition government’.9 And, when acknowledged, it often occurs behind the scenes. 
Also in the case of Uruzgan, the term national interest was not part of the vocabulary used to 
either explain or promote the mission. This does of course not imply in any way the Dutch to 
not have national interests, but very much shows the normative disposition that in principle 
the Netherlands is to engage in stabilisation activities in support of international order and 
stability without a reference to their own interest.
 
6.3 Occasions for Decisions: Military Trilateral Initiative
Deliberations about a deployment had commenced in the autumn of 2004.10 These initiatives 
predated formal Dutch governmental confirmation of its intention to commit troops which 
occurred in February 2005.11 Anticipating required troop contributions for the expansion, 
various nations, amongst them the Netherlands, had started their own multilateral talks 
with possible partners on a working level (directorates of operations of the respective 
Ministries of Defence). Hence, the initiatives developed by their director of operations did 
not come as a surprise to the military planners. The director of operations, General Cobelens, 
7 Interview Kamp.Translated from Dutch
8 Interview Casteleijn. Translated from Dutch
9 Interview De Vries,  Translated from Dutch
10 Interview Cobelens, NL LNO PJHQ, Van Klaarbergen.
11 Interview Cobelens, Kamp, Hartog, Keij, Huiben, Noom. 
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had been informed about the British plans via a Dutch liaison officer (LNO) stationed at the 
British Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in August 2004.12 In his letter to Cobelens, he 
outlined the British plans to deploy forces to the South and their interest in doing so in a 
multinational setting of likeminded nations.13
The director of operations was officially sounded out by the British somewhere in the 
autumn of 2004 with the idea of contributing forces for NATO’s expansion to the South. In 
addition, Cobelens had already established various informal contacts with the Canadians and 
the Americans as well since he anticipated a possible mission in the South of Afghanistan. 
‘Within NATO, we were one of the only nations capable of conducting such a mission [high 
operations]. In addition, we had already deployed our special forces to the Kandahar region’14, 
Cobelens revealed the Minister was constantly informed by the Chief of Defence about the 
ideas and initiatives to deploy to the South. ‘We fed the Minister of Defence with the various 
possibilities and options. As director of operations you do have a lot of power, and as such 
one has to have integrity and deliver reliable information’.15
The dynamics of the military bilateral talks16 of these likeminded nations reportedly 
took General Jim Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) by surprise: ‘They 
hammered out the whole thing without NATO’s assistance, behind closed doors.… We were 
not aware of the details’.17 
This finding supports the evidence found for this case where both the military and 
diplomatic head of the Dutch mission to NATO declared they were not in the loop when it 
came to the planning of the mission to Uruzgan. Both reported they were hardly – if ever – 
involved in either the informal negotiations or initial planning.18  Nor were they approached 
by partner nations’ delegates to explore possibilities.19  The explorative talks about a mission 
had, as mentioned earlier, started between the two directors of operations of the respective 
12 Based on archive DOPS, personal archive LNO and  interview with NL LNO, 19 June, 2013, by phone Northwood – Breda 
13 Interview NL LNO Norfolk – Breda, 18.06.2013 
14 The British had already opted for Helmand. The archive of the operations directorate does reveal however, a American 
situation report about Uruzgan (delivered by the US PRT in Uruzgan) delivered to the British. It describes potential 
strengths and weaknesses of the province for the Brits. One of the anticipated weaknesses would be the low visibility of 
the	province	and	political	impact	and	profile.	Also,	it	mentions	the	political	kudos	of	allowing	Canadians	to	have	Kandahar.	
15 Interview Cobelens. Translated from Dutch.	 This	 information	 is	 confirmed	 by	 Minister	 of	 Defence	 Kamp	 when	 he	 was	
interviewed. Translated from Dutch
16 In fact, there were trilateral talks since Canada was equally involved in this as well. However, this study only studies the 
deployment of the British and Dutch forces. As mentioned throughout this study, interesting parallels are also evident 
when	looking	at	the	Canadian	case.	See	Matthew	Willis,	‘An	Unexpected	War,	A	Not-Unexpected	Mission.	The	origins	of	
Kandahar 2005, International Journal 67(4)  (2013) 779-1000. 
17 Willis, ‘An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission’, 789.
18 Interviews Schaper and  Godderij Translated from Dutch
19 When the Netherlands kept on delaying its formal political approval for the deployment of Dutch troops the Dutch 
delegation at NATO was approached various times by partnering nations, but until than they were not in the loop. In fact, 































defence staffs. Consequently, informal talks20 on a working level at the three Ministries of 
Defence in Canada, the Netherlands, and, the United Kingdom were intensified. 
These informal talks between the three nations carried great value in the sense that 
without this partnering, none of these nations would likely have deployed their forces. In 
addition, shared thinking and observations about available provinces and probable time-
frames, amongst other things, are named to have figured in their calculations.21 
The exchange of information on a military level received a more formal status once the 
steering group military operations was informed about the deliberations concerning a 
possible deployment to South Afghanistan somewhere at the end of January 2005. Both on 
national level and international level, various documents started to appear. Following up 
on the letter sent to the MOD in August 2004, the Dutch liaison officer at British permanent 
joint headquarters had sent another letter in March that year in which he had briefly set out 
the ongoing planning of the British and their intent to cooperate with the Netherlands and 
Canada in a trilateral framework and to set up joint planning and information systems.22 
The intensification and more formal communication appearing in March 2005 was logical 
given the upcoming NATO Stage 3 informal force generation23 meeting, held in Brussels on 
the 16th of March. At this meeting, SACEUR intended to undertake early discussions with 
nations in the planning and force generation for operations. He was very well aware any 
national planning declared at the meeting had to be considered informal since most nations 
were still in, or had not even started, the process of obtaining parliamentary or governmental 
approval. 
At this point, one could start to wonder if the military was in fact not marching too fast, 
given the fact that officially politicians had not been informed yet.
Some perspectives:
Political and military processes often evolve parallel of one another, but in this particular 
case, the political process had not even started. This is quite exceptional and as far as I 
know it is the first time it has occurred in this manner. I have not experienced this before. 
The military planning process began to dictate the political need […] Foreign Affairs and 
the politicians rather easily bought into the plan. Personally (and as the counsellor of 
20 As pointed out by operational military planner Keij, ‘Communications, even only on a military level, can never be seen as 
informal. It signals much more than just ´explorative talks .́ His observation was underlined by the NL LNO at PJHQ who 
remembers how the UK was relying on NĹ s participation early on in the autumn of 2004. 
21 Willis, ‘An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission’, 780, pagina nummers uitzoeken
22 Interview Dutch LNO PJHQ, Translated from	Dutch;	and	letter	(19.08.2004)	from	LNO	to	DOPS
23	 The	procedure	for	staffing	an	operation	or	mission	is	often	referred	to	as	“force	generation”.	This	procedure	ensures	that	
Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives. http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/topics_50316.htm (latest	modification	26.08.2014,	last	accessed	08.08.2013).
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the Prime Minister), I believed the operations directorate was moving fast, too fast 
actually, since we still needed to assess the political sensitivities and determine our level 
of ambition.24
Both [pol/mil] processes are intrinsically connected to one another thereby influencing 
each other as well. Through the course of political decision-making, more clarity about 
the preconditions of the deployment is likely to occur. Military planning and preparation 
can provide more insight and information about the vocal points of the assessment 
framework, thereby possibly acquiring a prominent role in the political decision-making 
process. The inherent tension between the processes remains. Military preparation and 
the needed international agreements facilitating a possible deployment […] can result in 
irreversible consequences in the sense that the political decision-making will be reduced 
to […] ǵoing through the motions´ no matter how strongly this will be denied by the 
politicians.25 
Political and military processes, at the time when we are still exploring our options for a 
possible military mission, occur simultaneously. Being a military organisation, one tries 
to look ahead considering possible military contributions.26
These provisional actions initiated at the military level were contingent on a response from 
the political level but their impact on the decision path that evolved was nevertheless far 
from limited.
 
6.4 Emergence of  a Decision Unit: The Actions of a Single Group 
The provisional initiatives of the director of operations - in response to the British informal 
request- were supported from the start by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by one of the most 
important players, the head of political affairs, Hugo Siblesz. Cobelens was very well aware 
of the need to have at least informal back up for his informal international explorations for 
24 Interview Swartbol Translated from Dutch
25 J.A. van Reijn,’De missie Uruzgan: politieke besluitvorming nader bezien’, Carré 30(5) (2005) 20-24. Van Reijn´s perspective 
is based on his extensive experience at the military political strategic level as amongst other positions, chief plans and 
director operations at the Ministry of Defence.  His observations are also shared by some politicians, mainly from smaller 
opposition parties who describe the article 100 procedure as ´political theatre .́ Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg van de 
vaste commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Defensie, 22 februari 2006, Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, Dossier 27 925 
Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 207, 17, 31, 43.































a mission to South Afghanistan and approached Siblesz once he had been sounded out by 
the British.27
At the time when I was contacted by Cobelens, the matter had not yet been discussed at a 
political level. […] Since the risks of such a mission are political, we [MOF] have to be well 
informed about the risks and possibilities by the military. […] We assessed a deployment 
of Dutch forces to be an interesting possibility for us to play a relevant role in Afghanistan. 
We defined our interests as contributing to NATO ś expansion to the South. The military 
assured us they were up for the job. Soon thereafter, I informed our Minister [of Foreign 
Affairs].28
Both Siblesz and Cobelens believed Dutch forces were well equipped and trained to take on 
the difficult task of stabilising one of the Southern provinces in Afghanistan. Within the 
military, there was a desire [especially within the army] to prove itself under true combat 
circumstances in order to make up for the damaged reputation it had acquired ever since 
Srebrenica. In addition, the ongoing cutbacks Defence was facing fed the desire to show the 
military’s utility, often referred to as the ‘use them or lose them’ phenomenon. These lines 
of thought were known at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they were supportive of the 
evolving idea to contribute Dutch forces for NATO’s expansion in Afghanistan.29 
Initially, the informal explorations even occurred outside the scope of the steering group 
military operations. However, some months after the first talks, the steering group was 
informed about a possible contribution to NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan as well. 
After that, not only the key players in the steering group but also their respective key advisors 
and civil servants were actively engaged in the decision path that unfolded.
 
6.5  Decision Unit Dynamics: The Process of Interpretation
Even though the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs joined hands in 
the opportunity to commit troops to NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan, a common 
definition of the task at hand, had not yet surfaced. In fact, despite the military genesis of 
the activities to commit forces to South Afghanistan, the Defence staff also questioned 
27 Interview Siblesz en Cobelens Translated from Dutch
28	 Interview	Siblesz.	According	to	one	of	the	involved	diplomats	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	was	informed	at	a	rather	late	
stage (summer 2005) as such contradicting the information as provided by Siblesz Translated from Dutch
29 Interview Siblesz, Nijssen, Van Oosterom Translated from Dutch
119
Chapter 6   The D
utch Case
Part  2     Context, Cases and Analysis
and at times even criticised the possible mission. There were quite some differing views on 
the possible mission at the Ministry of Defence. First of all, the directorate general policies 
supposedly held reservations against the mission. When confronted with this assertion, the 
director of the directorate general policy at the Ministry of Defence explained the role of the 
directorate:
Our role within the Ministry is to ask difficult questions. Some people may interpret our 
critical questions as opposing arguments, but we should rather be seen as the devil’s 
advocate. It is our task to guard the Minister from issues that have not been investigated. 
As such, we ask those questions beforehand, in order to be truly able to support an 
initiative. This culture differs from the one at Foreign Affairs. There if a certain direction 
is taken, it is not done to voice criticism or start discussions. I personally believe, 
discussion are good […] until the last moment, just before the final version of the military 
advice was presented we have asked difficult questions.30 
Secondly, there were military planners who questioned the advisability of the mission at 
times. Some of them did experience stark – personal – hesitations and reservations towards 
the deployment of troops to the Southern regions of Afghanistan. ‘I have struggled with the 
mission and have had severe doubts. I wanted to be sure I had covered all possible risks […] 
One has to study his conscience very well’.31 Another planner even stated he refused to sign 
the order he had to distribute for the planning directorate of the MOD.  ‘I felt the numbers of 
troops and equipment were insufficient to do the job.32
Notwithstanding critical remarks and hesitations, the majority of the senior and civil 
military decision-makers believed a possible Dutch contribution to NATO’s expansion to the 
South of Afghanistan was feasible, thus the activities for a deployment advanced. However, 
the planning capacity at the Defence staff was limited to five planners who had to deal with 
both answering questions from Parliament and planning operations concurrently. 
As explicated by one of the planners from the Afghanistan team, there was a ‘split’ 
between having to provide guidance for the operational commands and dealing with 
political matters such as questions from Parliament: ‘ Unlike the United Kingdom which 
has separated the political and strategic level of planning33, we had to do both things at the 
same time. […] All of us knew we needed a political goal and subsequently derive our military 
30 Interview Casteleijn. Translated from Dutch
31 Interview Van der Have. Translated from Dutch
32 Interview Huiben. Translated from Dutch The planner handed back the order - unsigned - to his superior. 
33 The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is an adaptable and agile HQ created to command Joint and Combined military 
operations, and provide politically aware military advice to the Ministry of Defence. It is at the forefront of work throughout 
British Defence to further improve joint operational capability. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Guidance: The Permanent Joint 































mission from it. But in this case, there was no political goal when we started planning. […] 
joining the mission seemed more important than any other goal’.34 
Therefore, a so called ‘upscaling construction’ was launched to create additional planning 
capacity. All armed services were represented in the planning department of the Defence staff 
but the army provided additional planners from the army command. The army command 
was to provide the bulk of the personnel needed for the mission to South Afghanistan so in 
itself, as commented on by the military respondents, it was valid to reinforce the planning 
staff with mainly army planners. 
The upscaling construction apparently did have some disadvantages. The planners of the 
Defence staff indicated it had been quite difficult for those who had come to reinforce them 
to catch up. This occurred primarily because they had missed the orientation and analysis 
phase of the planning process.35  
The supposed lack of professionalism and lack of quality of the military planning 
capability at the Defence staff has been noted by quite a number of military respondents. 
Apart from the presumed low level of expertise and training for providing both strategic 
and operational analysis needed for the notification letter to Parliament (based on the 
assessment framework as described earlier), the planning staff had been charged with 
having complicated the planning of the deployment by communicating a maximum number 
of troops beforehand. Normally, the strength of the force package would be the outcome of 
the planning process. 
Yet, there is a tendency within the military, stemming from their anticipation of political 
approval for deployment of their forces, to keep their demands low. Consequently, the 
limitation in terms of troop numbers is often put upon themselves. In the case of Uruzgan, 
this was certainly the issue. The limitation of the troop numbers was described by many 
military respondents as a ‘self-inflicted wound’.36Anticipating possible political rejection 
when requesting permission to compose a robust task force, the Defence staff had come 
up with a number of 1000 troops. Minister of Defence Kamp recalled this number to have 
been presented to him by the military staff and explained that once the number was 
communicated within the political levels, there was no way back.37 As such, it became quite 
difficult to increase the number of troops when this was required by the appointed units. 
34 Interview Hartog. Translated from Dutch 
35 In a military planning process much information is collected during the so called orientation phase. This phase is to ensure 
the	 staff	 has	 a	 common	 understanding	 of	 the	 background	 and	 underlying	 causes	 of	 the	 problem	 and	 understand	 the	
political	objectives.	Afterwards,	the	staff	is	to	acquire	a	clear	understanding	of	the	problem/task.	
36 Interviews Vleugels and Keij. 
37 Interview Henk Kamp. Translated from Dutch
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Some reflections on the self-inflicted wound:
The discussion about the required number of troops was an artificial discussion. During 
a presentation by both Berlijn38 and Cobelens, one could understand, when reading 
between the lines, they wanted to have more troops. I mean, be honest and realistic and 
present your true requirement instead of anticipating resistance while doing so. When 
you come up with a phased approach with regard to deploying troops, you only do so to 
safeguard political support for the mission. There was a true belief that the politicians 
would only approve a certain number of troops which resulted in debates about how to 
make sure this quantity would not be increased […] over the course of years I have been 
annoyed about the troop numbers discussion in Parliament […] one needs to be able to 
send the right number of troops when required.39
 During the political decision-making process additional limitations or conditions are 
put upon the deployment of forces. […] [It is] Not the operational situation in the area 
where the forces are to deploy which dictates the planning, but the political situation in 
the Netherlands comes to drive the planning process. Ironically, a [any] limitation can 
result in an increase of risks for the deployed units, and a decrease in the effectiveness of 
the mission.40
The Dutch Prime Minster did not engage that much with the preparations for the mission to 
Afghanistan, neither did he provide (additional) guidance. He had been informed about the 
matter but kept a certain distance. Some respondents implied that Jack de Vries, the Prime 
Minister’s political advisor and assistant, was against the mission and to have cared more 
about party politics and the electorate. De Vries himself cannot recall he had been against 
the mission:
 I do not believe I was against the mission but yes, I did care about how things would end 
up from an electoral point of view. It was my task to advice the PM on how things would 
develop within the coalition and within Parliament and to point the PM to possible 
political risks. This can partially be best described as party politics but I also had to guard 
the profile of the PM41 
38 The Chief of Defence.
39 Interview Casteleijn. Translated from Dutch
40 Reijn,’De missie Uruzgan’.































The Prime Minister was kept in the loop throughout the planning of a possible deployment 
which was taking greater shape every day. Consequently, Prime Minister Balkenende, and his 
Minister of Defence Kamp and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bot met at the Ministry of Defence 
on the 3rd of May 2005 to be briefed on the developments and progress. Three weeks later, 
an additional meeting about the possible deployment to the South was held with all senior 
civil and military decision-makers involved (represented in the steering group military 
Operations). It was there that it was decided Minister Bot would sound out the political 
factions with regard to their provisional support for the mission.42
 
6.6 Occasion for Decision: Political Involvement 
Strengthened by the support of Prime Minister Balkenende and the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, the provisional ǵo ahead´ for the planning of the mission was provided 
during another SMO meeting on the 8th of June.43  The day before, a two day working 
conference had commenced in London dealing with Phase III of NATO’s expansion to the 
South. At this meeting, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and their (potential) 
partners, Denmark, Romania and Australia shared their thoughts and insights on committing 
to stabilising the South of Afghanistan. The various representatives at the conference were 
divided into working groups which dealt with the various aspects of NATO’s expansion to 
the South: operations, logistics, communication, information, medical, and, intelligence.  
In order to properly continue their planning, now that more official commitments had 
been made on an international level, the Netherlands needed to select a province in South 
Afghanistan. During the various meetings and contacts between the three nations, Canada 
had expressed its desire to take on Kandahar and consequently the United Kingdom decided 
to assume responsibility for Helmand. The Netherlands needed to make up their mind about 
which province would suit Dutch capabilities best, hence Ministerial approval was sought to 
deploy a recce team to Afghanistan.
Inspired by the (internationally) held belief that the Southern regions needed to be 
stabilised in an integrated manner, combining diplomatic, development, and Defence 
efforts simultaneously,  the Netherlands deployed a so-called joint fact finding mission on 
14 June. The party comprised of three military planners, an intelligence and a civil military 
officer, a diplomat and a representative of the Ministry of Development Cooperation.
42 Lenny Hazelbag, Politieke besluitvorming van de missie Uruzgan: een reconstructie. Research Paper 90 (Breda 2009) 13.
43 Hazelbag, ‘Politieke besluitvorming van de missie Uruzgan’, 14.
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Even though in the initial order it was envisioned having a civilian representative of the 
directorate general policy join the team, no such thing happened. According to the head of 
the directorate, this was a result of their, at that time, strong belief their personnel were not 
to engage with the details of the mission. This view changed throughout the course of events 
as the importance of the involvement of the directorate even on this level became apparent. 
The following anecdote perfectly illustrates the shifting dimensions in terms of roles and 
responsibilities in civil military relations - albeit in this case for the conduct of recces - at the 
Ministry of Defence:  
As a civilian strategist, I experienced what I coined the ‘Cobelens factor’, or put in other 
words, the ‘can do mentality’ as rather difficult. At the time of the fact finding mission to 
the South, there had been a discussion about the role of the DAB in these kinds of recces. 
One point of view [and my own opinion as well] was that regarding practical matters 
such as these, our directorate would not play an important role. However, eventually my 
people increasingly participated in recces. At one point in time, Foreign Affairs decided 
to include their own people in fact finding missions. This decision ultimately led to the 
participation of our directorate as well. However, the exact role of our directorate in 
this regard had not been that clear. Later on, we developed procedures for matters with 
regard to the recces to ensure a smooth cooperation. One really needs to be involved to 
be able to provide a sound judgment.44 
Officially, the fact finding mission had been – as stated earlier- executed to gather information 
about the most desirable province for the deployment of Dutch troops. But as one of the 
primary planners of the operation to Uruzgan [who was also part of the fact finding team] 
explains:  ‘Formally, a strategic recce was conducted to provide advice about which province 
the Netherlands was to deploy its forces to. Informally, this decision [Uruzgan] had already 
been taken by the Director of operations. It would have been a lot easier if we could have 
known this up front; at least I was not aware of his preference’.45 His view is supported by 
various military and political respondents.’46
Not all members of the fact finding mission agreed Uruzgan was indeed the best option 
for the Netherlands. One of the planners recalls, ‘With the limitations provided to us in 
terms of numbers of troops, the only logical outcome of the recce should have been Nimruz. 
However, it did contain the disadvantage of long logistical lines. On top of that, it would not 
44 Interview Casteleijn. Translated from Dutch
45 Interview  Huiben, Translated from Dutch































have been fair to our counterparts – in terms of risk sharing - if we had assumed responsibility 
over a relatively small and benign province’.47
Interestingly enough, initially [long before the fact finding mission] Kandahar had been 
the first choice of director of operations Cobelens. Casteleijn remembered this discussion 
well and commented: ‘The fact that we wanted to deploy our forces to the province of 
Kandahar in hindsight truly illustrates our naivety. We thought it was manageable since we 
already had deployed our special forces to the region. There was a lot of uncertainty about 
which province would ultimately be the one where we would be in the lead. In the end, we 
even feared Uruzgan to be the most dangerous province of all’.48 
The planning of the mission had been very much influenced by the boundaries set to 
the Dutch deployment: providing stability in Urzugan within a two year time frame, with a 
maximum of 1200 troops and a budget of 320 million euro’s49.  This resulted in, according to 
those involved in the planning [with a sense of understatement], a ‘challenging task’.50 
Consequently, the objectives informing the planning were not based on a proper 
assessment of the task but were driven by restrictions, partly put on themselves by the 
military [troop numbers], and partly put on the military planning process by the politicians 
[budget and time frame]. What needed to be achieved in Uruzgan, explaining why the 
Netherlands would commit its forces in the first place, was according to many respondents, 
not explicated. As such, various reasons for the deployment, like supporting the United 
States, prevention of terrorism on Dutch soil, the development of the Uruzgan, eliminating 
the Taliban, support for the facilitation of democracy in Afghanistan, etcetera,  have been 
named by both the military planners as by the diplomats. 
From the very beginning, it was evident to the military planners that an integrated 
approach to the stabilisation of Uruzgan was a prerequisite for sustainable results. The belief 
in an integrated approach had been expressed by Foreign Minister Bot in a speech he held at 
a conference on security and development in 2006, but was by no means a Dutch invention.51 
The terminology and concept had already - as mentioned earlier - been developed in Canada 
47 Interview  Huiben, Translated from Dutch
48 Interview Cobelens. Translated from Dutch
49	 Article	 100	 letter	 to	 parliament,	 Bestrijding	 Internationaal	 Terrorisme,	 brief	 van	 de	 Ministers	 van	 Buitenlandse	 Zaken,	
van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 22 december 2005, Kamerstuk 
27925, nr. 193, 6 (In Dutch).
50 One of the planners of the MOD had voiced his concern about the limit set to the amount of personell to be deployed to 
Uruzugan (Interview Huiben) Translated from Dutch Also, the commander of the Taskforce 1, expressed his concerns which 
eventually led to the commitment of additional troops (Interview Vleugels). Translated from Dutch
51 Minister Bot referred to the 3D approach as the trinity of politics, security and development - in reference to the 
Clausewitzian trinity of army, people and government-. ‘In places where we are trying to strengthen democracy and the 
rule	of	 law,	our	military	efforts	 should	 support	and	be	 seen	 to	 support	 this	overall	 effort.	Where	we	are	 trying	 to	win	
over the population for a more peaceful and stable order, our developmental instruments should support and be seen 
to	 support	 the	 overall	 effort’.	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 Bernard	 Bot,	 ‘The	 Dutch	 Approach:	 Preserving	 the	 Trinity	 of	
Politics, Security and Development’, Speech presented at the SID and NCDO Conference on Security and Development, The 
Hague (7.04.2006). http://cicam.ruhosting.nl/teksten/act.07.grotenhuis.speech%20Minister%20bot.pdf (last accessed 
15.08.2013).
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as well as in the United Kingdom.52 Already in April 2005, during a meeting in The Hague 
where concepts of the nations who would deploy their forces to the South were discussed, 
the Canadians had presented their 3D approach. Their terminology, combined with the 
terminology provided by NATO in their fragmentary order about the creation of Afghan 
Development Zones (ADZ),53 was included in the operations plan of the first task force.54
Also, the use of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)55  as a focal point of the 
stabilisation effort, supported by a battle group, had been decided upon at the international 
working conferences. The PRT was seen as the embodiment of the integrated approach, 
facilitating the stabilisation of Uruzgan.  
 
6.7 The Process Outcome: Provisional Consensus 
Meanwhile, the planning of the mission had developed in a mature and well-prepared 
fashion, requiring political approval and guidance for further execution. The group of senior 
civilian and military decision-makers reached provisional consensus, but with still a lot of 
information needed to be collected on the details of such a deployment. In order to gain 
approval for their instigated provisional actions and to continue on the decision path that 
emerged, Parliament needed to be notified. This action signalled that subsequent decisions 
would be contingent on not only the inclusion but ultimately also confirmation of Parliament 
with the taken route. 
 
6.8 The Action and the Subsequent Occasion for Decision : Notification of Parliament
On June 16th 2005, two days after the fact finding mission had left for Afghanistan, the Dutch 
Parliament was informed by the government about the latter’s intention to deploy troops 
in the Southern part of Afghanistan, in a joint effort with the United Kingdom and Canada. 
52	 The	term	‘3Dapproach’was	first	used	by	Canadians	in	2004.	See:	‘Address	by	Prime	Minister	Paul	Martin	on	occasion	of	his	
visit to Washington DC’, 29 April 2004. The British have introduced the comprehensive approach in their joint discussion 
note 04/05 published by their Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre in 2005. See: UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Comprehensive 
Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05 (January 2006)’, http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=we
b&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.arrc.nato.int%2Fsystems%2Ffile_download.ashx%3Fpg%3D3313
%26ver%3D1&ei=aX7GU8DmNKrH7Aa1n4GIBg&usg=AFQjCNEF5Hllu9tO_UUFuwzRhg7aludNtg&sig2=W4Bi3beS01Jd4rw
cwZcAEA (last accessed January 2013).
53 For a description of Afghan Development Zones, see chapter 4, P 89-99.
54 Interview Van Klaarbergen. Translated from Dutch































Officially and formally, this so-called ‘notification’, is the starting point for finding out the 
desirability and feasibility of a military mission. But as already shown, in reality and for all 
practical purposes, the prospects and possibilities for the intended deployment had been 
under political, diplomatic and military scrutiny for over a year. In Brussels, as well as in 
The Hague, deliberations were well underway with all parties and partners involved, about 
how a robust contribution to ISAF’s next stage in the stabilisation of Afghanistan, could be 
envisioned.56 
The announcement was, due to political sensitivities, somehow hidden in a more 
general letter to parliament regarding a NATO meeting.57 Anticipating political sensitivities 
regarding a possible deployment, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs had already probed coalition party D66 [Liberal Democrats] and opposition party 
PvdA [Labour].58 Consequently, both parties agreed to further explorations and planning 
to the South of Afghanistan.59 However, some Members of Parliament had expressed their 
annoyance about the ‘concealing feature’ of the letter.60
 
6.9 The Changing Configuration of the Unit: An (Inter) Governmental Coalition 
The configuration of the decision group in which the senior civilian and military decision-
makers had acted thus far had changed since parliament was informed about a possible 
deployment of forces. Now not only domestic politics came into play, but also the informal 
military working groups that were engaged with the details of the military endeavour 
acquired a more prominent status in the sense that the conditionality of the actions of the 
three nations further specified the interdependency of a joint approach. 
Indeed, five days after Parliament had been informed, General Cobelens and some 
of his staff members61 left for another trilateral working conference. The objective of the 
56 Lenny Hazelbag, ‘Political Decision-making of the Mission in Uruzgan, a Reconstruction’, in: De Weger, M, Osinga, F. and 
Kirkels (eds.) NL-ARMS 2009. Complex Operations: Studies on Lebanon (2006) and Afghanistan (2006-present) (Breda 2009) 251-276; 
Meulen and Grandia, ´Brussels Calling: Domestic Politics under International Pressure .́
57 Brief van de Minister van Defensie, 16 juni 2005, Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, Dossier 28 676 NAVO, nr. 22.
58	 The	letter	was	supposed	to	initiate	further	consultation	between	the	government	and	parliament,	after	which	the	article	
100 procedure was to result in a decision about the deployment. However, opposition party D66 had already announced 
its	point	of	view	before	the	letter	appeared.		In	a	television	broadcasting	(Buitenhof )	fraction	leader	Boris	Dittrich	expressed	
his sincere doubts the mission. Klep, Uruzgan, 23.
59 Klep, Uruzgan, 22
60 Hazelbag, Politieke besluitvorming van de missie Uruzgan, 15
61	 The	party	included	an	operational	planner,	a	communications	officer	and	information	officer
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meeting held in Ottawa was to seek concurrence on a common approach to ISAF Stage III in 
preparation for NATO’s force generation conference to be held on the 25th of July.62
Apart from the national delegations of the three lead nations, there were also 
representatives from relevant NATO commands: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE), Joint Forces Command Brussum (JFCB), American commands and staffs: 
Central Command Tampa (CENTCOM), Joint Staff and Pentagon, and other potential force 
contributors for Stage III such as Romania and Australia. 
Even though most nations had not yet concluded their operational analysis, a potential 
outline about the structure of forces required63 for the region was presented. The Americans 
advised a minimum of one provincial reconstruction team and one battle group or taskforce 
per province and emphasised the need to train both the Afghan national police and army if 
one was to achieve long term stability and security.64
On the 25th of July, the formal force generation conference for NATO’s Stage III operations 
to the South of Afghanistan was held in Brussels. Following from the advice provided by the 
director of operations of the MOD, the Netherlands offered to assume responsibility over 
Uruzgan but did announce some preconditions adjunct to their bid. The Dutch commitment 
was first of all limited to force strength of around 1100 (excluding the F16 squadron). Secondly, 
the Dutch favoured a phased approach to stabilisation of the province and wanted to remain 
autonomous in their decision as to whether or not  a new phase would be initiated (the so 
called incremental approach as explained earlier). Thirdly, the Dutch demanded that their 
fighter jets and helicopters to be stationed at Kandahar airport - so they would be able to 
provide air support65 to the Dutch troops – before the Dutch would start their operations. 
The fourth precondition was the requirement of a partner nation to support the Dutch in 
Uruzgan. Australia had already announced its intention to support the Dutch provincial 
reconstruction team with 200 soldiers. The fifth condition attributed the requirement of 
NATO funding for the military base at Kandahar. The Dutch believed it would be unfair if 
the three lead nations would be the only ones financing this essential piece of NATO’s 
infrastructure in the South. The last, and imperative aspect for the Dutch,  as will be shown 
later on, was the de-confliction between the American counter terrorist operations under 




PRTs supported by a military structure versus a military structure supported by PRTs. A decision had to be made concerning 
which	element	of	would	be	in	the	lead,	since	this	would	inevitably	influence	the	force	structure.
64	 The	information	provided	in	the	paragraphs	about	the	meeting	in	Ottawa	contains	an	unclassified	summary	of	the	data	
collected from documents of the operations directorate at the MOD. In addition, lieutenant colonel Bert Keij (one of the 
members of the planning party) provided insights about the meeting. Interview Keij. Translated from Dutch
65 Ever since Srebrenica, where air support could/had not been delivered to the Dutch troops in need, the provision of air 































the mandate of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the stabilisation operations headed 
by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).66 
Anticipating political approval would soon materialise, a warning order was sent to those 
military units likely to be deployed to Afghanistan on the 16th of August of 2005. Meanwhile, 
a third trilateral conference was to take place in The Hague on the 17th and 18th of August 
2005. NATO was to include all developed concepts of the working groups on operational, 
logistical, informational, communicational and medical matters in their final operations 
order 67 for the expansion to the South. At the time of the conference, both Canada and the 
United Kingdom had received political approval for the participation of their forces in the 
stabilisation of respectively Kandahar and Helmand. Denmark – a partner of the British - was 
still awaiting political approval. Australia announced it investigated a partnership with the 
Dutch PRT in Uruzgan and expected to receive a decision in November. They had already 
decided however, to deploy a Special Forces unit of 350 men to Uruzgan, operating under 
direct command of the Americans from September 2005 onward.68
Given the limitation to the Dutch mission in terms of troop numbers, it became paramount 
to find a suitable partner in order to be able to effectively expand coalition presence in the 
province. As such, the Australian deliberations to reinforce the Dutch PRT with at least 200 
military were warmly welcomed by the Netherlands. It was agreed bilateral meetings would 
be initiated in close cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well.69
6.10 Process of Interpretation: Domestic versus International Pressures
The process of interpretation was ongoing, at times requiring new decisions and inputs, 
but to a great degree continuing the activities as had unfolded from the outset. Thus, as 
preparations continued, a second recce was executed from the 8th to 14th September. The 
operational and logistic picture of the province needed enhancement and the developed 
concept of operations needed to be validated. On the whole, the team concluded the concept 
66 Discussion note of Directorate General Policy, Directorate Operations on the NL contribution to the Force Generation 
Conference	 Stage	 3	 in	 Afghanistan	 directed	 to	 the	 Minister	 and	 his	 secretary	 of	 State,	 21.07.2005.	 Keyfiles,	 Directie	
Operatieën (DOPS), disk 225, Semi Statisch Informatiebeheer Rijswijk. 
67 NATO’s operation order was to be presented at the NAC in October 2005. 
68	 Minutes	 working	 group	 meeting,	 24.08.2005,	 Keyfiles,	 Directie	 Operatieën	 (DOPS),	 disk	 225,	 Semi	 Statisch	
Informatiebeheer Rijswijk. 
69	 Minutes	 working	 group	 meeting,	 24.08.2005,	 Keyfiles,	 Directie	 Operatieën	 (DOPS),	 disk	 225,	 Semi	 Statisch	
Informatiebeheer Rijswijk. 
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of operations to be sustainable. The gathered information was processed in ‘first impression 
reports’ and distributed to the various military commands engaged in the planning.70
On the 19th September 2005, the United Kingdom called for a bilateral consultation 
with the Netherlands at its embassy in The Hague. The meeting covered British plans71 
for Helmand and the pending political approval for Dutch forces to deploy. The British 
emphasised their need for close coordination with the civilian part of the stabilisation effort 
in close coordination with the Netherlands and Canada, and proposed to establish a network 
of political advisors and to set up a monthly political-military video conference between the 
three capitals.72
Quite some turbulence, doubt, and nuisance, about the feasibility of the mission to 
Uruzgan evolved at the Defence staff in October 2005. The main source of commotion was 
the information provided in a report about the province by the Dutch military intelligence 
service. The report was initially provided to the Defence staff since the intelligence estimate 
about the security situation and the possibilities of exerting influence on the spoilers in the 
region was needed to compose a proper military advice. 
Apparently, an intelligence assessment and a supplementary intelligence report were 
circulating within the staff. Hence, it was not clear to the military planners which verdict 
about the security situation needed to be included in the military advice about the mission. 
As such, guidance was sought and the Minister and his Secretary of State were to decide on 
which formulation would best describe the level of insecurity in Uruzgan.73
A day before the report was sent to the Defence staff, the director of operations, General 
Cobelens, had already expressed the Dutch concerns regarding the security situation in 
Uruzgan at the trilateral working conference74 in Tampa, in the United States. Also, the 
deputy Chief of Defence and the director of political affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
had conducted explorative talks with the Australians in Australia, trying to safeguard the 
presence of an international partner in Uruzgan. 
On the 27th of October, the Chief of Defence presented the military advice, composed by 
his military planners and the directorate of general policy, to the Minister of Defence. As the 
head of the directorate remembered:
70 Recce reports, Directorate Operations, Ministry of Defence 2006, Defence Archives, Rijswijk. Liefst nog met vindplaats 
(archieffonds,	inventarisnummer,	ev.	Folionummer
71 The British elaborated on their plan for Helmand, outlining a phased presence of three year whereby they would focus on 
the	development	of	good	governance,	security,	and,	social-economic	development,	and,	the	fight	against	the	drugs	in	the	
region.
72 Interview Casteleijn. 
73 Internal memo on the intelligence report on Uruzgan, Directorate Operations, Ministry of Defence, Defence Archives, 
Rijswijk	archieffonds,	inventarisnummer,	ev.	Folionummer
74	 During	the	conference	Cobelens	emphasised	the	Dutch	perspective	that	NATO	should	be	able	to	make	a	visible	difference	
from OEF. Cobelens stated that if partners will prolong the current working methods of operations, there is a concern that 
partners	will	miss	a	window	of	opportunity	to	change.	Otherwise,	OEF	would	be	prolonged	with	a	NATO	flag	on	top	of	it.	































 Military advice provided to the politicians about a possible mission requires a long way to 
appear in its definite form. It does take an enormous amount of time and effort to finally 
get the signature of the Minster for the military advice. And when it finally does appear 
in its final setting, the Minister, nor me, will tamper with it. However, in the case of this 
particular mission, the military advice was adjusted after the appearance of a report from 
our military intelligence service. At the end of October in 2005, a crisis appeared when 
this report disclosed the true dangers of the mission.75
The day after the military advice had been presented to the Minister of Defence, the Council 
of Ministers conveyed but did not come to a decision about the mission. Shortly after, the 
Minister left for a visit to Afghanistan in a troubled state of mind with the information he 
had acquired about the security situation in Uruzgan. During this visit, he expressed his 
concerns about the feasibility of the mission and cast doubts as to whether the deployment 
was worth the risk. He especially referred to the fact that very likely counterinsurgency 
operations needed to be executed, something he was not a proponent of. He was cautioned 
to use such terminology by the directorate of general policy since it was assessed to create 
more opposition against the deployment. As such, it was decided to refrain from using the 
terms.76 
As a result of the information collected during the visit to Afghanistan and the information 
provided to him in the military advice, Minister Kamp had drafted a list of sixteen specific 
points he wanted to have explicated or guaranteed before he would deploy his forces. The 
drafting of this list anticipated possible questions and worries of Parliament about certain 
issues of the mission, like the separation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the 
NATO mission. The Minister preferred to have matters defined and arranged before he would 
present the mission to Parliament.77
The most prominent issues on the Defence Minister’s list included a need for American 
involvement in terms of troops and training activities in and around Uruzgan. He desired 
the continued presence of American forces in the North of Uruzgan since Dutch forces were 
unable – as indicated during a recce executed by the army staff78- to maintain the American 
firebases Anaconda and Cobra. Limited troop presence in the north of the province would 
75 Interview Casteleijn, Translated from Dutch
76 Interview Kamp and reports of DOPS 2006 Directorate Operations, Ministry of Defence, Defence Archives, Rijswijk. 
Translated from Dutch






Defence archives. Translated from Dutch
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create further instability, as such requiring American reinforcement. In addition, American 
reconstruction and fighting capability was envisioned to be crucial in the South east bordering 
province Zabul. Moreover, the Minister wanted a continuing American engagement in the 
development and training of Afghan police and military capability.79
Other points on the list encompassed the financing of airfield Kandahar by NATO 
instead of those nations executing operations in the Southern provinces and the provision 
of extra NATO troops if the Dutch required them. Furthermore, Kamp wanted the Afghan 
administration to provide capable administrators and police forces needed for the 
stabilisation of the province, and the Afghan government was to provide services for the 
Dutch troops to hand over captives in a responsible manner. Also, sufficient funding was to 
be allocated for the taskforce to be able to execute reconstruction activities. 
The sensitive80 matter of Dutch Special Forces operating in Kandahar province under 
the OEF mandate [one of the issues on the 16 bullet list of Kamp] was solved rather quickly 
by assigning the Special Forces to the task force in Urzugan, which was to operate under 
the ISAF mandate. The disentangling of the Special Forces engagement from OEF was not 
without paradoxes since the Dutch government in chorus required guarantees for American 
support in case of emergencies. Yet the United States were not very keen on special bilateral 
agreements that exceeded what under the circumstances could be considered a normal kind 
of mutual assistance. It took some tough negotiating at the highest levels in Brussels to 
formulate a solution that satisfied The Hague.81 Looking back on how in general OEF and 
ISAF were formally defined as worlds apart, the former head of military intelligence, Major-
General Van Reijn ironically remarked: ‘Evidently, the operational reality in Uruzgan and the 
political reality in the Netherlands, do not always coincide’.82
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence jointly tackled the issues as listed earlier 
and exploited their specific channels. Diplomatic channels were utilised to exert pressure on 
Afghan authorities to appoint trustworthy and capable administrators to Uruzgan; a demand 
also stressed by Foreign Minister Bot during a meeting with Karzai in Vienna on the 14th of 
November.  At this meeting, the situation in Uruzgan was also discussed and possibilities for 
developing a Memorandum of Understanding between the Netherlands, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Afghan government regarding the treatment 
of Afghan prisoners, were addressed. Minister Bot indicated President Karzai warned him 
about the worsening security situation in the province.83
79 Interview Kamp and reports of DOPS Archive 2006. Translated from Dutch.
80 Separating ISAF´s endeavors at stabilization and reconstruction from OEFs counter terrorism campaign, became a central 
issue in legitimising the deployment to  Uruzgan
81 Meulen and Grandia, ´Brussels calling: domestic politics under international pressure ,́ 22.
82 Reijn,’De missie Uruzgan’. 































The possible international repercussions on the lingering decision-making process were 
delivered in a letter from the head of the general policy directorate at the MOD to Defence 
Minister Kamp. He put forward several political considerations84 the Minister was to 
consider before coming to a final conclusion.  Meanwhile, the version of events with regard 
to the security situation [as presented in the military intelligence rapport] found its way to 
the public arena as the media started reporting on a possible Dutch mission to a dangerous 
area in South Afghanistan.85  
At the end of November, almost half a year after Parliament had been notified, a political 
decision was still pending. Several diplomatic activities86 were carried out to somehow 
influence the troubled state of affairs of attaining political approval.  Even though a decision 
was anticipated before Christmas, the last weeks of the year remained turbulent. A meeting 
with international partners scheduled in December, to further refine the planning of the 
deployment, was postponed until January and no orders were provided to the designated 
military units to advance their deployment activities.
Consequently, a long range of meetings and discussions were held with various political 
parties and authorities behind closed doors. The Council of Ministers discussed the mission 
three times87 over the course of three weeks. At one of these meetings, the Chief of Defence 
even briefed the Council, something which had never happened before. He was also 
requested to brief Parliament about the intended mission to Uruzgan. As explicated by the 
director of political affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘They wanted to see a uniform 
explaining what the mission was all about.’88
However, the political mood had not changed quite to the benefit of providing the 
political endorsement it required.89 At this point, the Dutch NATO Secretary General could 
no longer hide his frustration with the continuing delay of a Dutch political decision and 
publicly cast his doubts in the media.90 He urged a quick and positive decision. According 
to the press, his intervention annoyed some of the Ministers. An anonymous source from 
84	 The	 main	 issues	 as	 addressed	 by	 Casteleijn	 in	 his	 letter	 to	 the	 Minister	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 the	 military	 advice	 answer	
the political consideration regarding the division between OEF and ISAF, the threat of the Taliban, the tension between 
reconstruction	and	offensive	operations,		the	suggested	incremental	approach	and	the	troop	number	discussion,	the	rules	
of	engagement,	 local	Afghan	government	capacity	and	credibility,	 the	finances	of	 the	mission	and	a	plan	B	 in	case	 the	
Minister would decide not to deploy his forces to Uruzgan (Interview Casteleijn). Translated from Dutch
85 Dam, ‘Uruzgan, The CNN factor’.
86 Meulen and Grandia, ´Brussels Calling: Domestic Politics under International Pressure ,́ 21-22.
87 The deployment to Uruzgan was discussed at the board of Ministers at the 2nd ,9th  and 26th of  December 2005. 
88 Interview Siblesz.Translated from Dutch
89 Again, formal approval of parliament is not needed. However, the desirability of gaining political support in terms of a 
broad parliamentary majority has become a trend ever since Srebrenica. 
90 Meulen and Grandia, ´Brussels Calling: Domestic Politics under International Pressure ,́ 21.
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within the Cabinet was quoted as saying: ‘When things go wrong with this mission and 
people get killed, De Hoop Scheffer doesn’t have to do the explaining’.91 
Meanwhile, international partners started to become slightly nervous. Even the British 
Minister of Defence, John Reid, started to delay his activities concerning the deployment 
of his own forces, while referring to the uncertainty of Dutch parliamentary approval. The 
British had already – given the planned start of their activities in Helmand in May 2006 – 
begun with their practical preparations such as shipping their material and goods. These 
ships were brought to a halt in international waters, now awaiting approval to carry on since 
they were stopped by the Minister of Defence. But even more worrisome, it was assessed by 
British officials, Reid would  – in case the Dutch would not deploy – no longer present the 
British military and financial plans regarding their deployment to the House of Commons. 
If the Dutch argument about security situation in the South, defining it as too dangerous 
to start reconstruction activities, it was thought that the British Defence Minister would 
ask NATO to reconsider the possibility of the stabilisation of the Southern provinces in 
Afghanistan.92
Pending a political decision, telexes between Ottawa, London, and, the Hague, were 
running overtime. The content of the correspondence indicated a potential political rejection 
of the mission would not only jeopardise the position of the Netherlands within the alliance, 
but would endanger ISAF’s expansion to the South, and as such would undermine NATO’s 
credibility as a whole. It was furthermore assessed that a Dutch rejection of the mission 
would also play into the hands of officials in Washington who already had expressed their 
severe doubts about the added value of multilateral institutions such as NATO.93  
Hastily, anticipating possible international diplomatic mayhem, the diplomatic posts 
of the Netherlands in Washington, Brussels, Canberra, Budapest, Copenhagen, Ottawa, 
and London were instructed with ‘lines to take’ with regard to the unfortunate delay of a 
decision. On the 23rd of December, messages were sent to the capitals referring to the political 
situation in the Netherlands, promising to send off a translated version of the Article 100 
letter soon and anticipating a resolution of the matter by the beginning of February 2006.94
6.11 Process Outcome: The Article 100 Letter and Its Delivery to Parliament
91 Amerikaanse topambtenaren naar Den Haag: Bert Bakker (D66); ‘Ik hel steeds meer over naar een Nee’, Het Parool, 30 
November 2005. Translated from Dutch.
92	 Diplomatic	correspondence	20.12.2005.	Brussels,	Washington,	London,	Ottawa,	The	Hague,	Defence	Archives,	Rijswijk.
93	 Defence	archives,	diplomatic	 correspondence	20.12.2005.	Brussels,	Washington,	 London,	Ottawa,	The	Hague,	Defence	
Archives, Rijswijk.































The delivery of the Article 100 letter to parliament resulted in a deadlock which delayed the 
decision-making procedure to a great degree. However, before this episode is addressed it 
is important to discuss the drafting of the letter. As outlined earlier in this chapter, when 
it comes to the deployment of Dutch forces no easy or hasty decisions are made. Indeed, 
the assessment framework, foundational for the Article 100 letter, serves to balance the 
objectives set for the mission and attends to both political and military matters. On the basis 
of an analysis of the conflict, a judgement should be made about the means available to the 
international community (political, economic, and military) to stabilise the conflict. 
Cabinet should elaborate on why it believes that the military instrument is the most 
suitable instrument (means) in terms of political desirability. Its judgement is heavily 
dependent on the advice provided by the Defence staff. The military advice answers questions 
like suitability and availability of military units since the contribution has to match the 
composition and character of the multinational armed force and must be tailored to the 
anticipated tasks. The development of the military advice is, as indicated by the military 
planners, to a great extent channelled through the use of the assessment framework. The 
planners referred to the assessment framework as a ‘checklist’.95
The most important review criterion for the mission would have been the government’s 
assessment of the military deployment’s utility. In the case of Uruzgan, the solution was 
found in pragmatic reasoning. The government acknowledged the process of state building 
and democratisation had to start from scratch and would take an undefined period of time to 
take root. This message however would be difficult to convey in political and military terms. 
It in fact implied a blank cheque in terms of commitments in time. Consequently, the Dutch 
effort was presented in the earlier mentioned manageable fashion of two years. This also 
fitted in the strategy of the international community directed to foster commitment for the 
Afghanistan by defining measurable results within set time frames.96
As illustrated by one of the military planners: 
We needed to get a political mandate for at least two years, but knew we needed more 
time to achieve the goals set for the mission […] The political objective was to participate 
in ISAF […] not difficult in terms of providing military advice but unsatisfactory. We joined 
the mission on the basis of incorrect thoughts; it was more important to provide troops 
for at least two years instead of achieving a certain objective like a stable environment.97 
95 Interviews military planners. 
96 Klep, Uruzgan,123-132; Article	100	letter	to	parliament,	brief	van	de	Ministers	van	Buitenlandse	Zaken,	van	Defensie	en	voor	
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken II vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 22 december 2005, Dossier 27925 
Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 193.
97 Interview Hartog, Translated from Dutch
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In order to acquire unanimous approval from the coalition partner D66, who had been 
against the mission from its outset, a gathering was held with a delegation of the party shortly 
before the mission was discussed in the Council of Ministers on the 16th of December. At the 
meeting, the Chief of Defence and the head of the directorate general policy of the Ministry 
of Defence were to brief them about the mission. Shortly before they met, the head of the 
party in parliament, Borris Dittrich, held a press conference in which he declared his party to 
be in opposition to the mission. His statement forced both D66 Ministers and Cabinet into 
an awkward situation. Hence, now that international agreements had been made and the 
Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs had carefully worked on all the major issues possibly 
hampering the mission, party politics98 seemed to stretch the matter more even before a 
Cabinet decision was taken.99
At this point, in all likelihood, a political crisis was likely to arise regarding the 
deployment of Dutch forces to South Afghanistan. One of the opposition parties (PvdA) had 
also expressed its hesitations and was now sure the mission would not materialise as they 
did not expect D66’s Ministers to oppose the position of its party in Parliament. On the 21st 
of December, the evening before the mission was to be presented at the Council of Ministers, 
Foreign Affairs Minister Bot tried to massage the Ministers of D66 into agreeing with the 
mission and offered them the possibility of changing the word “decision” in the article 100 
letter into “intention”. This was believed to facilitate a way out of the stalemate and both 
Ministers agreed on the issue.
It was however not foreseen that the employment of the term intention would in fact 
initiate another episode in the already difficult state of affairs. When, finally, after months 
of deliberation, Parliament was officially informed about a mission to Uruzgan on the 22nd 
of December, the content of the letter was not discussed, but the use of the word intention 
became the centre of attention. In fact, Parliament refused to debate the letter while the 
status of it was reduced to an intention instead of a decision. 
It would take until the 13th of January 2006 for Parliament to deal with the matter. The 
main cause of the delay was rooted in the use of the term intention, but another reason was 
the material right Parliament believed it had acquired over the years in terms of delivering 
its consent about the deployment of forces. The time between the 22nd of December and the 
13th of January was used to deal with all procedural matters regarding the way in which the 
98	 The	hassle	caused	by	the	public	statements	of	D	´66	leader	Borris	Dittrich	are	attributed	to	as	party	politics.	The	prevalent	
reading	of	the	course	of	events	point	to	the	power	struggle	within	the	party	about	its	future	leadership.	Apparently,	Dittrich	
anticipated the mission would not materialize (due to a lack of parliamentary support) and assumed his public performance 
shortly before the mission would be decided upon within the council of Ministers could potentially strengthen his position 
in the party. As soon as the D66 Ministers voted for the mission, his position became untenable and he resigned. He has 
admitted	to	having	played	a	game	and	to	have	lost.	The	´game´	has	been	heavily	criticized	in	parliament	during	the	general	
consultation held on the 2nd of February. For an overview of the casted critique see: Verslag van een Algemeen Overleg van 
de vaste commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Defensie, 22 februari 2006, Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, Dossier 27 
925 Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 207, 28 and 37































mission would be discussed in Parliament. It was agreed there would be a round of written 
questions, a hearing and a confidential briefing before a general consultation100 would be 
held before matters could be forced to a conclusion.101  As explicated by Foreign Minister Bot:
In my years as Minister of Foreign Affairs I was amazed about the great level of detail 
Parliament involved itself with. There were tons of very detailed questions. Questions 
whose relevance and interest were unknown to me, and mainly served to promote either 
the respective Member of Parliament or the party itself. These questions made me sick. 
I know it is difficult to be a good Member of Parliament, but these questions no longer 
serve any purpose, instigate an inconceivable amount of work, and, in the end, nothing 
is done with the information’ provided.102
Meanwhile, the media exploited the Parliamentary interlude to advance the discussion 
initiated by the opposition as to whether the intended deployment was a reconstruction 
or a fighting mission. This binary representation had caused quite some nuisance amongst 
the senior civil and military decision-makers since the Article 100 letter had outlined both 
the importance of reconstruction, as well as the importance of advancing security through 
combat, also pointing to the risks of the mission. In fact, the objective of the mission was 
presented as supporting and strengthening the Afghan authorities, and by doing so enabling 
them to eventually provide their own security and stability: 
In line with the ISAF mandate the Dutch detachment will focus on enhancing stability 
and security by increasing the support of the local population for the Afghan authorities, 
and decreasing the support for the Taliban and associated groups. Fostering good 
governance, efficient police and armed forces, enhancing the constitutional state, the 
execution of CIMIC and reconstruction activities, and the stimulation of reconstruction 
activities by others are important elements of this approach.103
Nevertheless, even though the Article 100 letter carefully described both the fighting and 
reconstruction efforts that had to be undertaken by the taskforce in order to stabilise 
100	For	 a	detailed	overview	of	 the	general	 consultation	 see:	 	Kristić,	 ‘De	Staten-Generaal	 en	de	 inzet	 van	de	Nederlandse	
krijgsmacht’, 146-147. In Dutch
101 For a day to day reconstruction of the version of events between the 22nd of December until the 13th of January see: 
Hazelbag, ‘Political Decision-making of the Mission in Uruzgan, a Reconstruction’. 
102 Interview Bot, Translated from Dutch.
103	Article	 100	 letter	 to	 parliament,	 brief	 van	 de	 Ministers	 van	 Buitenlandse	 Zaken,	 van	 Defensie	 en	 voor	
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken II vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 22 december 2005, Dossier 27 925 
Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 193, Translated from Dutch.
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Uruzgan, the reconstruction effort swayed most of political actors and the media.104 Finally 
on the 13th of January, the third version of the Article 100 letter was debated in Parliament. 
By no means were the risks of the mission hidden or not explicated:
This is a mission with real military risks. It has to be noted that the armed forces have 
gained a lot of knowledge and experience with risky missions in places like Iraq and 
Afghanistan and that they have accomplished these missions successfully. Although it 
cannot be ruled out that on the Dutch side there will be casualties, the government is of 
the opinion that with the knowledge and experienced gained, with the build-up and the 
size of the Dutch contingent, and with the assurances of help and assistance from NATO, 
the risks have been brought down in such a way that the mission is a responsible one. 
Stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan, in particular the South where the Taliban 
originate is of the utmost importance to furthering international lawful order as well 
as to combating the international terrorism that is a threat to Europe also. Especially 
because of the latter interest, the government considers the risks to be acceptable.105
The main justification of the mission, as presented in the letter to Parliament, was the 
prevention of another terrorist attack by taking away their breeding ground in Afghanistan. 
This was an argument which had not been used earlier nor represented typical Dutch rhetoric 
such as contribution to relief of international suffering. Furthermore, no causal link between 
deploying troops to Urzugan and by doing so preventing a possible terrorist attack in the 
Netherland had been established in the minds of the Dutch population.106 Interestingly 
enough, all parliamentary reports and correspondence from the outset of the planned mission 
throughout the deployment were filed in a dossier called ́  Fighting International Terrorism’.107 
104	Articles	focussing	on	the	reconstruction	effort:	“Volgens	Bos	is	de	gevechtsmissie	gescheiden	van	de	wederopbouwmissie	
waar de Nederlanders aan zullen meedoen” cited in: ‘Optimisme over doorgaan Afghanistan-missie’, Elsevier, 31 januari 
2006;	“Nederland gaat	deelnemen	aan	de	 ISAF-missie	van	de	NAVO	 in	de	Afghaanse	provincie	Uruzgan.	Deze	missie	 is	
gericht  op	 wederopbouw”	 cited	 in:	 NOS,	 ’Missie	 Uruzgan	 gaat	 door’	 (version	 21.02.	 2006),	 http://nos.nl/artikel/54336-
missie-uruzgan-gaat-door.html	;	´Vrijdag	3	februari	heeft	de	Nederlandse	Regering	besloten	definitief	deel	te	nemen	aan	
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) stage 3. Medio dit jaar vertrekken 1200 militairen naar Uruzgan voor hun 
wederopbouwmissie´ cited in: Ministerie van Defensie,  ‘Persbericht 03-02-2006’, http://www.defensie.nl/documenten/
persbericht/2006/02/03/persmap-0>.
105	Article	 100	 letter	 to	 parliament,	 brief	 van	 de	 Ministers	 van	 Buitenlandse	 Zaken,	 van	 Defensie	 en	 voor	
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken II vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 22 december 2005, Dossier 27 925 
Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 193, Translated from Dutch.
106 Christ Klep, Uruzgan. 124.
107	All	 parliamentary	 documents	 related	 to	 the	 mission	 in	 Afghanistan	 are	 stored	 under	 file	 number	 27	 925,	 named	
































6.12 The Foreign Policy Action: The Deployment of Forces
As delineated in the previous paragraphs, much of the planning of the mission had already 
occurred before a formal decision to deploy had been made; even political approval for 
explorations was sought quite late. The planning was very much influenced by the boundaries 
set for the Dutch deployment: providing stability in Urzugan within a two year time frame, 
with a maximum of 1200 troops and a budget of 320 million Euro’s108, resulted in – according 
to those involved in the planning with a sense of understatement - a ‘challenging task’.109 
The stabilisation of Uruzgan was communicated as an integrated effort, but it had not 
yet been caught in a joint plan. The military planners at the Defence staff had developed 
a concept of operations based on the information gathered at the international working 
conferences and during the recces. Based on the acquired information, the planners assessed 
an incremental approach to best suit both the Dutch capabilities and the task of stabilising 
the province. The approach advocated a phased110 unfolding of troop presence throughout 
Uruzgan allowing a fine alignment of the strengths and weaknesses of the units versus the 
anticipated risks. The concept and other documents such as NATO’s operations order, and 
military estimates were provided to the assigned commander of the taskforce111 and his staff 
in order to draft a plan. 
Most (mainly military) respondents indicated the lack of a strategy - explicating the 
objectives that needed to be attained, which forced the staff of the first taskforce to formulate 
these objectives themselves. As explained by General Vleugels: ‘We can deal with quite some 
vagueness when it comes to planning a military operation. But this was not a purely military 
operation. We were to stabilise the region with a set of actors. The coordination of that 
108	Article	 100	 letter	 to	 parliament,	 brief	 van	 de	 Ministers	 van	 Buitenlandse	 Zaken,	 van	 Defensie	 en	 voor	
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken II vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 22 december 2005, Dossier 27 925 
Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 193 (In Dutch).
109 One of the planners of the MOD had voiced his concern about the limit set to the amount of personnel to be deployed to 
Uruzugan (Interview Huiben, Translated from Dutch).Also, the commander of the Taskforce 1, expressed his concerns which 
eventually led to the commitment of additional troops (Interview Vleugels, Translated from Dutch).
110 In the operational concept, the following phases were distinguished: Phase 0: ‘Build up’. The deployment taskforce is to 
assume their construction activities and a small forward detachement  is to collect information and take over the projects 
of the American provincial reconstruction team; Phase 1:  ‘Containment’. The majority of the task force is to deploy and 
take over responsibility of the province from the Americans, but will still keep their presence limited to Tarin Kowt and Deh 
Rawood. The objective during this phase is to gain situational awareness and to create freedom of movement; Phase 2: ‘Ink 
spot	I’.	Extra	infantry	capability	in	order	to	enlarge	the	Dutch	presence	and	influence	in	the	province;	Phase	3:	‘Ink	spot	II’.	
Additional	infantry	capability	to	further	enlarge	the	Dutch	presence	and	influence	in	the	province.	During	this	phase,	the	
taskforce will be at its highest strength. It was explicated in the concept of operations only the Dutch would decide when 
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effort, be it in either a plan or a guiding document, was not provided. As such, we had to deal 
with it ourselves.’ 112
The emergent feature of a strategy for Uruzgan, initiated from the operational military 
level, was commented on by respondents as inherently connected to the complexity of 
contemporary missions.113  A blatant contradiction can be found in the views provided by 
many of the same respondents.  Most of them agreed a strategy should have been explicated, 
whilst they also pointed to the fact that they think a strategy would not have made a great 
difference in terms of the drafting of the concept of operations and the plan.114 
Generally, the confusion seemed to arise from the understanding of what strategy is and 
is not. Some respondents believed strategic guidance provided by the Chief of Defence is 
strategy, others [mainly civil respondents] believed everything the Ministry of Foreign affairs 
does is strategy and some even claimed strategy to be a theoretical invention which does not 
appear in practice. Most civil respondents pointed to the fact that they were not accustomed 
to drafting strategies at all and, in addition, did not believe that setting concrete goals would 
be helpful since it would imply accountability. 
Some perspectives:
Politicians do not like to be held accountable. Vagueness is part of their language […] 
Missions like these need to be designed with a sense of pragmatism. Indeed, we did not 
have a clear interdepartmental strategy, but it was all new. Consequently, the planning 
was done in a pragmatic manner.115
Preferably the goals set in a campaign plan have to be identified by The Hague but if it is 
decided on grounds of ‘situational awareness’ that those who have most information and 
experience are to draft the plan, then this initiative should be backed up by The Hague. 
Only then can a true unity of effort of all activities be guaranteed.116
Composing a plan is a matter of experience. In The Hague, one focuses more on the broad 
issues. The big question is of course how one translates big political matters into a plan. 
The politics about and surrounding the deployment is more important than the plan. The 
112  Interview Vleugels, Translated from Dutch
113  Interview Bot, Kamp, Berlijn, Oosterom, Vleugels 
114  Interview Berlijn, Vleugels, Vd Have, TNO planners, Huiben. 
115  Interview Oosterom, Translated from Dutch































experience and information primarily resides with the military. As such it is not strange 
that the military came up with the plan.117
One has to be pragmatic with these kinds of operations. It is a fact of life. We did not 
receive many guidelines, if we had, our lives would have been easier […] looking back 
the plan was too idealistic […] no one provided us the parameters about what we were 
to achieve. The joint effort as such was not clear. It should have been the political level 
explicating the use of the effort.118
According to the Chief of Defence, an interdepartmental comprehensive campaign plan did 
in fact exist and he stated he does not understand the claim of its absence.119 However, most 
military and civilian respondents and the official government evaluation 120 conducted about 
the deployment to Uruzgan have indicated a lack of a comprehensive interdepartmental 
campaign plain. The planning staff at the Ministry of Defence drafted a Dutch operations 
order for Uruzgan. It derived from the NATO operations order but this was purely military 
in the sense that the other departments had not provided their input.121 This was despite 
the communicated message throughout government and parliament that it was to be an 
integrated mission attending to all three aspects: Defence, Development and Governance. 
The so-called ‘master plan’122 drafted by the staff of the first taskforce in the first quarter 
of 2006, was the first attempt to operationalise the propagated comprehensive approach. 
Although essentially a military plan, the master plan utilised an effects based approach. This 
approach encompassed a description of effects beyond the field of military expertise, such 
as developing governance and the rule of law. Consequently, Vleugels did feel the need to 
call for additional expertise, since the Dutch army had not until then exercised effects based 
operations. He had previously worked with operational analysts from the Defence Science 
and Technology Laboratory (TNO)123 and believed in their added value, especially in their 
knowledge about measuring effects and called in their help. The two analysts both refer to 
the drafting of the plan as an interesting and pioneering event.124 
117  Interview Casteleijn, Translated from Dutch
118 Interview V.d HaveTranslated from Dutch





123 TNO: Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek http://www.tno.nl/index.cfm?Taal=2
124 Interviews Smeenk and Gouweleeuw. Translated from Dutch
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As acknowledged by various military planners125, the civilian analysts,126 the matter as 
to which goals needed to be achieved with the Dutch effort in Uruzgan remained largely 
unanswered. Cabinet acknowledged it would be rather difficult to answer this question. 
Various goals were formulated: the creation of rule and law, the development of the Afghan 
national army and police, but no concrete goals were set. All in all, the goals remained broad 
and vague.
The competing views, as to if and how a plan needed to be drafted to direct the efforts of 
the taskforce did cause some nuisance between some of the civil and military actors. Even 
though the civil military relations in the steering group military relations were commented 
on as rather good, those who had to do the actual planning did experience some difficulties, 
especially with regard to developing a joint approach and understanding of the approach 
to be taken in Uruzgan. The main point of discussion was the earlier mentioned absence of 
goals formulated by the three departments at the strategic level.127 
Some perspectives: 
We [the planners] did have several meetings with the other departments [Development 
and Foreign Affairs] but neither of them plan their activities [...] neither of them is 
equipped to draft a plan so they outsourced the whole undertaking.128
 [During the writing of the plan] we already indicated to the Department of Foreign affairs 
and the Department of Development Aid that they had to take into consideration their 
responsibility for more than half of the effects to be obtained in Uruzgan.129
The goals for the mission were not clear. […] The [master] plan has […] never attained a 
formal status.130
While the planning staff of TFU 1 developed the master plan, they came to acknowledge 
they did not know enough about the situation in Urzugan in terms of development and 
governance. As such, the planners asked for a civil assessment in order to be able to conduct 
a proper analysis. However, such a civil assessment was not available and time was running 
125 Interviews Huiben, Noom, Gool, Kruitwagen, Klaarbergen, Van der Have. 
126 Interviews Smeenk and Gouweleeuw
127 See: Tweede	Kamer	der	Staten-Generaal,	‘Algemeen	overleg,	Eindevaluatie	Nederlandse	ISAF	missie	in	Uruzgan’,	http://
www.tweedekamer.nl/vergaderingen/commissievergaderingen/details/index.jsp?id=2012A00340.
128 Interview Hartog, Translated from Dutch
129 Interview Van Klaarbergen, Translated from Dutch































out. They did include the civilian effects that needed to be obtained but was as described by 
the planners beyond their area of expertise. 
Only a month before the deployment of the taskforce [one year after the initial assessments, 
subsequent reconnaissances, talks, meetings and research had been conducted] a civil 
assessment131 was drafted. The Netherlands Embassy in Kabul had initiated the writing of 
such an assessment using data collected by the Afghan (though Western sponsored Non-
Governmental Organisation) Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) Uruzgan.132 It presented a social 
analysis of the region, addressing the three lines of operation of security, good governance 
and economic development and identified projects which would need to be executed in order 
to quickly establish the reconstruction effort. It did not however explicate how the mission 
was to be achieved in a comprehensive manner.  Furthermore, the civil assessment was 
completed only when the first Dutch troops were already in theatre (July 2006).133 As pointed 
out by most civil and military respondents, the civil assessment should have preferably been 
guiding the planning.
After the planning staff of TFU 1 had developed their master plan, it was delivered 
to the Ministry of Defence for approval and commitment. Since the developed campaign 
plan addressed all three lines of operation [development, governance, and, security] it was 
presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, anticipating 
additional input or comments from their side. Explicated by many other involved planners, 
but fittingly formulated by chief army plans: ‘Foreign affairs and development cooperation 
both portrayed the ‘not invented here syndrome’ when the plan was presented to them’.134
The workings of the ńot-invented here syndrome ,́ was commented on by most of the 
civilian respondents of the other departments as not being accustomed to planning in general 
and into a plan designed by the military in particular. The Department of International 
Development Aid especially believed the military was not going to address their input and 
was awaiting the civil assessment.
131 In this document, the tribal conventions foundational to formal government structures and the traditional social and 
political	structures	in	Uruzgan	were	outlined.	It	articulated	government	institutions	to	not	sufficiently	represent	the	ethnic	
and	political	composition	of	the	province	and	hence	have	limited	influence	and	described	local	meetings	to	be	controlled	
by tribal authorities and of great importance for the acceptance of government by the inhabitants of the province. Ministry 
of	Foreign	Affairs/Development	Cooperation.	Dutch	Embassy,	Kabul.	‘Civil Assessment	(unclassified	version)	(2006)’		http://
www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2006/10/0_368-bijlage-2.pdf (last accessed 02. 02.2012).
132	Martijn	Kitzen,	‘Close	Encounters	of	the	Tribal	Kind:	the	Implementation	of	Cooption	as	a	Tool	for	De-Escalation	of	Conflict;	
the Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35(5) (2012) 713-734, 721.
133	 Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs/Development	Cooperation.	Dutch	Embassy,	Kabul.	‘Civil Assessment	(unclassified	version)	(2006)’, 
http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2006/10/0_368-bijlage-2.pdf (last accessed 02.02.2012); Brief 
van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Den Haag, Kamerstukken II 
vergaderjaar 2007 – 2008, 15 februari 2008, Dossier 27925, Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 295 (in Dutch).; Brief 
van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Van Defensie en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking,  Den Haag, Kamerstukken II 
vergaderjaar 2005 – 2006, 21 juli 2006, Dossier 27925, Bestrijding Internationaal Terrorisme, nr. 221 (in Dutch).
134 Interview Van Klaarbergen, Translated from Dutch
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Notwithstanding this, the master plan was not valued for its effort to fill the gap formed by 
an absent interdepartmental strategy or campaign plan. As commented on by one of the 
political advisors who later on deployed with the taskforce: 
I was quite impressed by the master plan […] It would have been better if the departments 
had managed to come up with an overarching plan whereby strategic guidance was 
provided. Nevertheless, both the master plan and the civil assessment did provide a basis 
to start from. […] In theatre however, it proved quite a challenge to keep the civilians to 
stick to the plan.135
Most planners believed the emergent planning and evolving trait of the campaign plan, 
characterized by bottom up initiatives, to have been inevitable for this mission. They refer 
to the fact that the lack of integrated planning with other departments and the vagueness 
about what it was the Netherlands wanted to achieve in Uruzgan to have been the main 
grounds of the emergent features of both the planning and the plan for the stabilisation 
effort in Urzugan.  
It nevertheless caused some difficulties and missed opportunities as well. The chief plans 
of the army command indicated a proper plan, available long before the task force was to be 
deployed, would have been much better for the planning and commencing of development 
efforts in particular:
We could have already applied for funding of projects. Through a joint analysis with the 
embassy, we could have started project planning months before the deployment and 
funds would have been available when arrived in Uruzgan. Now, we were faced with 
procedures of Foreign Affairs in the field, causing months of delay with regards to getting 
approval for projects and funding. So we were actually behind on reality […] One of the 
reasons is the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have that much experience 
with project planning nor the capability.136
Throughout the course of events, the Dutch population had been informed by the media 
about the political struggles to gain approval for the deployment of Dutch forces to Uruzgan. 
The debate, which had primarily taken place within a smaller group of civil and military 
decision-makers, had now found its way to the public arena. Until November 2005, the 
135 Interview Messerschmidt, Translated from Dutch































media had reported in a very limited fashion137 about the progress of planning activities and 
concerns about the feasibility of the mission. 
It was not until the appearance of the military intelligence report about the perilous 
security situation and the public statements of D66’s faction leader Dittrich against the 
mission that the media began to catch up with the events leading to the deployment of forces 
to Uruzgan. The main perspective was with reference to the security matters and the potential 
dangers of the mission, following the political lines of argumentation in the debate about 
the deployment of forces to Uruzgan.138 The most interesting political communiqué was a 
statement from the Minister of Defence, publicly stating that he would withdraw his troops 
if the situation in Uruzgan did not allow them to carry out the tasks they were assigned to.139 
As described earlier, once the Article 100 letter was delivered to Parliament on the 22nd of 
December, a variety of articles and reports started to appear and the common tone remained 
a relatively negative one about the security in the province and the potential dangers of the 
mission, but also addressing the political tensions within the coalition and the use of the 
word intention instead of decision.140
Subsequently, the debate in the media took two different directions: a focus on the 
precarious security situation but mainly with a positive judgement about the feasibility 
of the mission, thereby following the official line of argument as communicated by the 
government, and a focus on the political decision-making process and the occured political 
row.141
When the third version of the Article 100 letter was sent to Parliament on the 13th of 
January, the media interest increased significantly, and most reports were in fact supportive 
of the mission but kept focus on the dangers of the mission.142 Interestingly, the debate in the 
media hardly paid any attention to the troubles in the province of Uruzgan and the purpose 
of and the need for the mission. According to a media analysis conducted on all articles of 




the media actually started frequently reporting about the mission. From the 82 articles which appeared in the leading 











142  Ibid., 84.
143  The four leading newspapers in the Netherlands are: De Telegraaf, Trouw, De Volkskrant, and NRC Handelsblad.
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process, the reporting on the deployment to Uruzgan continued to focus on the political 
struggle in both Cabinet and Parliament.144
Meanwhile, the political debate in Parliament allowed for several interpretations about 
what it was the Dutch were aiming to achieve in Uruzgan. Even though the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to be singing from the same hymn sheet, 
the opposition parties sparked the debate with their reading of events, topped with the 
opinions of experts and other authorities, and a Babylonian confusion was born.
There was a need for careful deliberation as to how a mission to the volatile South would 
be presented to Parliament and to the Dutch population. However, Cabinet was not able 
to steer the debate and many have argued this to be a result of the absence of a strategic 
narrative. The study ´Uruzgan and the CNN factor´ indicated the need for a clear communicated 
narrative to be a prerequisite to not only guide instruments of power, but also to engender 
popular debate.145 
As such, the Chief of Defence acquired public exposure in order to explain the mission to 
the Dutch population. This in itself was a novelty.  As he explained: 
The military has to deal with the whims of politics. This is a result of democracy and part 
of the societal contract. However, the military is part of the larger picture and of course 
politicians need to take into consideration and to include them in their communication 
to the populace […] our missions are dependent on public support. I felt a true conviction 
[of the need] to communicate with the Dutch population about our deployment to 
Uruzgan. To explain to them what it was we needed to do in Afghanistan. Consequently, 
I briefed the media every two months in order to reach the Dutch citizens and to create 
understanding and support for our mission.146
The most pressing argument needed for support was believed to lie in propagating the 
importance of bringing stability to poor and defenceless Afghans. This objective was to 
adhere to Dutch popular sentiments, but it was only just mentioned in the media. In fact, 
there was, as described earlier, a fundamental misconception about the type of mission 
Uruzgan was likely to be. This was compounded by the way the mission was presented to the 
public, namely in a binary fashion: a fighting or a reconstruction mission. This delineation 
had in fact not been made in the Article 100 letter.  As commented on by the special advisor 
to the Prime Minister: ´There was major difference between what we prepared and discussed 
144		Ten	Dam,	‘Uruzgan	The	CNN	effect’,	107.
145		Ten	Dam,	‘Uruzgan	The	CNN	effect’.	































at the SMO and what the media made of it. It is all about perception. Particularly in this case, 
the narrative was paramount to opposition’.147 
All respondents involved in the planning of the operation signalled the gap between the 
political need to emphasise the development part of the mission (reconstruction) and the 
military understanding of the potential dangers and battles (fighting).148  As explained by 
one of the special assistants to the Prime Minister:  
The political sensitivities were evident. […] The political decision-making did not evolve in 
the sense that it tried to sell a fighting mission as a reconstruction mission. There was a 
genuine objective of facilitating reconstruction in Uruzgan. At the same time, the risks of 
the mission have been attended to and been taken into account [during the decision-making 
process].149
Some perspectives on the fighting and reconstruction debate:
We never employed the term ‘fighting mission’ due to our desire to reconstruct the 
province. Also, using words like counterinsurgency would have implied we were going 
to fight […] We avoided using these terms because the mission would have been viewed 
through a different lens.150
 The story about the mission needed to be explained [in the Netherlands] as a reconstruction 
effort. As such, we needed to include reconstruction in the whole debate.151
After Iraq, we had learnt the lessons of the importance of political support. As such, one 
of our goals was to guarantee great popular support for this mission. The deployment 
was framed as a reconstruction mission; consequently the dangers have not been 
articulated in a sufficient manner. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defence especially had framed the mission in too positive a sense. The Prime Minister 
did not engage actively in the framing of the mission. He had only expressed his wish and 
support to make the mission happen. To him, the provision of Dutch troops was a matter 
of common sense.152
147  Interview Van Oosterom, Translated from Dutch
148  Interviews military planners. 
149  Interview Swartbol. Translated from Dutch
150  Interview Bot, Translated from Dutch
151  Interview Casteleijn, Translated from Dutch
152  Interview De Vries, Translated from Dutch
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In conclusion, the necessity of the deployment was not easily apprehended by the Dutch 
audience. However, the need to tell the public why the mission in Afghanistan was worth 
pursuing has often been made by commentators, politicians and generals. Secretary-General 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer especially regularly acknowledged that somehow electorates refused 
to believe in the ongoing necessity of NATO’s endeavors in Afghanistan. He blamed himself 
and all those politically responsible for failing to communicate the message. Looking back 
he ventured: ´We haven’t been convincing enough .́153 
 
6.13 Conclusions
The context in which the decision was taken to commit Dutch military forces to NATO’s 
expansion to South Afghanistan was greatly conditioned by military alliance politics. 
Hence, from its inception, the dynamics of coalition initiatives as emerged between Canada, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have been vital. Their cooperation might have 
been habituated by Alliance politics in the sense that all three nations anticipated NATO’s 
expansion to the South of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, neither one of them sat back nor waited 
to be asked by NATO to contribute their forces. As such, the often assumed pressure of NATO, 
dictating the actions of its member states is qualified as far more complex and nuanced. 
The initiative for the mission and the initial negotiations with partnering nations was a 
distinct military undertaking. Even when put in the political context of NATO’s expansion 
to the South and the Dutch desire to be a loyal and trustworthy NATO/US ally and to ‘do 
good’, the role of the director of operations, General Cobelens, undoubtedly shaped the 
decision to deploy a taskforce to Uruzgan. It was due to his ability to anticipate and react to 
international developments within both a political and military context, his network and 
persuasive ability, that the Dutch engagement was instigated in the first place. Most – if not 
all – respondents agreed, and even British respondents recall the person of Cobelens and his 
dedication to commit Dutch troops to the stabilisation of Afghanistan. 
By himself however, even supported by partnering nations, Cobelens could not have 
initiated this mission. He was strengthened by the support of the highest diplomat at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the directorate of political affairs, Hugo Siblesz. 
Contributing to NATO’s expansion throughout Afghanistan had not, by itself, been at 
odds with both departments’ view on further Dutch commitment in Afghanistan; in fact 
especially within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a sincere belief was held that Dutch forces 































would implement a Dutch approach to stabilisation, a way of doing things that would ‘ 
outdo’  the Americans. 
The beliefs and ideas of the senior civil and military decision-makers in the Netherlands 
with regard to the use of their military for NATO’s expansion to the South of Afghanistan 
can be best described as complementary in the sense that they both envisaged benefits 
from committing troops, albeit for different reasons. In addition, the senior civil and 
military decision-makers were supportive of the idea of integrating diplomatic, military 
and developmental efforts. The foundations for a more integrated way of both planning and 
executing operations between the various departments had been laid in both operations in 
Iraq and North Afghanistan (Baghlan).
Preventing another potential military debacle154 had very much structured the minds 
and practices of the senior civil and military decision-makers. As such, the development of 
the assessment framework was to prevent ill informed decisions made by politicians about 
the use of military means. However, the framework had acquired for itself the veneer of an 
instrument for rational decision-making but cannot in itself prevent teleological reasoning 
[reasoning towards an end or a goal].155  Ideally, an intention to send troops for a mission 
should be the result of having assessed all facets of the assessment framework. Some argue 
the assessment framework is supposed to create the impression of having contributed to 
well-designed and thorough decision-making, but the practice of its use for past missions 
has showed a reversal of this procedure: first a decision in principle was made, followed by 
the use of the assessment framework in its political setting. This trend has persisted in the 
case of the mission to Uruzgan while a decision in principle had in fact already been taken 
(June 2005) after which the political arena was explored. In addition, the objectives to be 
attained [which are supposed to be foundational to the framework] were according to most 
civil and military respondents not clearly articulated. Consequently, the application of the 
framework did not result in a unanimous verdict from the political decision-makers about 
the feasibility of the mission.
Even though the respondents point to the logic of committing Dutch forces to NATO’s 
expansion to the South, the inevitability was not clearly articulated in a strategy designed 
at the political strategic level, nor was the propagated integrated approach embodied in a 
synchronised effort. As such, the steering group military operations had not acquired the 
ability to provide strategic guidance. Neither had it produced an interdepartmental approach 
to the initiation of an overall strategy that would best serve the comprehensive approach to 
operations. Instead, two documents were written: the master plan, written by the military 
including civil effects, and a civil assessment, written by the Dutch embassy in Afghanistan. 
Neither one of the documents guided the planning. In fact, the master plan appeared shortly 
154  In reference to the events that had unfolded in Srebrenica
155  A point made by Moelker in ‘Culture’s Backlash on Decision-making’, 33.
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before the deployment and the civil assessment appeared when the task force had already 
arrived in theatre.
The undisputed inevitability of the mission resulted in the working of a ‘trap’ in a very 
coercive manner. The mission was viewed to be too important, and in fact essential for the 
Netherlands for various reasons, like being a trustworthy NATO partner. As such, the logic 
of the deployment seems to have been dictating the course of events long before Parliament 
was notified. Even potential show stoppers such as the appearance of the intelligence report, 
or a clear justification in terms of formulating the ends, did not bring the intention to deploy 
military forces to a halt.
In fact, once the deployment was endangered by struggles in Parliament and party 
politics, it was due to the efforts of Foreign Affairs Minister, Bot, that the troubled and delayed 
decision-making procedure was massaged into a positive outcome. Not only did he came up 
with the solution of providing D66 with a ‘way out’ by juggling with the words intention and 
decision, he also used much of his time at the end of 2005 to facilitate a solution.  So at the 
end, more political ownership of the decision-making process occurred. 
When contrasting these findings with the propositions as put forward in chapter two, 
several issues come to light. For one, the inputs into the decision-making process on the 
use of military means for the stabilisation of Afghanistan were not instigated by political 
guidance on this particular ‘foreign policy problem’ as such (proposition I). Instead the 
initiation of the decision-making process seemed to be a military initiative. Even when put 
in the political context of NATO’s expansion to the South and the Dutch desire to be a loyal 
and trustworthy NATO/US ally and to ‘do good’, the role of the director of operations, General 
Cobelens, undoubtedly shaped the decision to deploy a taskforce to Uruzgan.
  The decision-making dynamics that consequently advanced indeed revealed a process of 
interpretation in which the senior civil and military decision-makers perceived and deduced 
constraints and pressures imposed on them by the domestic and international environment 
(proposition II). Within this process, it seemed that particularly the domestic constraints 
and pressure  in terms of national politics and sensitivities prevailed. Once the decision-
making process hampered and started to impact the deployment of NATO forces to South 
Afghanistan on the whole, international pressure increased.  
The reconstruction of the decision-making has furthermore showed that a strategy 
articulating the purpose of the use of the military means has not been the output of the 
process in itself (proposition III). Instead, two separate documents, a military and a civilian 
document, were drafted and were to direct the Dutch stabilisation efforts in Uruzgan. No 
strategic ownership was acquired at the strategic level, nor were these documents integrated 
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Chapter 7 The British Case  
 
7.1 Introduction: Setting the Stage
The context in which the decision was taken to commit British forces should principally be 
seen in relation to the on-going deployment of British forces to Iraq and the unfolding logic 
of NATO’s expansion to the Southern provinces in Afghanistan. The ‘defining moments’ of 
the reconstruction of the British case are largely found in the dedication of Prime Minister 
Blair to strengthen the United Kingdom’s presence in Afghanistan, military alliance politics, 
and a self-enforcing belief amongst senior decision-makers at the political military level in 
the inevitability of a leading British role in  NATO’s expansion to the South of Afghanistan. 
Prime Minister Blair had instigated a renewed British interest in Afghanistan and made 
sure his intent was clearly communicated by either him personally or by his trustees. 
However, two major strategic decisions during the decision-making procedure to deploy 
British troops to the South of Afghanistan were not initiated from prior coherent strategic 
guidance: the selection of the province, and the number of troops.1 
NATO’s stabilisation operations, and the Alliance’s desire to expand its footprint, is the 
setting in which the senior civil and military decision-makers anticipated and developed the 
activities that led to the use of military means for the stabilisation of Helmand. 
7.2  The Foreign Policy Problem: The Logic of Participating in NATO’s Expansion   
South  Afghanistan
At the time a renewed interest in Afghanistan emerged, instigated by NATO ś proclaimed 
counter clockwise expansion, the United Kingdom was still heavily engaged in the Iraq 
campaign. The deployment had put both British politicians and military in an uncomfortable 
position: the legitimacy of the campaign was questioned since intelligence on the presence 
of weapons of mass destruction had been wrought. Moreover, the war had been unpopular 
from the outset, and the already limited support was declining.2
1 Michael Clarke (ed.), The Afghan Papers: Committing Britain to War in Helmand, 2005-06. White Hall Papers 77 (London 
2011); Interview Cavanagh. Even though most individual actors relevant for the British case have been interviewed, 
the reconstruction of the case heavily draws on material as presented in the Afghan Papers and Britain’s Afghanistan 
Deployment in 2006 a series of papers edited and/or collected by Michael Clarke, director of the Royal United Services 
Institute	 (RUSI)	 written	 by	 various	 political	 and	 military	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 decision-making	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	
campaign. In addition, much evidence has been delivered to both the Iraq Inquiry and the House of Commons Defense 
Committee	which	has	been	very	useful	for	the	reconstruction	of	the	UK	case.			
2	 Steven	Philip	Kramer,	‘Blair’s	Britain	after	Iraq’,	Foreign  Affairs 82(4) (2003) 90-104, 90.
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Across Whitehall, there seemed to be a drift towards denial of disappointing results in Iraq 
and a sense that redemption could be found in the proposed Afghanistan deployment.3 As 
recollected by Prime Minister Blair, military commanders had been disenchanted by the 
limitations of what they could achieve in Iraq and as such expressed their desire to focus 
more on Afghanistan than Iraq.4 In addition, the apparent success in the Multinational 
Division (South East) in 2003-045 supposedly had encouraged the British Chiefs of Staff to 
conclude that operations in Iraq could be successfully maintained and accomplished, while, 
concurrently, planning [in conjunction with close allies] a deployment to South Afghanistan 
to further expand NATO’s footprint during phase III.6 
Furthermore, both civil and military respondents indicated there was a general feeling 
that Afghanistan was indeed a ‘good war’ since the international military presence had 
originated from a United Nation’s Security Council resolution7 and NATO troops had entered 
Afghanistan accordingly. This was a very powerful motive, given the debates about the 
contested legitimacy of the Iraq operation.8 The argument which supposedly had swayed 
British Ministers most was the proclaimed responsibility of the international community 
to finish its efforts started in Afghanistan, by consolidating the progress made so far and 
ensuring the investment was not wasted.9 In addition, the narrative voiced by politicians 
that this war needed to be fought for the Afghans and their future, seemingly had convinced 
large parts of the public as well.10 
According to Prime Minister Blair, the United Kingdom had never turned its back 
on Afghanistan and referred to an ongoing commitment to the Afghan cause, even at 
times when operations in Iraq were not going smoothly.11 As such, the renewed focus on 
3 Interviews respondents and Beadle, ‘Afghanistan in the Context of Iraq’, 79.
4 Tony Blair, The Journey (London 2010) 671.
5 Reportedly, pragmatism and minimum force played a key role in the success which British forces achieved in MND (SE). 
Also	 the	political	process,	 coupled	with	 the	 threat	of	military	 action,	 increasingly	pacified	Shia-based	elements	of	 the	
insurgency such as al-Sadr and the Mahdi army was named to have played a crucial role. See Iraq: An Initial Assessment of 
Post- Conflict Operations. Sixth Report of Session 2004–05	I.	House	of	Commons	Defence	Committee	(2005	London),	29	–	35.
6 Robert Fry and Desmond Bowen, ‘UK  National Strategy and Helmand’, Whitehall Papers 77(1) (2011) 68-72.
7 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) See http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/
resolution_1386.pdf
8 Foreign Secretary at the time of the invasion of Iraq, Jack Straw provided evidence to the Iraq Inquiry that he had urged 
Tony	Blair	 just	a	week	before	 the	war	 to	 ‘explore	all	possible	alternatives’	 to	conflict.	Richard	Norton,	 ‘Taylor	 Iraq	war	






9 Cavanagh. ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment’, 50.
10 See: http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2010/10/assessing-british-support-for-the-war-in-afghanistan 































Afghanistan was framed as a continuous commitment to the war torn country. In a sense 
this was not completely incorrect as the British had engaged themselves in Afghanistan since 
the intervention of the ‘coalition of the willing’ in 2001. Initially, the British military efforts 
had concentrated around Kabul, but in the summer of 2003 they launched a PRT in Mazar- e 
– Sharif. Initially, the PRT originated under the OEF command, but was transferred to ISAF 
a year later. Simultaneously, a second PRT was launched in Meymaneh (Faryab Province).12 
Hence, the main focus of the United Kingdom in Afghanistan was directed to the relatively 
calm northern part of the country. 
7.3 Occasion for Decision I: Blair’s Desire to Lead NATO’s Expansion to The South 
At the NATO conference in Istanbul in June 2004, Prime Minister Blair announced that 
Britain would increase its contribution to ISAF by deploying the largely British-staffed ARRC 
headquarters to Afghanistan to lead the stage three expansion of ISAF.13 This announcement 
reportedly took General Dannatt, at that time commanding the Allied Rapid Reaction 
Corps14, by surprise: ‘Very quickly at the NATO summit in June, very quickly after that, an 
announcement was made which I was totally unaware of, that in the middle of 2006 or 
thereabouts the UK would take a major lead in an enhanced NATO operation in Afghanistan 
and that we, the UK, would be a significant player in that and that Headquarters ARRC would 
lead that. Wow, where did that come from?’.15 
Most likely, it had originated from Prime Minister Blair’s conviction that the United 
Kingdom needed to commit more forces to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Consequently, 
he had offered the earlier mentioned deployment of the ARRC and showed great interest in a 
deployment of British forces to the South.16 The alteration of the British effort in Afghanistan 
from the North to the South was formally agreed to by the Chiefs of Staff and consequently 
articulated to NATO by the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, on the 10th of February 2005 at 
the NATO Ministerial conference in Nice.17 
12 Eronen Oskari, ‘PRT models in Afghanistan’, Civilian Crisis Management Studies 1(5) (2008) 20.
13 James Ferguson, A Million Bullets, the Real Story of the British Army in Afghanistan (London 2009).
14 Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC) is ‘a highly capable multinational, NATO operational headquarters, 
fully	ready	for	rapid	deployment	worldwide	within	five	to	thirty	days,	with	dedicated	and	integrated	support	to	sustain	and	
protect the headquarters once deployed’. See: NATO ‘HQ ARRC’, http://www.arrc.nato.int/alliedrapidreactioncorps.aspx 
(last accessed, 10.05.2014).
15	 Evidence	delivered	by	general	Dannatt	to	 the	Chilcot	 Inquiry,	on	 the	28th	of	 July,	2010.	http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/
media/53218/Dannatt%202010-07-28%20S1.pdf
16 Fergusson, A Million Bullets; interviews respondents.
17 Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment’,54‐55.
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The respondents all indicated that the political context of NATO’s expansion had seemingly 
informed the reasoning for committing British forces. It appeared as if it was a logical step in 
a direction already taken by Prime Minister Blair and his government and in line with NATO’s 
plans to expand its area of operations to the South. Some even argued, if NATO failed in 
Afghanistan, the British strategic end would fail with it. In other words, the national strategic 
imperative became the renaissance of the NATO’s campaign through a deployment of British 
forces to the South of Afghanistan. The deployment of forces would potentially serve as a 
catalyst for the completion of the NATO plan and, essentially, to a significant commitment of 
American forces which was assessed as a precondition for success as well.18 
According to a special advisor to the government, Matt Cavanagh, the military came close 
to arguing that only Britain could assume responsibility over the South, thereby rescuing 
the campaign and prompting the Americans and other allies to reinforce their efforts and 
commit to the ISAF plan. Even though many military resources were still committed in Iraq, 
the deployment to South Afghanistan was considered manageable, he explained.19
The evidence as presented during the hearing [of those involved in the decision-
making in the run up to the deployment to Helmand] in the House of Commons Defence 
Committee20 and the Iraq Inquiry21 indicated the military did in fact provide the information, 
both in briefings and memos that the mission was do-able, [which will be dealt with in a 
more extensive manner later on in the chapter].  There was however often a reference to 
the deployment to Iraq, and the fact that this put a restriction on the number of forces and 
equipment available for Afghanistan.22 
As alluded to by Clarke:  ‘Whatever interpretation was made of the desire to re-engage in 
Afghanistan from around 2003, there can be little doubt that carrying it through at a time 
when operations in Iraq so dominated the minds of policy-makers, made strategic coherence 
extremely difficult to maintain by mid-2005. Critical military decision-makers at the time, 
including military service chiefs, struggled to recall any occasions on which a genuine 
strategic discussion of the upcoming Afghan commitment took place. Regular meetings and 
18 Fry and D Bowen, ‘UK national strategy and Helmand’, 70; Michael Clarke,’ Conclusion’, Whitehall Papers 70(1) (2011) 81-93, 84.
19 Interview Cavanagh; Cavanagh, Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment, 50.
20	 The	Defence	Committee	‘is	appointed	by	the	House	of	Commons	to	examine	the	expenditure,	administration,	and	policy	
of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. It chooses its own subjects of inquiry’. UK Parliament, ‘Defence 
Committee’,	 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/Defence-committee/
role/ (last accessed 10.11.2013).
21	 The	Chilcot	inquiry	[named	after	its	chairman,	Sir John Chilcot] ‘is a public inquiry into the United’s Kingdom role in the 
Iraq War. Prime Minister Gordon Brown, on 15 June 2009 announced with an initial statement that proceedings would take 
place	in	private.	This	decision	which	was	subsequently	reversed	after	receiving	criticism	in	the	media	and	the	House	of	
Commons’. The Iraq Inquiry, ‘About the inquiry’,  http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/about.aspx (last accessed 10.11.2013).
































transatlantic video conferences were overwhelmingly dominated by Iraq operations’.23 Even 
more tellingly, as put forward by General Jackson, he had no idea why the UK had gone to 
Helmand, even though he was Chief of the General Staff at the time the decision was taken.24
Furthermore, as indicated by the private secretary of the Secretary of State for Defence, a 
long-term strategy for the region in which British interests were spelled out for departments 
of state, had not been developed. Furthermore, the Foreign Office had difficulties articulating 
British long-term interests and relative priorities for Pakistan and Afghanistan.25 Yet, as 
explained by the Permanent Undersecretary of Defence: ‘The motives were clearly political 
[…] There was a strong and clear political and strategic rationale for the mission’.26 His 
observation was underlined by Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (commitments)27 Charles 
Style:  ‘The idea of deploying troops to the South was not bad. Both the UN and NATO had 
a real aspiration to ‘do good’.28 The rationale of, amongst other things, supporting NATO, 
had gained ground with the military planning circles as well. Chief plans at the Permanent 
Joint Headquarters called to mind: ‘Given the reality of the NATO expansion to the South, 
I – and most people involved in the planning of the operation – never questioned the lack of 
clarity [about the mission] or raised any doubts about the political/military direction of the 
operation.’29
However, some questioned the endeavour in terms of the desire to do good. One of them, 
former ambassador to Kabul, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles, claimed the only political objective 
for the United Kingdom sending troops to the South of Afghanistan was ‘keeping up with the 
Joneses’. In other words, trying to be like the rest, in this case, a reliable NATO partner. ‘We 
wanted to impress the Americans’ he said.30 
23 Clarke, ‘The Helmand Decision’, 14.
24 Elliot, High Command, 254.
25	 A	view	presented	by	Nick	Beadle,	private	secretary	in	the	Private	Office	of	the	Ministry	of	Defense	from	late	summer	2005	
to mid-2007 for respectively Defense secretaries John Reid and Des Browne. See: Beadle, ‘Afghanistan and the Context of 
Iraq’.
26 Interview Tebbit.
27	 Later	on,	 the	term	for	 this	post	changed	to	deputy	Chief	of	Defence	Staff	operations.	The	post	entails	 the	provision	of	
oversight over upcoming and ongoing operations. 
28 Interview Style.
29 Interview Chief plans PJHQ.
30 Interview Coper Coles.
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7.4 Occasion for Decision II: NATOs Force Generation Meeting 
In February 2005, a month before NATO’s Stage III informal force generation31 meeting 
took place, Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced his intention to deploy 
British forces to the South of Afghanistan in parliament. However, deliberations about 
a deployment to the South were already well underway. As already outlined in the Dutch 
case, informal meetings with partnering nations - Canada and the Netherlands – that had 
occurred since the summer of 2004, served to cater for an enhanced trilateral cooperation 
with the intention to assume responsibility for NATO’s Stage III expansion. 
These informal talks between the three nations carried great value because without this 
partnering, neither one of these nations would likely have deployed their forces. In addition, 
shared thinking and observations about available provinces and probable time-frames, 
amongst other things, are known to have figured in their calculations.32 
As explained by a senior government official: ‘It was a grouping of people that thought 
they could be working together. This idea had emerged amongst the militaries of these 
countries. Personally, I do not recall or believe, the United States had initiated the idea of 
these countries working together in order to take on the counter clockwise expansion to the 
South […] .33
Consequentially, a military liaison process instigated these three partners to engage in 
South Afghanistan, rather than a political initiative. However, it followed a direction already 
explicated by Blair when he announced the United Kingdom was to play a larger role in 
Afghanistan and subsequently made the offer of deploying the ARRC at the NATO summit 
in the summer of 2004, as described earlier. This initiative was instrumental in shaping the 
subsequent process from then on.34
Nevertheless, some argued the decision-making process mission for the deployment 
of British forces to South Afghanistan contained a democratic deficit. ‘There ought to be 
something underneath military enthusiasm. Further down the system, there should be 
strategic literates to guide the effort. We should have said, well hang on, let’s stop, let’s think. 
By the time doubts were raised [in the autumn of 2005 MGM] reflection about what was going 
31	 The	 procedure	 for	 staffing	 an	 operation	 or	 mission	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 “force	 generation”.	 This	 procedure	 ensures	
that Alliance operations or missions have the manpower and materials required to achieve set objectives. NATO, ‘Troop 
Contributions’, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50316.htm (last accessed 08.08.2013). 
32 Willis, An Unexpected War, A Not-Unexpected Mission. PP 2, 8
33	 Interview	government	official.	
































on was no longer possible. It has to be said though; there were opponents and supporters for 
the mission in both the civilian and military community’.35
Some even argued NATO’s expansion to the South of Afghanistan embodied political 
guidance and respectively approval in itself. As alluded to by a military planner: ‘The very fact 
that there was an ISAF campaign plan in place, contradicts the suggestion that politicians 
were behind on the deployment of forces to the South of Afghanistan. This plan was NAC 
[North Atlantic Council] approved and as such is evidence that there was political approval 
and direction’.36
7.5  Emergence of  a Decision Unit: The Actions of a Single Group with a Dominant               
Leader
Prime Minister Blair had set out the decision path for a British engagement at the NATO 
conference in Istanbul. His dedication to revive the NATO mission in Afghanistan by 
committing British troops for its Stage III expansion had reportedly set the tone for the 
detailed planning that followed in the Ministry of Defence and subordinated military 
headquarters.37  
The closed features of the Reid group which was to oversee the planning for the mission 
to South Afghanistan were very much a reflection of Prime Minister Blair’s personal style 
of leadership.  According to a special advisor to the government, Matt Cavanagh, Blair was 
more practiced in questioning advice telling him he could not do something than he was in 
spotting the risks in advice reassuring him that he could. In fact, the Prime Minister already 
seemed to have made up his mind and envisioned a leading role in the expansion of the 
Afghan campaign.38 It facilitated an emphasis on the accomplishment of the task that had 
been set out for them. 
The relations within the Reid Group were furthermore heavily influenced by the Prime 
Minister’s predilection for the military as his preferred institution. This engendered a 
dominant position of the military as a pivotal actor in the process: they were not only the 
providers of the majority of resources required for the task but also already heavily engaged 
in the preparations for the deployment within the trilateral military working groups.  
As articulated by a high government official: ‘Blair liked the approach of the military. 
They would tell him what they could do. Unfortunately, the military – in this case – made 
35 Interview Clarke.
36 Interview Southall.
37 Interviews respondents 
38 Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment’,  50.
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a rather bad judgment caused by over- enthusiasm about their own capability. As such, the 
question needs to be asked whether the military made the proper assessment as to what it 
was they were getting into’.39  Hence, looming political desire articulated by Prime Minister 
Blair coincided with military enthusiasm to commence a novel endeavour. 
 
7.6  Decision Unit Dynamics: The Process of Interpretation
The interpretation of the task at hand was very much geared in the direction of how to 
deploy instead of first thoroughly addressing the question of if a deployment had in fact to 
materialise. Yet the planning of the deployment at hand had already been considered, for all 
practical purposes, with important choices that had to be made. One of these choices was 
the selection of the province the United Kingdom were to deploy their forces to. A decision 
entailing strategic guidance, but in fact precisely that had been lacking.  
 Selection of the Province
In the first half of 2005, the British never intended to go into Helmand, presuming they 
would be lead nation and they anticipated being deployed to Kandahar due to its strategic 
importance.40 The permanent joint headquarters had sent off a reconnaissance party to 
South Afghanistan headed by General Messenger, to provide them with recommendations 
about the Southern provinces. Messenger came back recommending Kandahar, but decided 
after another recce that British troops would have to deploy to Helmand.41 In April 200542 
the decision had been made to assume responsibility over the biggest opium producing 
province43 of Afghanistan: Helmand. 
The chief reason for the decision to deploy British forces to the province Helmand instead 
of another province appeared to be coalition military politics instead of a well thought 
through strategic political decision. In fact, according to senior military sources, the Director 
of operations at the Ministry of Defence had been sent to one of the working level planning 
39	 Interview	senior	government	official.
40 Carl Forsberg, The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar. Afghanistan Report 3. Institute for the Study of War (2009 Washington DC); 
Carl Forsberg, Politics and Power in Kandahar. Afghanistan Report 5. Institute for the Study of War (2010 Washinton DC).
41 Interview Messenger.
42	 According	to	Matthew	Willis	this	decision	to	have	been	made	in	December	2004	since	Canada	announced	the	deployment	
of their PRT to Kandahar province. He argues the announcement would not have been made unless negotiations between 
UK	and	Canada	would	not	have	progressed	to	a	final	stage.	Willis,	‘Canada	in	Regional	Command	South’,		60.
43 See: Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan’, Journal of Agrarian Change 5(2) (2005) 
191-216; Adam Pain, Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor. Issues Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(2006); Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan’, Small 































conferences in Ottawa (June 2005) with the guidance to opt for Kandahar. He nevertheless 
returned with the message British forces were to deploy to Helmand.44 
General Richards was preparing to assume command over ISAF from May 2006 onwards 
and had assessed Kandahar as the centre of gravity of the insurgency and the vital ground 
of the campaign.45 As explained by the general: ‘Until today I do not understand why we 
deployed to Helmand since my guidance delivered to the Director of operations at the MoD 
was to assume responsibility for Kandahar’.46 
The explanation provided by those involved at the informal military planning conferences 
was that Canada had been granted responsibility over Kandahar because the United Kingdom 
wanted to safeguard the trilateral cooperation. Apparently, Canada had announced their 
troop contribution non-negotiable and conditional on being given Kandahar. The Canadian 
focus on Kandahar seemed to be founded in the fact that a Canadian battle group had 
already been present in Kandahar since 2002.47 Hence, the British delegation had accepted 
responsibility for Helmand as a ‘necessary concession’ in the cooperation with its partners 
in South Afghanistan.48
Some perspectives on the choice for Helmand province:
How then did we end up going to Helmand, rather than to Kandahar? I can offer nothing 
more as a reason than a failure to persuade the US to support us, as against the preference 
of the Canadians to go to Kandahar. The US rightly guessed we would go into Southern 
Afghanistan anyway. Ministers were advised not to try to reverse decisions that had been 
made in military circles some time previously. The tail was wagging the dog: coalition 
military politics were driving national strategic interest. With hindsight, my impression 
is that diplomacy and politics followed rather tamely. Notable commanders, including 
General Richards, instinctively understood the strategic significance of Kandahar, with 
its links to Quetta in less-troubled times. If our long-term strategic priorities are in 
Pakistan and our security interests lie in the border regions, then we should have pushed 
harder to be at the centre of gravity of the region.49
How did our nations go about getting which province? There was no strategic foresight 
on where to go. Canada selected Kandahar because of its strategic importance. Other 
44  Interview Richards.
45  Fergusson, Million Bullets, 231 ‐233
46  Interview Richards. 
47  Willis, Alliance Dynamics and National Imperatives, 60 
48	 	The	conference	took	place	on	the	21st	of	June	2005	in	Ottawa.	
49  Beadle, ‘Afghanistan and the context of Iraq’, 75.
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provinces in the South such as Uruzgan were significantly important but not the most 
important. The UK made a strategic error in this case by choosing Helmand.50
Consequently, the arrangement that had taken shape between the military and defence staffs 
in London, Ottawa, and The Hague was that the Canadians would send an enlarged battle 
group to Kandahar; the Dutch would send a battle group to Uruzgan province; and the British 
would deploy their forces to Helmand. The three partnering nations agreed to mutually 
support one another. Uruzgan was important for its ‘stay behind potential’ and training 
facility for insurgents’51 but Helmand and Kandahar were deemed key in the strategic sense 
that they were at the centre of attention of both criminal and insurgent activities. Kandahar 
especially embodied the heart of the Taliban resurgence and needed to be secured.52
Later on, the choice for Helmand was rhetorically repackaged in the sense that it would 
be consistent with the British counter-narcotics role in Afghanistan, a role Prime Minister 
Blair identified as vital for British interests. As recollected by Clarke, based on his personal 
interviews with the involved actors: ‘The impetus for Downing Street to stage a deployment 
to Helmand was so strong that Blair would have redirected the decision if one would have 
chosen to assume responsibility for Kandahar’.53 His observation is underlined by the 
Permanent Undersecretary for Defence, Tebbit, who described Blair’s dedication towards the 
countering of narcotics to have been prevalent before 9/11. ‘It has always been a strong British 
stand, even when we were chasing after Al Qaeda [during operation Enduring Freedom]’.54 
Some media reported on the presupposed relation between the drugs on the streets of 
London and the deployment to Helmand as imaginary. An article in the Guardian ironically 
stated: ‘Lost in some Lawrence of Arabia fantasy, he is walking the fields of Helmand when 
he should be patrolling the streets of Glasgow. Offered a virtuous circle, he has opted for a 
vicious one’.55 
Interestingly enough, Prime Minister Blair himself hardly made any reference to the 
decision-making with regard to the deployment to Helmand or his interest in fighting 
narcotics on the streets of London as a reason for the British engagement in South 
Afghanistan in his biography.56 However in all truth, the counter-narcotics pillar of the 
50  Interview Southall.
51 As indicated by Sean M. Maloney small stay-behind groups were present in Uruzgan. Maloney, Sean, ‘A Violent Impediment: 
the Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province 2003–07’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 19(2) (2008) 201-220.
52 Giustozzi, Antonio and Noor Ullah. ‘The Inverted Cycle: Kabul and the Strongmen’s Competition for Control over Kandahar, 
2001–2006’, Central Asian Survey 26(2) (2007) 167-184.
53 Interview Clarke. 
54 Interview Tebbit. 
55 Simon Jenkins, ‘Blair’s latest expedition is a Lawrence of Arabia fantasy’, The Guardian, 01.02.2006.
































ISAF campaign had been a British responsibility since 2002.57 Soon thereafter, the counter-
narcotics programs in Afghanistan became a Foreign Office priority. The department seemed 
to be even more determined to carry it out effectively when Helmand, the centre of Afghan 
opium production, became a British concern.58
Force Package and Expenditure
The second strategic issue that needed to be dealt with was the size and composition of the 
British military contribution.  Somewhere in August 2005, the 16 Brigade and 3 PARA regiment 
received a warning order about a deployment to Helmand which was due to commence in 
the beginning 2006.59 This warning order to particular units confirmed that prior to any 
operational planning and formal appreciation of the task, the Ministry of Defence - very 
likely with the support of the Treasury - already decided to limit the size of the force to a 
reinforced battle group of 3150 men.60 In addition, it was communicated to the planners that 
expenditure had been capped at 1 billion for a three-year deployment.61 
Secretary of State for Defence, tasked by Prime Minister Blair to prepare the British 
deployment to South Afghanistan, asked for a more detailed plan for a force of approximately 
3000 men.  He and his Defence Chiefs acknowledged that ‘the further down the planning 
route they went, the harder it would be to pull back’.62  
As recollected by General Messenger, the permanent joint headquarters presented the 
force estimate to the Ministry of Defence in August 2005.63 This plan was then presented 
by the director of operations at the MOD to the Secretary of State for Defence in September 
2005.64 However, the planners at the permanent joint headquarters had not even begun 
drawing the composition of the taskforce. As explained by chief plans of the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters: ‘The NATO plan was to send a taskforce. None of us knew what a taskforce was. 
57 The ‘lead nation’ model of international assistance to Afghanistan was agreed to at a donors’ conference held in Tokyo 
in early 2002. Five countries each agreed to assume lead coordination responsibility for assistance to a single area of 
security-related Afghan administration: the United States for the army, Germany for the police, Italy for the judiciary, the 
United Kingdom for counter-narcotics, and Japan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militias. 
The Afghanistan Compact, a formal statement of commitment by the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA)	and	the	international	community,	finalized	in	January	2006,shifted	responsibility	from	lead	nations	to	Afghanistan	
itself.  Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress. Congressional 
Research Service (2010) 12.
58 Valentina Soria, ‘Flawed Comprehensiveness: the Joint Plan for Helmand’, Whitehall Papers 77(1) (2011) 30-48, 35
59 Rodwell, ‘Between Idea and the Reality’, 19; Interview Stuart Tootal.
60 Tom Rodwell, ‘Between Idea and Reality’,  19
61 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 224-225; Soria, ‘Flawed Comprehensiveness’.
62 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 224.
63 Interview Messenger.
64 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 224-225
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No doctrine was available. If that would have been the case, we would have understood the 
estimate of the composition and size of the taskforce better’.65
At the trilateral working conferences, the United States briefed the three partnering 
nations about what should at least be included in the formatted taskforces. Of course, every 
nation remained autonomous with regard to the composition of the respective taskforces, 
but had in the back of their minds the suggestions about the composition of the task force as 
put forward by the American representatives. 
In addition to the lack of understanding about the composition of the task force, the force 
package discussion was fraught with debates on reducing operational activities in Iraq. Also, 
the planning assumption of the campaign in Helmand was – according to most respondents 
– informed by the belief that the United Kingdom would deploy its forces to a relative benign 
region with a main focus on stabilisation and reconstruction activities.66 
The question remained whether the proposed size of the taskforce was indeed realistic. 
The estimate allegedly relied heavily on the already committed British forces in Iraq. 
However, political and military decision-makers believed these two operations could be 
carried out concurrently.67 As explained by the Prime Minister; ‘Afghanistan did not affect 
decisions on drawing down troop levels. Had it been said to me at any time in early 2003 that 
we could not fulfil our task because of shortages of troops, I would not have committed us’.68
In various accounts69 military commanders were accused of providing advice that 
politicians and civil servants wanted to hear, rather than the cold facts that might have led 
to a less enthusiastic political imperative about leading the NATO campaign into Southern 
Afghanistan.70 One of the architects of the alteration from Iraq to Afghanistan was the 
director of operations at the Ministry of Defence, General Fry. Along with Blair’s foreign policy 
advisor, Nigel Sheinwald, and the Chief of Defence, General Walker, he became instrumental 
in moving forward the deployment through Whitehall.71 General Fry dismissed suggestions 
that commanders had not provided straightforward advice to conform to the political 
mood, or out of fear of promotional prospects: ‘That’s not being spinelessly compliant with 
65 Interview chief plans PJHQ. 
66 Interviews Hill and McNeil.
67 Interview respondents; Fairweather,  A War of Choice..
68 Statement delivered by Tony Blair to the Iraq Inquiry on the 14th of January 2011. Iraq Inquiry, ‘Statement delivered by 
Tony Blair to the Iraq Inquiry 14.01.2011’, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50743/Blair-statement.pdf (last accessed 
15.11.2013).
69	 Iraq	Inquiry,	Defence	Committee	Hearings	on	Afghanistan,	media	reports,	amongst	others:	Deborah	Haynes,	‘They	went	
into	 Helmand	 with	 eyes	 shut	 and	 fingers	 crossed’,	 The	 Times,	 9	 June	 2010.	 (version	 09.06.2013)	 http://www.thetimes.
co.uk/tto/news/uk/Defence/article2547216.ece (last accessed 06.12.2013); Waal, Depending on the Right People; Frank 
Ledwige, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven, CT 2011); Sherard Cowper-Coles, Cables 
from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign (London 2011).
70	 Haynes,	‘They	went	into	Helmand	with	eyes	shut	and	fingers	crossed’.































what you know the political intentions are. It’s taking upon you a responsibility for making 
judgments and recommendations which are properly yours. You don’t delegate these things 
up to politicians who are probably less well qualified to make the judgments than you are’.72 
However, military officers working on the Afghanistan estimate expressed severe doubts 
about the feasibility of the mission and composition of the force and consequently chose to 
raise their concerns on various occasions. One of them was the chief planner at the permanent 
joint headquarters  in Northwood. He and his deputy wrote a paper questioning the estimate 
that had been provided to the Ministry of Defence by PJHQ stating it to be sub-optimal 
because it had insufficient intelligence and other shortcomings. The general refers to the 
paper as ‘not that mature in that it was long and needed further work but it commented that 
J2 [intelligence]73 was inadequate. It commented that the proposed order of battle [ORBAT] 
and equipment table was inadequate. It proposed further Prelim Ops and strengthening of 
the ORBAT and equipment table including more weaponry and better armoured vehicles’.74
The paper was consequently criticised by the Chief of Staff of PJHQ and the  operations 
staff at the Ministry of Defence on the basis that if the shortcomings as mentioned in the 
paper, became a matter of knowledge to senior MOD staff and the Defence Secretary, they 
would not give permission for the deployment to go ahead. Consequently, the paper was not 
published.75
The subsequent months were used by the Ministry of Defence to set about winning 
Treasury approval for a three year mission costing close to 1 billion pounds.76  According to a 
civilian involved in the planning, the time frame of three years was questioned as well. ‘We 
said the time frame didn’t make sense. We got a huge push back from Whitehall, who wanted 
us to write something different for the Ministers’.77




and reported separately to the higher echelons. Chief intelligence refers to this information as ‘nonsense’ and stated he 
did	attend	the	meetings.	He	did	however	conduct	regular	sensitive	reporting/discussions	directly	with	CJO	and	Gen	Wall	eg	
on the SF reconnaissance preliminary operation PJHQ mounted to assess Helmand in more detail before main deployment 
(email correspondence general Newton, 13 December 2013).
74 Interview chief plans PJHQ
75 Interview chief plans PJHQ and email correspondence December 2013. 
76 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 224
77	 Civilian	planner	quoted	in:	Haynes,	‘They	went	into	Helmand	with	eyes	shut	and	fingers	crossed’.
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At this point, choices were made with regard to the size of the force, the expenditure, and 
the duration of the mission, but none of these choices were founded on a proper analysis 
of the task at hand. That is to say, a thorough understanding of what one could encounter 
in Helmand. The main planning assumption about the forthcoming mission was that 
the British anticipated a rather benign environment. Opinions differ about the planning 
assumptions of the operation to Helmand. As already referred to earlier, most respondents 
- most prominently those who executed recess to the province and those who were involved 
in the planning - indicated they had not anticipated an insurgency. Hence, the original 
assumption was that combat operations would only be conducted when necessary, since the 
main focus would lie on the stabilisation of the province through the implementation of 
reconstruction activities and the facilitation of ‘good governance’.  
Indeed, the Secretary of State for Defence told a reporter that ‘if we came for three years 
there to accomplish our mission and had not fired one shot at the end of it, we would be very 
happy indeed’.78 What was not highlighted by the media, however, was the fact that Reid 
had also said [during that same interview] that he expected the mission to be ‘complex and 
dangerous’ because ‘the terrorists will want to destroy the economy and the legitimate trade 
and the government that we are helping to build up’. In addition, he added that ‘if this didn’t 
involve the necessity to use force, we wouldn’t send soldiers’.79
Even though the latest deployment to Iraq had taught the armed forces that intelligence 
in these kinds of operations was crucial80, it seemed that yet again, the (lack) of intelligence 
was foundational for the underestimation of the task at hand. In retrospect, the intelligence 
community was criticised for failing to provide a reliable analysis of the real condition of the 
Taliban insurgency, which presumably led to an underestimation of the threat and fuelled a 
sense of misplaced confidence in Whitehall81 as to what could be achieved.82
The situation in Helmand was discussed in Whitehall as General Fry presented the 
earlier mentioned plan about the size of the force and the budget in September 2005. At 
this meeting several critical questions were asked about the security situation and possible 
threats to the British forces, all of which were downplayed by General Fry. This was much 
to the frustration of secret intelligence service personnel and military officers present who 
were aware of information collected during a Special Forces reconnaissance mission earlier 
78 See: BBC, ‘UK troops “to target terrorists”’ (version 24.04.2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4935532.stm (last accessed 
10.05.2014).
79 Ferguson, A million bullets, 21
80 Robert Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 29(1) (2006) 
3-52; Davies, Philip HJ., ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 17(3) (2004) 495-520.
81	 Whitehall	is	the	popular	term	for	the	Cabinet	Office.	































that year: an increase of coalition forces in the province could provoke a fight especially if the 
opium trade was endangered.83 
Others, however, suggested that the intelligence picture was as good as it could get but 
was certainly limited. When asked about the intelligence estimate with regard to Helmand, 
General Fry called to mind the British mission to Sierra Leone. ‘Even though we did not know 
what we would be facing in Sierra Leone, the operation turned into a success’.84
Some chose to voice their disquiet about the limited intelligence. One of the military 
officers who attended the meeting questioned the General’s characterisation of the security 
situation in Helmand. Consequently, he confronted General Fry’s deputy, General Hughes, 
and told him that in fact they had no idea what they would find on the ground. He asked 
him to put his concerns forward to the Secretary of State for Defence, but General Hughes 
reportedly refused to do so.85 
Also, the secret intelligence service operative who was present at the meeting raised his 
doubts by delivering a formal letter of concern to Reid, but by then the Secretary of State 
for Defence seemed to have made up his mind.86 Moreover, Air Chief Marshal Stirrup stated 
to the Defence Committee [which investigated the decision to move into the South of 
Afghanistan] that senior military staff was aware that Helmand was a hostile environment 
and halted their planning for a time because of this: ‘I personally said, We need to call a 
halt to our planning. We cannot possibly deploy UK Forces when we don’t know what the 
environment is going to be like and we don’t know who will be in the adjoining provinces, so 
we don’t know what the total picture will look like. We did halt for a time, but then concern 
grew within NATO, the Dutch resolved their difficulties and then at that stage we were seen 
by NATO as holding up the whole process. We were asked [by NATO] to step forward again, 
which we consequently did’.87
7.8 The Process of Interpretation Continues 
Strategic guidance was to direct the course of events in order to arrive at more definitive 
actions with regard to the deployment instead of the provisional decisions made thus far. 
83 Fairweather,  A War of Choice, 225
84 Interview Fry.
85 Fairweather, A War of Choice,  225
86 Ibid.
87 UK Parliament, ‘Operations in Helmand 2006’ (version 17.07.2011) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/
cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm#note37 
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In order do so, more information on the situation in Helmand needed to be collected. 
Hitherto, several recces were already conducted by, amongst others, teams of the Permanent 
Joint Headquarters in Northwood. However, limited information was available about the 
situation in Helmand since the only military activity on the ground in Helmand prior to 2006 
had been the American led counter-terrorist operation Enduring Freedom. Its main focus 
was the search for al-Qaeda and while doing so attempted not to intimidate or alienate the 
local population or the Taliban. Hence, the American armed forces acted in a ‘live and let 
live’ way88 resulting in a limited intelligence picture.89 ‘At that stage, it was not clear yet that 
it would turn into a counterinsurgency operation’, recollected Messenger.90
In April 2005, the Chiefs of Staff formally agreed to commence preliminary operations 
later that year. The deployment of this team had been a result of the requirement of good 
intelligence, since as explained by General Wall (director of operations at PJHQ), this had 
been one of the things that had not gone ‘terribly well in Iraq’.91 Colonel Messenger had 
been appointed as head of the preliminary operations team [also known as advance force] 
in October 2005. 
His appointment was much to the dismay of General Butler who was chosen to lead the 
initial deployment task force in Helmand. He himself would have preferred to have made the 
initial reconnaissance of the province and to draw up the operational plan accordingly since 
it was his troops who were tasked to do the job. Nevertheless, he had to accept he was to 
follow the dictates as provided by the permanent joint headquarters in Northwood.92
Messenger was provided with the following orders: to write a comprehensive campaign 
plan, to conduct intelligence gathering operations, to supervise the building of the necessary 
infrastructure [for the incoming taskforce], and lastly to liaise with forward elements of other 
nations. 93 ‘I had received political guidance in broad terms: it would have to be a stabilisation 
mission and it was not to last more than three years[…] but we did not have a view why we 
were there […] Nobody, including ourselves,  understood the challenge’, recollected General 
Messenger, who had executed two recces to Helmand in early 2005.94
88	 Evidence	delivered	to	the	House	of	Commons	Defence	Committee	by	General	Fry.	UK	Parliament,	‘Operations	in	Helmand	
2006’ (version 17.07.2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm#n34
89	 Warren	Chin,	 ‘Colonial	Warfare	 in	a	Post‐Colonial	State:	British	Military	Operations	 in	Helmand	Province,	Afghanistan’,	
Defence Studies 10(1-2) (2010) 215-247, 230.
90 Interview Messenger.
91 Iraq Inquiry, ‘Statement General Wall to Iraq Inquiry’. http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/49687/20100106-wall-day-
final.pdf
92 Fairweather,  A War of Choice,  225-226
































Brigadier Mungo Melvin, director of operational capability of the Ministry of Defence, had 
executed an interim study of the mission to Helmand in the summer of 2006.95 He had 
argued that a miscomprehension of the political situation, scope, and complexity of the 
threat facing British forces in 2006 had been instrumental in the meagre assessment. ‘The 
British disposition to thrive on managing crises, if not muddling through them, counts 
against a longer-term imperative to make plans well ahead and to resource them properly. 
Pragmatism is one of Britain’s national virtues, and is all very necessary. But expediency can 
prove self-defeating if one does not get the strategic idea right in the first place’.96 
Strategic Guidance
From September 2005 onwards97, the Reid group was to provide strategic guidance to the 
planning of the Helmand campaign.  Within the group itself, there appeared to be a systemic 
lack of understanding of the situation the United Kingdom was getting itself and their armed 
forces into.98  This was compounded by the fact that there seemed to be a commonly shared 
belief, within government, and the military, that this deployment was going to happen. 
According to the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Kevin Tebbit, his superior was ‘to kick 
the MOD into action’. He described how there had been pressure on John Reid from Number 
10 to undertake this mission. This pressure was reportedly heavily exercised by the special 
advisor to No. 10, Nigel Sheinwald.99  
Hence, the question was not íf the deployment was to happen but more a question of 
how. This is an important notion because it indicates the existence of a single idea that 
seemed to dominate the whole political military system100: 
We failed to ask enough probing questions […] Equally seriously, we were responsible 
for setting the tone which made other people in the system, military and civilian, who 
might otherwise have pressed harder on these questions, assume that to do so would be 
pointless or be seen as unhelpful […] the senior military were equal partners in the failings 
in pre-deployment planning and after deployment they were equally slow to grasp the 
95 Sean Rayment, ‘British troops in Afghanistan “on the brink of exhaustion”’, The Telegraph, 06.08.2006 (version 06.08.2006), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525678/British-troops-in-Afghanistan-on-the-brink-of-exhaustion.html.
96 Melvin, ‘Learning the Strategic Lessons from Afghanistan’, 59-60.
97	 In	the	recollection	of	those	respondents	that	have	been	involved	in	the	Reid	group,	this	committee	had	been	initiated	in	
September 2005.
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full implementations of the new reality, losing sight of strategy in their determination to 
crack on and merely focusing on troop numbers.101
  
Des Browne, Chief Secretary to the Treasury [later on in May 2006 he became the Secretary 
of State for Defence] indicated the Treasury had been involved since they were represented in 
the Reid Group.102 ‘I had the responsibility to ensure that we had the resources to be able to 
support that [the deployment] financially. [...] John Reid was very clear that he would not take 
to the Cabinet a recommendation that we deploy into Afghanistan unless the military advice 
was that we were able to do that with the resources that we had’.103
Nevertheless, it was evident that assumptions existed in the Ministry of Defence about 
troops and equipment coming back from Iraq, which would allow some flexibility in the 
Afghan deployment. Senior officers, however, confirmed no detailed staff work had 
been done on this matter. If a drawdown of forces in Iraq had to be halted or delayed, no 
contingency planning had been done on how the two simultaneous theatres of operation 
would be manned and supplied.104
Some members of the Reid Group, particularly Reid himself, were adequately concerned 
by the small number of troops needed relative to the size of the task and the consequent 
risk of overstretch.105 Consequently, formal written reassurance was asked from the Chief of 
the Defence Staff acknowledging the feasibility of the deployment. Chief of Defence General 
Walker did acknowledge [in a letter to Reid] it would cause some logistical ‘pain and grief’ to 
specialist assets but that the plan for Afghanistan was not predicated on withdrawal of such 
capabilities from Iraq.106 
Supposedly other members of the Reid group, and within the various levels of the 
departments represented in the group, had decided not to speak up or question the 
information presented to them. Notably, the permanent undersecretary of defence, Kevin 
Tebbit, indicated he had been indeed seriously concerned about a new commitment and 
stated he felt it could be a mission too far, but at the same time admitted he had not pressed 
101 Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial Decision-Making in the Run-Up to the Helmand Deployment’, 52-53.
102 Evidence provided to the Iraq Inquiry by Des Browne on the 25th of January 2010. Iraq Inquiry, ‘Evidence provided to the 
Iraq Inquiry by Des Browne 25.01.2010’ http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/45531/100125-browne-final.pdf
103 Evidence provided to the Iraq Inquiry by Des Browne 25 January 2010.
104 Clarke, The Helmand Decision, 21.
105 Rodwell, ‘Between the Idea and Reality’, 19.
106	On	the	12th	of	September	Reid	had	sent	a	personal	memo	to	the	Chief	of	Defence	asking	for	a	formal	confirmation	that	
the commitment in Iraq would be sustainable if a deployment to Afghanistan would be carried out simultaneously. 
Iraq Inquiry, ‘Secretary of State to CDS about Iraq/Afghanistan commitments 12.09.05’, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.
uk/media/54458/120905aps-pso.pdf .	He	received	an	answer	on	the	19th	of	December		 in	which	the	CDS	confirmed	the	
achievability of the deployment to South Afghanistan. Iraq Inquiry, ‘CDS to Secretary of State aboutIraq/Afghanistan 
































his objections fully. He had raised his concerns to his planning staff and the Chiefs of Staff 
but they told him the mission [to Helmand] was manageable. Another factor that had played 
into the decision of Tebbit not to press his objections to the fullest was his belief that if 
the United Kingdom did not come forward, nobody else would. He and others hoped for a 
‘snowball effect’ to occur: the planning assumption was that other countries would follow 
the British initiative.107  
Also, Cavanagh stated he had spoken to several people within the ‘system’ who became 
silent witnesses to the process instead of voicing their concerns or critique.108 Some chose to 
speak up later in the evidence they presented to parliamentary hearings or committees or in 
publications or interviews.109
Besides the worries about the feasibility of the mission and the force configuration, 
another challenge had surfaced. Two objectives that had been set for the mission needed 
to be reconciled: the stabilisation of the province and the conduct of counter-narcotics 
operations. Given the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Helmand were one way 
or another involved in the production or trading of opium110, one needed to come up with 
alternative livelihoods. However, no alternatives had been defined yet and thus the military 
had not been very enthusiastic about including counter-narcotics operations into their 
campaign plan. 
As explained by Brigadier Ed Butler, commander of 16 Air Assault Brigade, the military 
‘took a tactical view that we couldn’t get involved in those [counter-narcotics operations] 
because we could see that that was the quickest way of upsetting the ordinary Afghan farmer. 
We didn’t want to turn the farmer into an insurgent, so counter-narcotics was another 
contradictory objective’.111 
All the concerns mentioned above were made public by the Secretary for Defence two 
months after he had been appointed to oversee the deployment to South Afghanistan. 
On the 14th of November 2005, John Reid made the following declaration to the House of 
Commons: 
107 Interview Tebbit; Iraq Inquiry, ‘Evidence delivered by Kevin Tebbit to the Iraq Inquiry on the 3rd	of	February	2010’	http://
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bydate/091203.aspx
108 Interview Cavanagh. 
109 See: Iraq hearing, http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/transcripts.aspx; House	 of	 Commons	 Defence	 Committee	 on	
Afghanistan, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm; The Afghan 
Papers on the decision –making on Helmand (RUSI).
110 Helmand holds a dominant position in Afghanistan as an opium producer, accounting for around 25 percent of the national 
opium poppy cultivated area in recent years. For more information see: Pain, Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor; 
Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Peacekeepers among Poppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies and Intervention’, International 
Peacekeeping 16(1) (2009) 100-114.
111 Evidence by Ed Butler to the HCDC, Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12 I, House of Commons (2011 
London), Evidence 102.
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I will not announce the deployment to Helmand until I am satisfied that we have the 
military configuration that we ourselves need, and until we have the necessary back-up 
and resources across government here to provide alternative livelihoods to farmers whose 
current livelihood may be dependent on narcotics. To take away one form of income without 
substituting another would encourage insurgency rather than stability. Finally, I will not 
make that announcement until I believe that the multinational jigsaw has been put together 
and we have the necessary input from our NATO colleagues both in and around Helmand.112
In other words, he required more assurances that the costs of the mission would be met 
in full by the Treasury; that the Canadians would definitely be in place in Kandahar to the 
east of the British and the Dutch in Uruzgan to the north; and thirdly, that the Department 
for International Development (DfID) would provide sufficient resources for the nation-
building activities that would have to follow immediately.113
Besides concerning itself with the configurations of the deployment, the Reid Group 
had been tasked with the provision of a strategic concept outlining the purpose of the 
deployment. However, most respondents and reports have indicated such a concept was 
missing. According to the Director of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) the decision 
[to deploy to Helmand] should be seen as a momentous example of the British114  problem 
with the formulation of a national strategy and carrying it through with military coherence. 
He refers to this problem as ‘strategic illiteracy’115 a theme put on the research agenda of the 
research institute ever since Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, 
delivered a  lecture claiming a lacking habit of thinking strategically among British Defence 
professionals in December 2009.116
Some perspectives on (the alleged absence of ) strategy:
I am not quite sure you can call Helmand a strategic issue, more an operational issue. 
There should have been a strategy for [our involvement in] Afghanistan as a whole.117
112 UK Parliament, ‘Minutes House of Commons, 14.11.2005, column 683’, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051114/debtext/51114-02.htm.
113 Clarke, The Afghan Papers, 19-20.
114 In the series of papers published by the RUSI, the complexities of the formulation with strategy are dealt with within the 
British	context.	However,	as	addressed	and	discussed	in	Chapter	1,	severe	difficulties	with	the	formulation	of	strategy	are	
endemic	in	most	Western	countries	that	have	deployed	their	troops	in	the	setting	of	contemporary	operations.
115 Clarke, ‘The Helmand Decision’, 6.

































Individuals had their own views and acted with the best of intentions. But the system 
as a whole seemed to have no strategic brain: no self-awareness of the full scale of the 
potential challenge, or a settled procedure for taking new challenges in its ride.118
There was no long term strategy. This is a difficult issue. You never know in the beginning 
what will happen in the end. One of the lessons we have learned is to have a stronger 
political goal before troops were sent off to Helmand. We did not really have that.119
Strategic guidance was provided by the political desire to commit troops to NATO’s 
expansion to South Afghanistan. The respective NATO operational order outlined the 
purpose of the mission.120
Yet the planning process had been complicated by additional factors. First of all, international 
planning between the three nations and concurrently NATO did not always occur in a 
coordinated manner. Secondly, the various national military commands, and Ministerial 
departments were engaged in their own respective planning.
The commander of the 16 Air Assault Brigade referred to the planning activities as a split 
planning effort: the American plan [including Operation Enduring Freedom] and planning by 
the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the Ministry of Defence, 
the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development, his own headquarters 
and the allied commands and headquarters. Consequently, he described the mission he was 
to undertake as unclear because of the many players involved and proclaimed he and his staff 
had not known enough to come up with a coherent, long-term campaign plan.121
The split between the planning team and those who were supposed to implement the 
plan itself highlighted the dysfunctional nature of the planning process.122 Indeed, even 
though most – if not all at the time – involved actors were convinced by what seemed to be 
a self-evident logic of committing a British taskforce for NATO’s expansion to the South of 
Afghanistan, a certain chaos had occurred when it came to the planning of the stabilisation 
effort.  
Comprehensive Campaign Plan 
Even though political approval had not been granted yet in the sense that the Cabinet had 
agreed to the deployment, a campaign plan needed to be written. In retrospect,123 the plan 





122 Soria, ‘Flawed Comprehensiveness’, 33
123 Soria, ‘Flawed Comprehensiveness’.
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for the British deployment was assumed to be ‘joint’ from the start and described as an effort 
to promote a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of Helmand. A proclaimed desire 
to do so was founded in the lessons of Iraq124  and had certainly focussed governmental 
attention on the need for joined up governance for the stabilisation of (post) conflict states. 
In fact, in 2004, the post conflict and crisis response unit (PCRU)125 was created with the aim 
of facilitating integrated missions abroad. However, from the outset, no one had called – 
despite the experiences from Iraq –for the drafting of a comprehensive interdepartmental 
plan for Helmand. 
Actually, two different institutions had called for the development of a military and a civil 
stabilisation plan: respectively the permanent joint headquarters had ordered its preliminary 
operations team to draw up a plan and the Cabinet Office had ordered the head of the PCRU 
to draft a plan.126 At that stage [October 2005] political approval had still not been granted. 
Both teams127 ended up at Kandahar airfield since there was no infrastructure available 
yet in Helmand and transportation means were rather limited as well. Etherington alluded to 
how the deployment of civilian personnel from the PCRU had not been popular among the 
three departments, but been pushed through by the Cabinet Office. He questioned to what 
extent there had been a true desire in London to make the deployment to Helmand a ‘civilian 
ends mission’. As he put it: ‘If this would have been the case, a civilian component should 
have been added to the planning team of the advance party from the start. Yet, there was an 
imbalance from the beginning’.128
Even though neither the MOD nor Cabinet Office had envisioned the civilian and military 
team drafting a joint plan, they ended up doing so, both on their own initiative. The whole 
endeavour of drafting a joint plan in the end worked rather fittingly since Messenger and 
Etherington had served together in Northern Ireland and knew each other rather well. 
As explained by the head of PCRU: ‘I was lucky enough that I knew Gordon. As such. the 
relationship between my team and the military became less fractured when we started 
working at the military HQ [in Kandahar]. The military are well practiced and have many 
resources. This was in stark contrast with our civilian element. Most of us could not keep 
up with the planning.  Therefore, Gordon deliberately slowed down his planning in order to 
use the quality of the civilian planners. And we of course benefited from them.’129 Messenger 
124 Amongst other things: the absence of a civilian reconstruction and development capability.
125	The	 Post	 Conflict	 Reconstruction	 Unit	 was	 renamed	 Stabilization	 Unit	 (SU)	 in	 2007.	 Its	 role	 was	 limited	 to	 providing	
stabilization advisers, and only upon invitation from its parent departments (FCO, DFID and the MOD) did it provide 
periodic planning support or facilitation, in: Stuart Gordon, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid 
and Security in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. Feinstein International Center (2011 Medford, MA) 32.
126 Interviews Messenger and Etherington, 

































underlined the beneficial venture of civil and military planning for the stabilisation of 
Helmand: ‘due to our cooperation, the UKJPH was not military in its nature’.130 
Since no template for the plan had been provided, they decided to employ the format 
of British military campaign planning as a framework. Civilian aspects of the planning, 
such as rule of law and alternative livelihoods, were inserted accordingly and, as indicated 
by both of them, they shaped it [the process of writing the plan] themselves and as such 
composed the ‘first genuine civilian military plan’.131  The documents that had informed 
their planning had primarily been NATO documents, amongst which the fragmentary order 
issued by commander ISAF, the British General Richards, calling for the establishment of 
Afghan Development Zones. The logic underpinning the creation of these zones was based 
on the famous ink spot philosophy.132
While drafting the joint plan, Etherington and Messenger quickly agreed the boundaries 
that had been set to the British deployment [providing stability in Helmand within a three 
year time frame, with a maximum of 3150 troops and a budget of 1 billion pounds and the 
inclusion of counter-narcotics activities] seriously complicated the drafting of a workable 
plan. Furthermore, both of them recognised the intelligence gap resulted in a very limited 
understanding of the complexity and challenges of the province and envisioned that more 
time was needed for the task force to scan the horizon and collect additional information. 
As such, they incorporated the recommendation in their plan that initial operations of the 
task force should primarily be focused on the gathering of intelligence about, amongst other 
things, the social make-up of the province.133
Shortly before Messenger was due to deliver his plan to Northwood, early November, 
he had persuaded the headquarters to allow him more time to incorporate the ideas of the 
civilian planners.134 In that way, one single plan could be presented to both the military 
and civilian superiors. Shortly thereafter, Mark Etherington, in close coordination with 
Messenger, provided his initial estimate back to Whitehall before the end of November 
2005 (three weeks after his arrival in theatre), articulating the practical impossibilities of 
130 Interview Messenger.
131 Interview Messenger.
132 This approach builds on the British experiences in Malaya where development had fostered to winning the ‘hearts and 
minds’ of the local population. See: Paul Dixon ‘The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern 
Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan’ in: Idem (ed.), The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq 
and Afghanistan’ (Basingstoke and New York 2012) 1-48, 30. Originally, the ink spot philosophy is based on the ‘touche huile’. 
For more on the foundation of counter-insurgency thought see:  Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds. The Routledge 
Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (London and New York, 2012).
133 Interviews Messenger and Etherington. 
134 Fairweather, A War of Choice:232  
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delivering results given the constraints provided by the Cabinet Office.135 It called for an 
adjustment of either the aim of the mission or the constraints given to it.136 
Despite their advice, Cabinet Office ordered the production of a joint plan within the 
original provided constraints. Consequently, Messenger and Etherington produced a Joint 
United Kingdom Plan for Helmand (JUKPH) which was sent to London by mid December 
2005. It did meet the overall strategic aim and tried to be as realistic as possible.137 After 
the report was received at the Cabinet Office it was allegedly substantially rewritten before 
it was send off to the Reid Group.  As such, it remains unclear whether the final report as 
delivered to the Ministers was in fact the product as produced by Etherington and Messenger 
or Cabinet Office.138
Once the plan was conveyed, it had a rather limited impact on the planning of the 
respective departments with regards to their activities. Various respondents have indicated 
there had been no strategic ownership of the JUKPH in Whitehall.139 All involved departments 
selected their own ‘piece of the pie’. There seemed a reported reluctance to work together 
primarily founded in a desire to maintain a position of institutional primacy.140 Thus, the 
impression had arisen amongst those involved that the plan just needed to be delivered in 
London but not necessarily implemented in Helmand.141 In other words, the prerequisite for 
comprehensiveness needed to be satisfied, but appeared to be symbolic. 
In addition, those who were to implement the plan and deliver the results, 16 Brigade 
and the civilian staff, had their own operational preferences and acted accordingly.142 The 
commander of 16 Brigade, Brigadier Butler, and his planning staff, had developed their own 
concept of operations. The joint plan had not informed their planning and notably not even 
the planning of their higher headquarters, the permanent joint headquarters, which had in 
fact delivered the earlier mentioned preliminary operations team.143 
135	Both	military	and	civilian	planners	identified	various	problems	with	the	comprehensive	approach.	Etherington	identified	
four	 flaws	 in	 the	 concept:	 (1)	 a	 lack	 of	 strategic	 expertise	 at	 the	 centre,	 (2)	 a	 competing	 culture	 between	 the	 three	
departments	of	the	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	(FCO),	Department	for	International	Development	(DFID)	and	the	
Ministry	of	Defence	(MOD),	(3)	a	lack	of	overarching	authority	able	to	take	a	holistic	overview,	recognize	deficiencies	and	
correct them and, (4) a problematic civil/military relationship, further aggravated by a lack of government as oversight and 
incentives to work jointly. Etherington´s views are shared by Gordon Messenger who signaled - amongst other factors - the 
lack	of	international	ownership	of	the	´non-	military	effort´	in	coalition	operations,	and	the	difference	in	time	horizons	
between	departments,	the	scale	of	military	effort	and	planning	capability	versus	the	capability	of	the	civilian	sector,	and	
a lack of understanding of the concept of the comprehensive approach. Mark Etherington quoted and interviewed in: 
Rodwell, ´Between Idea and the Reality’, 14; Gordon Messenger quoted and interviewed by Tom  Rodwell, in: Idem.
136 Grandia Mantas, ‘Shafer Revisited’.
137 Interviews Messenger and Etherington. 
138 Williams, ‘Empire Lite Revisited’, 73.
139 Interviews Rachman, Etherington, Messenger.
140 Fairweather, A War of Choice; Soria, ‘Flawed Comprehensiveness’; Interviews Cavanagh, Tebbit, Foster.
141 Interview Etherington.
142 Interview Rachman.































The civilian element believed they could initiate and implement their activities on their 
own terms as well and had reportedly not employed the plan either. The Department for 
International Aid especially had been annoyed by the assumption they were to derive their 
tasks and respective activities from the plan.144 
In the last days of December and the beginning of January 2006, Cabinet discussions were 
ongoing to approve the deployment, but both Prime Minster Blair and Secretary of Defence 
Reid were finding it difficult to bring things to a decision-point - partly because Treasury 
Ministers had insisted on the condition of Canadian and Dutch commitment. Both Blair and 
Reid appeared wary of bringing things to a decision. As such, the upcoming international 
conference in London was used as a forcing device to precipitate a decision.145
 
7.9  The Foreign Policy Action: The Deployment of Forces
With the international conference on Afghanistan in January 2006, Afghanistan Compact,146 on 
the horizon Blair seemed to be determined to force matters to a conclusion. As the host of 
the conference, he wanted to commit first in order to encourage other countries to follow his 
example. Neither he nor the Foreign Office wanted to be in a position of hosting a conference 
that was meant to chart the way forward, while not being able to say with clarity what the 
British role would be. As a result, after the delays of previous months, things were brought 
to a head pretty quickly.  Consequently, the decision147  was pressed through the Reid Group 
and subsequently through the Cabinet in a matter of days.148 
In the early days of January 2006, the Secretary of Defence chaired a Cabinet meeting 
which was convened to vote about the mission to Helmand. A non-binding vote was held to 
decide if the deployment was to be supported. Several senior Ministers attended, amongst 
whom Des Browne, the Chief Secretary of the Treasury [later on Secretary of State for 
Defence]. Allegedly, Reid ran the Cabinet meeting imperiously in which not much room for 
144	Interview	DfID	official.
145 Interview and email correspondence with Cavanagh (04.11.2013).
146The aim of the conference was ensure international assistance for Afghanistan and link it to Afghanistan’s national 
government	planning	for		a	period	of	five	years.	For	more	information	about	the	conference	see:	United	Nations	Security	




senior military advisers should have nonetheless have raised serious concerns about the unpredictable nature of the 
conflict	on	which	 they	were	embarking.	This	briefing	should	have	drawn	clear	attention	 to	 the	need	 for	 force	 levels	 to	
be	sufficiently	robust	to	cope	with	an	unpredictable	conflict.	We	believe	that	such	concerns	as	were	raised	by	the	armed	
forces were inadequate at best, and that they were not raised, as they should have been, to the very highest levels of 
government’. Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2010-12 I, 6. 
148 Interview Cavanagh and Rodwell.
177
Chapter 7   The British Case
Part  2     Context, Cases and Analysis
debate had been offered. The Chief Secretary of the Treasury, Browne, asked Reid whether he 
believed they knew enough about Helmand to be able to deploy their troops. The Secretary of 
State for Defence had waved away the consideration and asked Des Browne if he was to vote 
against the mission. Browne decided to abstain.149
Finally, on the 26th of January 2006, just before the conference was to commence, 
Secretary of State John Reid announced British forces would deploy a taskforce of 3150 troops 
to Helmand for three years. The key Ministers seemed to believe in the clarity of the overall 
decision, it reinforced their sense that the military were happy with it and the military were 
reinforced by their sense that the politicians had made up their minds leaving them with no 
alternative then but to get on with it. All others in government (departments) either joined 
the consensus or kept quiet. Some alternatives, however, were presented, like a delayed 
deployment, a smaller force, or a more comprehensive intelligence picture. Nevertheless, 
these seemed all to be treated as problems to be handled rather than constraints considered 
on their merits, indicating the gathering momentum.150  
The official objective of the mission of the British forces to the South was to conduct 
security and stabilisation operations within Helmand and the wider Regional Command 
South, jointly with Afghan partners, other Government Departments and multinational 
partners. The intention was to support the Government of Afghanistan in improving 
governance and development. The initial objective in 2006 was to establish a central 
‘lozenge of security’ around Lashkar Gah, Gereshk and Camp Bastion and then expand their 
presence as conditions permitted. Furthermore, British forces were to gather intelligence 
and gain a cultural understanding of the environment and, by developing a ‘local envelope’ 
of security, they would be able to help create the right environment for governance, build 
Afghan capacity, and, create capacity for economic growth.151
The objective of the mission illustrated, as described by Jack Fairweather in his book 
‘War of Choice’, the political thinking and desire for ‘a simple deployment, occupation and 
withdrawal’, ‘perfectly reflected the type of war the British military wanted to fight, but 
not the one they were going to get’.152 Blair’s enthusiasm for the use of the military was 
questioned about a week after the Secretary of State for Defence had announced the decision 
to deploy British forces to Helmand. Until then, Blair had engaged his armed forces in five 
different conflicts around the world.153 Some of his political opponents felt his enthusiasm 
149 Fairweather, War of Choice, 235.
150 Cavanagh, ‘Ministerial decision-making’, 52.
151 UK Parliament, ‘Operations in Helmand 2006’ (version 17.07.2011) http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/
cmselect/cmdfence/554/55405.htm#note31
152 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 235.
153 Iraq (1998 and 2003); Kosovo (1999); Sierra Leone (2000) and Afghanistan (2001). BBC,  Announcement for the documentary 































to employ the Royal Prerogative154 which enabled him, amongst other things, to deploy 
the military needed to be limited. Hence, on the 6th of February 2006, just some days 
after the Secretary of State for Defence had announced the deployment of British forces to 
Helmand, David Cameron – leader of the Conservative party - spoke to Parliament to pledge 
consultation with Members of Parliament whenever armed forces were to be deployed. The 
leader of the Conservative party proposed the setting up of a democracy task force that would 
examine the Premier’s power to deploy military troops and whether or not these kinds of 
decisions should be subject to some form of parliamentary confirmation hearing.155 In fact, a 
comparable procedure like that exercised in the Netherlands when it comes to the use force. 
David Cameron’s proposal reflected both a growing political and popular mood in the 
United Kingdom, a reluctance towards military undertakings. Even though the service men 
and women themselves were genuinely supported by the majority of the populace, the use 
of military missions was questioned more and more. The aftermath of Iraq left many people 
wondering about the legitimacy and purpose of the interventions.156 
Consequently, the purpose of the deployment to Helmand needed to be communicated 
in a convincing manner. This had not occurred, leaving some military to publicly speak up 
about, amongst other things, the dangers of the mission. A senior officer of the advance 
party [who was interviewed by the media just some days after Reid had announced the 
deployment of forces to the South of Afghanistan] commented: ‘British troops being sent to 
lawless Helmand province in Southern Afghanistan will “stir up a hornets’ nest” and provide 
“plenty more targets” for insurgents’.157 Moreover, other senior military officials expressed 
their concerns about the vagueness of the British mission and its accompanying difficulties 
of establishing stability in the troubled region.158 
Expressing one’s views to the media – particularly about the political context and 
objectives – is by itself not the task of a military person. However, some showed sympathy 
for this development since [according to a senior government official159] part of the problem 
nowadays for politicians is to formulate a single message and having a military person 
154	The	Royal	Prerogative	are	a	series	of	powers	officially	held	by	the	Queen	that	have	been	passed	to	the	government	of	the	
day. They enable decisions to be taken without the backing of, or consultation with, Parliament. This form of power has 
been	criticised	for	its	‘democratic	deficit.	
155 George Jones, ‘Cameron seeks to limit Blair’s use of Royal Prerogative’, The Telegraph, 06.02.2006 (version 06.02.2006) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509778/Cameron-seeks-to-limit-Blairs-use-of-Royal-Prerogative.html (last 
accessed 22.11.2013)
156 See: Kings College London, ‘Public Perceptions of the Armed Forces Research Program’, http://www.kcl.ac.uk/kcmhr/
research/kcmhr/publicperceptions.aspx.
157 Toby Harnden, ‘British troops will be targets in Afghanistan’ , The Telegraph, 29 January 2006 (version 29.01.2006). 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509071/British-troops-will-be-targets-in-Afghanistan.html (last accessed 
22.11.2013). 
158 Toby Harnden, ‘British troops will be targets in Afghanistan’ , The Telegraph, 29 January 2006.
159	Interview	anonymous	government	official.	
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communicating the purpose of a military mission to the public seemed in itself not a bad 
thing to do. 
The links between the media and the military were originally encouraged by the Blair 
government, which co-opted respected and authoritative military figures in order to build 
press support for interventions in Iraq and the Balkans in the late 1990s. Thus the government’s 
principal military adviser became in addition one of the principal sources of military opinion 
for the press.160 
Not all agreed that military actors needed to assume a public role, certainly not engaging 
themselves in the public debate. In fact, the army was accused of being too closely linked to, 
and making use of, the media. Their supposed close ties are viewed as having caused problems 
for Whitehall since it had the potential to run a powerful and efficient communications 
operation not necessarily in line with the chosen political direction161, in this case questioning 
the purpose and feasibility of the mission.  
Despite the public outcries of military officials in the media, the prospect of a deployment 
of British forces to South Afghanistan had not instigated a heated public debate as one would 
expect after the trouble the military [and politicians] had gotten themselves into after Iraq. In 
fact, the failures of Iraq seemed to be the unifying rationale for the mission to Helmand.162 As 
such, the nation bought into yet another deployment of their military forces.163 
 
7.10 Conclusions
The context in which the decision to assume a leading role in NATO’s expansion to the 
South and subsequently the deployment of British forces was taken, showcased a fusion of 
international momentum for Afghanistan. It embodied the inevitability of NATO’s Stage III 
operations, a political will to step up, and a military desire to facilitate a mission that was 
largely seen as  a ‘good war’. The Prime Minister’s clear guidance on a prominent role for the 
United Kingdom in NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan and military alliance politics, 
were instrumental, especially as they occurred against the backdrop of disappointing results 
in Iraq. 
160 Waal, Depending on the Right People, 23.
161 Ibid.
162 Fairweather, A War of Choice, 233.
163 Supposedly, the reduction of British involvement in Iraq and reiterated claims by politicians across the ideological spectrum 
(using terminology such as the ‘good war’) supporting the need to stay the course in Afghanistan is the most probable 
explanation provided for this surprising trend. See:  Douglas Kirner and Graham Wilson, ‘Assessing British Support for the 
War in Afghanistan, 5 October 2010, http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2010/10/assessing-british-support-for-the-war-in-































The decision path that emerged soon after the Prime Minister voiced his preferences and the 
informal international military working groups, was directed to the deployment of British 
military forces to South Afghanistan. Indeed, the eminence of certain actors in the decision-
making process was put forward in this case. Notably, Prime Minister Blair and some of his 
trustees such as the Secretary for Defence Reid played a major role within the political arena. 
Within the military establishment, the Director of operations at the Ministry of Defence, 
General Fry, had acquired himself a prominent role. In fact, he had been the main instigator 
of the trilateral military initiative and continued to be a great force throughout the decision-
making process.
 Despite the strong lead of the Prime Minister and his trustees, there was an absence of a 
meaningful strategic focus. This particularly surfaced when studying the decision that had 
to be made on the selection of the province and the force levels.  Moreover, the planning 
process remained fractured, primarily because various levels within various departments 
had no direct desire to cooperate and sought ways out. 
To conclude, it seems that the senior civil and military decision-makers did not concern 
themselves, or maybe did not even recognise the need, to identify strategic questions that 
needed to be addressed and answered before military forces were to deploy. The majority of 
the senior civil and military decision-makers acted in the belief that this deployment was 
inevitable and in their enthusiasm neglected to question the mantra of ‘a logical thing to do’. 
As commented on illustratively by secretary of Defence Des Browne: ‘We all had the best of 
intentions. We were part of a greater plan that everybody bought into’.164
When contrasting these findings with the propositions as put forward in chapter two, 
several issues come to light. For one, the inputs into the decision-making process on the use 
of military means for the stabilisation of Afghanistan were initially very much  instigated by 
political guidance (proposition I)  as Prime Minister Blair went ahead and not only offered 
the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps  to assume command over ISAF but moreover, envisaged a 
more robust role for British forces within NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan. 
The decision-making dynamics that consequently advanced indeed revealed a process of 
interpretation in which the senior civil and military decision-makers perceived and deduced 
constraints and pressures imposed on them by the domestic and international environment 
(proposition II). Within this process, it seemed that particularly the domestic constraints in 
terms of force packages and time lines (related to the on-going deployment in Iraq) impacted 
the formulation of a common definition of the task at hand. The external pressures mainly 
manifested themselves in the role the United Kingdom was seen to play with regard to 
NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan. 
164 Interview Browne.
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As witnessed, no clear strategy, articulating the purpose of the military mission (proposition 
III) to Helmand was put forward. Instead, the head of the military team that was tasked to 
design a military plan and the head of the civilian team who was assigned to draft a civilian 
plan, happened to be old acquaintances and on the basis of their shared history, decided to 
join hands. Their effort was hardly appreciated at the strategic level back in London. Once 
the UK Roadmap for Helmand reached the capital, no ownership was taken and the various 
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Chapter 8  Cross-Case Comparison:  
A Powerful Idea Meets a Window of Opportunity
 
8.1 Introduction 
The putative idea of deploying military forces to the South of Afghanistan materialised 
in an extremely powerful manner amongst senior civil and military decision-makers in 
London and The Hague. In fact, it came to dictate the course of events, driven by the implicit 
knowledge that a mission had to transpire. The workings of the actions undertaken and 
the decisions made by the senior civil and military decision-makers in both nations will be 
compared in this chapter. The findings will be structured along the lines of the propositions 
that have guided this study. 
 
8.2 The Foreign Policy Problem 
NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan was communicated in 2004 at the NATO summit in 
Istanbul. Thus, the intention of the international community to redirect their focus from 
Iraq to Afghanistan became apparent. This included both the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. The disappointing results of the British forces in Iraq very much shaped the 
way a possible commitment to NATO’s expansion was conceived both at the political and 
military level. In the Netherlands, a possible commitment was considered by a small group 
of senior civil and military decision-makers and was initially not actually part of a wider 
political debate.  
The foreign policy problem, the expansion of NATO to South Afghanistan and its need 
for reinforcement, presented itself as a useful ‘window of opportunity’. It provided the 
opportunity to attain a set of interrelated objectives and ideas. The first objective for both 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands was being able to manifest themselves as reliable 
partners to the United States and NATO. Their habitual response to foreign policy actions 
in support of the Alliance and its leading nation was, as showcased, apparent. Respondents 
from the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in fact indicated the relationship with both 
NATO and the United States to have been a foundational motivation for the deployment to 
the South. 
The second prominent objective articulated was the Western responsibility to take Afghan 
society forward and so to fulfil its obligation to deliver the stabilisation it had promised 

























































component present in both nations’ foreign policies and consequently a role they very much 
liked to adhere to. Moreover, the common denominator in the rhetoric as exercised by the 
British and Dutch civilian and military actors reflected the normative demands they felt 
needed to be met; collective values about the provision of security and the rule of law. 
However, the British case distinguished itself from the Dutch case in the sense that the 
moral component in its foreign policy was far more pronounced. The British Labour party 
presented the famous ‘forces for good’ idea as a guiding principle in their foreign policy which 
was carried out by Prime Minister Blair with great dedication and enthusiasm. This kind of 
policy and rhetoric was not developed with the same dedication in the Netherlands, despite 
the Dutch tradition of employing moral components to its foreign policy. 
The question remains, however, to what extent the rhetoric exercised in both nations 
truly accounts for the motivations of the senior civil and military decision-makers. Often 
an idealistic argument is made since it resonates better in the process of obtaining political 
approval and public support. This aspect of the reasoning practiced by the senior civil and 
military decision-makers will be considered later on in this chapter. 
 
8.3 The Opportunity for Decision 
The opportunity for decision in both nations was instigated by different actors in the civil 
military interface. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Blair had clearly set out the leading 
role he would like his nation to play in NATO’s expansion in Afghanistan. He had set the stage 
with regard to articulating his desire to take up a more robust role in Afghanistan, especially 
with regard to NATO ś expansion to the South. He had even promised the employment 
of ARRC to lead the NATO headquarters during NATO ś expansion to the South without 
consulting some of his primary military advisors.
In the Netherlands, no political guidance was provided prior to the emergence of the 
trilateral military initiative between Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom with 
regard to a potential role for the Netherlands in the stabilisation of South Afghanistan. This 
facilitated the prominent role the director of operations at the Ministry of Defence, General 
Cobelens, acquired himself in the initiation of the decision path for the deployment of 
military forces to South Afghanistan. 
Nonetheless, the most prominent similarity between the two cases is the role of the 
military, more specifically the trilateral military initiative, at a very early stage within the 
decision-making process, pre-dating a formal (political) decision. The fact that the trilateral 
military initiative reportedly even took SACEUR by surprise is telling. The ambition of those 
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involved in the military scheme seemed to be two steps ahead of national political obstacles 
that had to be overcome. Furthermore, they also kept ahead of NATO ś force generation 
process in order to retain initiative in terms of deciding where to deploy their troops and in 
which configuration. 
The dynamics of the trilateral military initiative occurred informally, but conditioned 
the course of events that ultimately led to the deployment of forces to South Afghanistan to 
a profound extent. Hence, the military directors of operations of both countries1 were great 
driving forces behind the upbeat rhythm that emerged once the trilateral informal working 
groups were initiated. 
 
8.4 The Emergence of the Decision Unit(s)
The principal actors entrusted with the leverage to assign government resources for the 
stabilisation of South Afghanistan (the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Cabinet, and 
the Prime Minister) are, for this study, treated as a decision unit. The configuration of these 
units differed not only in the two nations, but also across time since the series of decisions 
that were taken, depending on the phase in the decision process, required different actors. 
In the Netherlands, the interdepartmental Steering Group Military Operations concerned 
itself with the conditions of the deployment whilst the planning team at the Ministry of 
Defence carried out the planning. The members of the steering group got along rather well, 
but their loyalties resided with their respective departments. Interestingly, this did not seem 
to interfere with the advancement of their decision-making. Whilst preparing to inform 
Cabinet about an upcoming military deployment they acquired a shared sense of direction 
with an ability to resolve potential problems.
Even though the Netherlands was, at the time, ruled by a coalition government, the 
members of Cabinet could have acted autonomously in that they did not necessarily needed 
to check back with the political leaders of their party whilst engaged in decision-making. It 
can, as in fact occurred in this particular case, result in tensions between the political leader 
of a ruling party and its Ministers in Cabinet. This in itself reflects the single group features of 
the Dutch Cabinet. As soon as their decisions are discussed in Parliament however, coalition 
features come into play again more prominently.  
1 Even though their position cannot be compared one on one due to the clear separation between the strategic and 
operational level in the British military structure (see chapter 6), for the sake of argument their respective positions in 

























































Whilst formally Cabinet is not required to obtain a majority of votes from Parliament to 
deploy their military forces, in practice it does so.  Once Parliament was included in the 
decision path set out by the senior civil and military decision-makers, the configuration of 
the decision unit changed into a coalition of autonomous actors.  Even though the group of 
senior civil and military decision-makers remained the focal point regarding the employment 
of its military means, the political sign off and consequent debates in Parliament were 
required to provide legitimacy to the military endeavour.
In the United Kingdom, the senior civil and military decision-makers advanced the 
series of decisions primarily through the interdepartmental Reid Group that was called 
into life by Prime Minister Blair. He maintained a prominent role in the decision-making 
whilst appointing Secretary of State, John Reid - a trustee of Blair – to run the group. Reid 
was instructed to deliver the mission to South Afghanistan. The relations in the group 
amongst the civil and military members were difficult as the Prime Minister favoured the 
military as his pivotal actor, not leaving much room for those would have liked to challenge 
the perspective of the military actors in the group. Consequently, conflict in the group was 
largely avoided. 
(Inter) Governmental Coalition Decision Group
Besides the particularities of the decision groups of both nations in which the senior civil 
and military decision-makers acted, another dynamic came into play. From the outset, the 
civil military decision units in both nations acquired features of an (inter) governmental 
coalition decision group, since the conditioning activities of the trilateral military initiative 
instigated a dynamic of its own. The informal, but nevertheless shaping, trilateral military 
working meetings went into great detail, concerning themselves, for example, with the 
concept of operations whilst political approval still needed to be obtained. The workings of 
the (inter) governmental coalition group became most prominent during the last phase in 
the decision process in both nations. 
In fact, both nations had made their deployment conditional on one another. At this 
point, the intergovernmental coalition feature of the civil military decision group which had 
been present all throughout the decision-making process acquired a more prominent stature: 
neither the Netherlands nor the United Kingdom could do something without checking back 
with the other nation. This represented a shift in the configuration of the decision unit: the 
initial single group (the senior civilian and military decision-makers) had changed into an 
inter-governmental coalition group. This group required not only the cooperation of various 
groups within their own society but also collaborative inputs from other nations. 
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Consequently, the Dutch delay in the decision-making stalled the decision-making process 
in the United Kingdom, since the Secretary of State for Defence had made the deployment 
of his forces dependent on the political decision of the Netherlands. The delay in the Dutch 
decision-making was caused by a prominent aspect of Dutch politics in general: the need for 
consensus, first in Cabinet, and subsequently in Parliament.  The junior coalition party - D66- 
stalled the decision-making process to a significant degree. The internal division that had 
occurred within their party needed to be co-opted in order to advance the decision-making. 
The consequent mincing of words, employing indistinct terms such as ́ intentioń  in the Article 
100 letter were designed to accommodate a solution for the division within D66. However, 
once the letter was delivered to Parliament the use of the word ‘intention’ resulted in political 
commotion. No longer were the content of the letter and the objective of the mission a point 
of debate, but a play on words to safeguard political support within Cabinet and beyond, 
became the centre of the debate. Even though, in the end, the deployment could not be halted 
the decision-making process had been severely hampered and delayed. This in itself, caused 
quite some distress at both the national and international level since NATO’s expansion to 
South Afghanistan was dependent on the deployment of forces from Britain, Canada and the 
Netherlands. 
This finding outlines and builds on the notion that a decision group, in response to a 
problem, in fact undertakes several different actions simultaneously. As such, they are often 
still interpreting one aspect of the problem whilst already initiating provisional action 
with respect to another aspect of the problem2, as has been showcased by the workings of 
the trilateral military initiative on the one hand and the domestic features of the decision-
making process for the employment of military means on the other. 
 
8.5 The Dynamics in the Groups: the Process of Interpretation 
The political situation never stood still after the possibility of a military engagement surfaced; 
indeed, it constantly challenged the senior civil and military decision-makers to make 
judgements. The complexity of the dynamics which occurred within this group of people 
can first and foremost be explained and interpreted by the configuration of the group. As 
witnessed in these cases, the operation of the respective decision units differed to a great 
2	 Robert	Billings	and	Charles	F.	Hermann,	‘Problem	Identification	in	Sequential	Policy	Decision-making:	The	Re-representation	


























































extent. This is largely attributed to the fact that different techniques were employed during 
the interpretation of the ‘foreign policy problem’, depending on the configuration of the unit. 
The starting point of interpreting the task at hand was, as addressed earlier, in the British 
case clearly articulated by their Prime Minister. In addition, it was common knowledge that 
the military was his preferred institution. Even though within the group of senior civil and 
military decision-makers, they did not always seem to agree, the majority of them desired to 
remain loyal to their political leader. As such, an actual ‘open’ debate within the Reid Group 
questioning the intention of the deployment did not transpire to any great degree. As some 
of the participants commented, hardly any debate occurred as the common focus was to 
make the deployment happen.     
In the Dutch case, the Dutch Prime Minister was not that engaged in military endeavors 
and as such recused himself from an active role. He delegated the decision-making to the 
Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. They were informed about a possible Dutch mission 
to South Afghanistan several months after the first informal [military] talks had taken place 
between the British and Dutch directors of operations. Once they were informed however, 
they acquired for themselves a more prominent role in the decision-making process. 
In the process of interpretation two prominent issues needed addressing: the force 
levels and the selection of the provinces where both nations were to deploy their troops. 
The military was to provide advice about the military feasibility of the operation and about 
the force structure. Interestingly, both militaries provided their political masters with a 
force level proposal that came back to haunt them. Their respective habitual responses, 
anticipating a political distaste for launching grand and expensive operations – especially 
in the light of ongoing operations at that time – turned out to be a miscalculation. Once the 
required troop numbers were communicated it became rather difficult to attain more troops 
needed for the task at hand. 
Through convincing argumentation by military commanders lower in the chain of 
command - most prominently those who were to command the respective task forces - 
the force levels were increased. Interestingly though, the tendency amongst the military - 
both in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom - was to blame the politicians for having 
provided an untenable force level required for the mission, only to later conclude that the 
initial advice had come from the military establishment itself. 
Another component of military advice required for an informed decision-making process 
was an assessment of the security situation in the respective provinces and the feasibility 
of troops stabilising the region. The provision of military intelligence is a crucial factor at 
this stage. The intelligence assessments that were distributed in both countries became the 
center of heated debates - interestingly, two different debates at different times within the 
decision-making process. In the United Kingdom, mostly in retrospect, the military has 
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been blamed for failing to conduct  proper assessments and the lack of solid advice about 
the achievability of the deployment. In the Netherlands a rather skeptical report provided 
by the military intelligence service [which questioned the achievability of the mission and 
sketched a rather disturbing picture about the security situation and stated the likelihood 
of casualties] ultimately left the Minister of Defense and others to question the feasibility of 
the mission. 
In the process of interpretation, the use of an assessment framework in the Netherlands 
at least generated a sense of informed and rational decision-making. But as evidenced in the 
Dutch case, despite the fact that some major questions, like the objective of the mission, 
and the attainment of goals were not sufficiently specified, the decision-making was not 
hampered by the lack of explicating these points in the assessment framework. 
 
8.6 The Process Outcome 
The outcome of the process itself indicates what happened in the course of the deliberations 
of the senior civil and military decision-makers. The outcome is inherently dependent on 
the configuration of the decision unit of which they are part.3  Since the process of deploying 
military troops in both nations contained sequential decisions, at times including a changing 
configuration of the decision unit, subsequent process outcomes came to light. 
The insights as provided by the respondents in the British case pointed to groupthink 
as the dominant feature of their decision-making process. The Reid group to a great degree 
instinctively provided advice in line with what was communicated to them as the preferred 
course of action. Put differently, they habitually followed the lines of thought as explicated 
by their leader. As predicted by the decision framework, a single group with a dominant 
leader will very likely produce a tendency to avoid group conflict. This model of reasoning is 
coined by Hermann as ‘concurrence’4 and the hallmark of the model is groupthink. 
The phenomenon of group think did not surface in the Dutch case. The most obvious 
explanation would be the institutional setting in which the decision-making took place. 
For one, the Prime Minister is truly a ‘primus inter pares’ and, as said earlier on, he did not 
concern himself that much with foreign politics, let alone outline a direction from which the 
senior military decision-makers were to generate certain actions.  It would be too simplistic 
3 For a detailed description of the various outcomes of the process outcome see: Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape 
Foreign Policy’, 68.
4	 Charles	F.	Hermann,	Janice	Gross	Stein,	Bengt	Sundelius	and	Stephen	G.	Walker,	‘Resolve,	affect	or	dissolve’	International 

























































however to solely explain the absence of group think by pointing to the differences of the 
two different political systems and subsequently their decision units. 
In the Netherlands also, the power of a dominant idea did came to dictate the course 
of events albeit in a slightly different manner. The main difference from the British case is 
the fact that the opponents of certain decisions were not afraid to speak up throughout the 
chain of command (civil and military actors). As indicated by some military planners, they 
felt that decisions about, for example, the selection of the province had already been taken 
and their recces were ´just cosmetic .́ One of the planners who did not agree with the force 
package, arguing it would be of a too small size to deal with the tasks at hand, refused to sign 
off the operation order to the subordinated units.  
The line of reasoning which occurred within the group of Dutch senior civilian and 
military decision-makers is attributed to the unanimity model. The benchmark of this model 
is the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics in which the struggles amongst group members, 
whilst advocating the preferences of their respective agencies, occurs. The existence of 
decision rules and norms can provide means for alterative decision outputs.5 The Dutch 
case has demonstrated this with the prominence of the assessment framework (rule) and its 
preference for a parliamentary majority before military forces are deployed. 
The process outcome in the Netherlands featured characteristics of concurrence 
amongst the senior civil and military decision-makers and the way they came to decide that a 
deployment of military forces was to take place.  However, when Parliament had to endorse 
the decision as presented to them, it refused to do so. The interesting aspect of it being 
that they declined to do so because of the fact it was not presented to them as a genuine 
decision. Aware of the sensitivities present amongst one of the governing coalition parties, 
the decision was delivered masked by a subtle change of wording, namely ‘intention’. The 
usage of this word, rather than Cabinet taking full responsibility for their decision to employ 
military troops, caused a deadlock. This form of deadlock, also known as ‘fragmented 
symbolic action’,6 is a disagreement that explodes outside the decision unit. Consequently, 
the participants of the decision unit will take action by themselves, or even criticise the 
behavior of those who compromised their decision. 
Once the senior civil and military decision-makers in both countries came to agree on 
the need to deploy forces to respectively Helmand and Uruzgan, the resources needed to 
implement the prescriptions of the task at hand needed to be made available. What did 
acquire quite a prominent status in the Dutch decision-making process was the list of ten 
bullets as set up by the Minister of Defence. It attempted, and ultimately succeeded in 
safeguarding political and popular support for the mission. In the United Kingdom, the 
5	 Hermann	et	all.,	‘Resolve,	affect	or	dissolve’,		139
6 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 68.
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Secretary of State for Defence had drafted a similar list, stating three preconditions that 
needed to be accomplished before he would seek political approval from the members of 
Cabinet. He had clearly stated, as had his Dutch counterpart, that if these preconditions were 
not fulfilled, the deployment was to be halted. As such, both Ministers of Defence did acquire 
ównership´ over the decision process albeit relatively late in the process. 
Within the United Kingdom, much more debate during and after the decision-making 
process occurred at various levels and in various departments amongst the senior civil and 
military decision-makers. In the Dutch case the major debate occurred within Parliament, 
and initially concentrated more  on the use of the word ´intention´ than the mission itself. 
However, there had not been that much debate and/or difference of opinion between the 
senior civil and military decision-makers themselves. This is not to say none of the actors 
involved in the Netherlands had been questioning the utility or achievability of the mission, 
but the differences of opinion were less profound than in the United Kingdom.   
The attainment of political approval mattered, as outlined earlier, to a great degree for 
the outcome of the decision-making process in the Netherlands, and as such influenced the 
course of events more than in the United Kingdom. The main explanation for this divergence 
is, as alluded to earlier on, the difference in political system: a coalition cabinet versus a 
majority cabinet. 
Interestingly enough, the political purpose of the mission was neither at the centre of 
the debate in Parliament nor at the centre of public attention as expressed in the media. As 
such, the construction of a narrative underlying the interaction within the public sphere 
was less evident. Yet, strong arguments needed to be formulated due to the probing of 
Members of Parliament that took place in the last phase of the decision-making process 
in the Netherlands. Party politics had come to haunt the attainment of political approval 
from Parliament, delaying the decision for at least two months. Not because, as indicated 
earlier, of the content of the objective to deploy forces, but because of the procedure and the 
employed wording in the notification letter to Parliament. 
In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister does not formally require the obtainment 
of political approval, but in practice he did seek agreement of members of his Cabinet.  In 
the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for Defence was to attain approval for the deployment to 
Helmand. In the meeting however, the Secretary of State waved away a critical question from 
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, who then decided to abstain from voting. In contrast to 
the Dutch case, obtaining political approval from Cabinet in the United Kingdom is far less 
guided by consensus. 
All in all, the process of obtaining political approval for the respective missions to South 
Afghanistan brought to light the rhetorical actions and strategic adaptation to external 

























































self-entrapment’.7 Ultimately, the Netherlands especially, but to an extent the United 
Kingdom as well, were put under pressure by internal and external actors to deliver military 
troops. The detailed planning that had occurred had instigated certain expectations, 
especially for the United States that subsequently exercised diplomatic pressure when the 
decision-making process halted.   
An important outcome of the decision-making process was the drafting of an 
interdepartmental strategy guiding the stabilisation effort. It turned out to be a complex 
endeavor for both nations. Firstly, major decisions such as the selection of the respective 
provinces had not been taken at the strategic level, paving the way for the general bottom up 
approach illustrated by both cases. The window of opportunity in which the senior military 
decision-makers had initiated the trilateral working groups dealing with the specifics of the 
operation occurred with no or limited political guidance. Hence, a clear political objective 
had not been explicated but this did not seem to hamper the development of, for example, a 
concept of operations in line with the existing NATO order of operations.  
However, the fact that both nations had called for a comprehensive approach to the 
stabilisation of the respective provinces implied a joint strategy to guide this intended 
integrated effort. The difficulties with the development of a joint strategy are illustrated by, 
first of all, the lack of habit of strategy making for complex operations in general and more 
specifically with comprehensive strategies in particular. 
In the United Kingdom, Secretary of State for Defence John Reid had supposedly 
called for a joint plan, and two separate civil and military teams had been sent to South 
Afghanistan to draft a plan.  In fact, the PCRU was tasked with designing a strategy for the 
British stabilisation effort in Helmand, but so was a military team from the Permanent Joint 
Headquarters. No strategy had been delivered to these teams, just some general guidelines 
about the timings, force compositions and available funds. The fact these two teams joined 
hands and came up with a joint plan was the result of serendipity: the head of the civil and 
military teams were old acquaintances, got along well and shared mutual beliefs about the 
importance of a joint plan.
This pragmatic approach, albeit on another level, was also adopted by General Theo 
Vleugels and his staff. In search for a comprehensive campaign plan, he decided to not 
only develop one himself but to include a team of civilian experts. By doing so, he did not 
only acknowledge the need for an inclusive approach but also sought to include the other 
departments. However, mandated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Embassy in 
Kabul had started drafting a civil assessment. This document was to guide the civilian effort 
of the campaign. Like in the United Kingdom, the initial attempts to deliver a comprehensive 
7 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 32.
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plan were everything from joint from the outset, and, in contrast to the British case, had 
ultimately not become joint at all.
This also brings to light that despite institutional arrangements which are designed to 
guarantee a joint approach (the SMO and the PCRU), these arrangements are by no means a 
guarantee that a comprehensive approach to operations actually occurs. One does however 
need to take into consideration the - at that time - novelty of these kinds of operations. Even 
though both nations had experimented with their respective comprehensive approaches 
to operations in both Iraq and North Afghanistan, the comprehensive approach remained 
rather novel.  
Consequently, the plans developed in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had to be 
ówned´ by the respective task forces assigned for the deployment. In the Dutch case, this 
was not difficult since they themselves had written the plan. In the British case however, this 
ownership turned out to be more complex. Neither the commander of the first task force 
nor his planning staff had been included in the writing of the plan. As a result, their habitual 
response to the product was to ignore it and carry on in whatever way they saw fit. 
Within this phase of the decision-making process, the actual writing of the campaign 
plans and the size of the force package had become an issue high on the agendas of the civil 
and military actors involved. Both the British and Dutch task force commanders had time 
and time again expressed their severe concerns about the number of troops that had been 
assigned to them. However, some tended to forget the fact that this had been a so called ́ self-
inflicted wound´ instigated by the top of the military establishments in both nations. Hence, 
they directed their frustrations at the political level, blaming them for the composition of 
the task force and, therefore, putting the relations under strain. One could argue this to have 
been a habitual response toward those (the political class) who are traditionally viewed as 
having no clue about the military and military operations. 
8.6.1 The Foreign Policy Action: The Deployment of Forces
The ultimate action that was to come about from the sets of decisions made by the senior civil 
and military decision-makers in London and The Hague was the deployment of their military 
forces. Despite the high profile of the deployment that had taken root in their reasoning, 
the provision of a strategic narrative capturing the nature of the mission proved to be a 
complex enterprise. Thus the nature of the mission remained a source of controversy in both 
nations.  The most prominent reason for this controversy turned out to be a fundamental 
misconception about the reconstruction aspect of the mission. Both London and The Hague 
emphasised the reconstruction aspect of the mission since it was believed to facilitate more 

























































Arguments therefore needed to be selected that would sway the national audiences and gain 
their support. 
Thus, once political approval was obtained, senior military decision-makers in both the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands engaged themselves with the crafting of a strategic 
narrative. The Dutch Chief of Defence sensed the sensitivities amongst the Dutch audience 
about the potential ‘fighting mission’ that he was about to engage his forces in. This role 
was not quite in line with the belief that the Dutch military was to engage in peacekeeping. 
He understood that if one was to gain public support for an ‘a-typical’ mission, the strategic 
framing was crucial. Consequently, a careful juggling with words occurred, trying to 
emphasise the reconstruction effort of the mission whilst not downplaying the possibilities 
of armed engagements. 
Although the British audience was far more accustomed to having its troops  deployed to 
remote and dangerous places, the mission to Helmand was first and foremost presented to the 
public as a ‘stabilisation mission’. The Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid, was in-famously 
(mis) quoted time and time again about the presumed low fighting intensity of the mission. 
All in all, in both nations the senior civil and military decision-makers faces several 
difficulties with constructing a convincing narrative. Not surprisingly, the audiences in the 
Netherlands and in the United Kingdom were not that convinced about the purpose of the 
mission, leaving the deployment controversial. Consequently, the controversy about the 
mission left room for widening the gap between the two opposing views of the goals of the 
nature of the mission. This in fact occurred because of a lack of a convincing narrative. In 
other words, the process of argumentative entrapment that had taken the senior civil and 
military decision-makers down the road of deploying their forces, did not seem to have the 
same effect on their national audiences. 
 
8.7 The Propositions
After having described how the sequential decisions of the senior civil and military 
decision-makers culminated in the ultimate action of the deployment of military forces, 
the propositions that have steered both the data collection and analysis will be further 
scrutinised below. 
The first proposition engaged with the initiation of the decision-making process that 
ultimately resulted in the deployment of forces. It presupposed that inputs into the decision-
making process to use military means were instigated by political guidance on a foreign 
policy problem. This assumption derived from the prescriptions as put forward in theory 
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on civil military relations and strategy.  As presented in both cases, the trilateral military 
initiative between Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom carried great value in a 
sense that without this partnering, none of these nations would have deployed their forces. 
The catalysing effect of this partnership is an essential finding of the study with regard that it 
proves the utility and importance of (multi) lateral military relations as breeding grounds for 
the deployment of forces. It challenges the classic belief of the military following politically 
initiated goals. Even though the political context of NATO’s expansion to South Afghanistan 
shaped the minds of the military high command, NATO in itself remained rather passive and 
at no point took the lead, either as an organisation or through the permanent missions of 
the two nations in Brussels.
The driving forces behind the trilateral military initiatives were the directors of operations, 
General Cobelens (NL) and General Fry (UK). The resemblance between these men, in terms 
of their ability to act beyond their prescribed roles, is significant. The reasoning of these two 
men was shaped by their own respective ideas on how to potentially claim a role for ‘their 
militaries’.8 in the stabilisation of Afghanistan, whilst knowing that NATO would eventually 
call for their assistance. In this way they could keep the initiative instead of having to sit back 
and wait. In this way they identified a window of opportunity: it combined calculation of 
their interest with shared ideas amongst the group of senior civilian and military decision-
makers, namely the desire to be a good ally to both NATO and to the United States.
Furthermore, the practical experience of both directors of operations informed their 
strategies for convincing others through their personal communicative encounters. Both 
men were known for their charismatic personalities but also for their dedication to ‘making 
things happen’.  Their ability to do so was largely a result of their convincing argumentation. 
Their communicative skills are the primary attribute in the way these men swayed major 
actors like the Director of Political Affairs (NL case) or the Permanent Under Secretary of 
State (UK case). But without the feel for the political game, i.e. familiarity with the ŕules of 
the game´ neither one of them would have been able to initiate the scheme of events. 
Interestingly, the roles assigned to the directors of operations required them to fulfill 
a less weighty posture. Despite the fact that both theory and societal norms require the 
military to refrain from the initiation of missions and policy respectively, these two men 
nonetheless went ahead and acted as they saw fit.  Nevertheless, the Ministers of Defense of 
both nations indicated that they required their military chiefs of operations to be two steps 
ahead and to anticipate possible future missions. The question remains as to whether the 
activities developed by these two directors can in fact be described as a pro-active approach, 

























































or something beyond that. Without a doubt, as indicated by the respondents as well, their role 
in the shaping of events has been large. 
Furthermore, the institutional differences between the British and Dutch and their impact 
on the provision of political guidance during the respective decision-making processes are 
prominent. The main features and distinctions between the two political systems are the role 
and position of the Prime Minister and certain facets of coalition politics and procedures. The 
British case has evidenced Prime Minister Blair ś influence on both the decision to engage and 
the course of events resulting in the deployment. This particularly emerged from his personality, 
his personal preference for small advisory committees, his preference for employing military 
means in pursuit of the attainment of political goals in the international arena, and his 
preference for the military ‘can do mentality’ which he viewed as diametrically opposed to the 
attitudes of civil servants.  
The fact that the Dutch Prime Minister did not play a major role in the decision-making 
process leading to the deployment of Dutch forces cannot be solely explained by his position 
within the political system as a ṕrimus inter pareś  (a first among equals). Here, the interests of 
Prime Minister Balkenende have to be taken into consideration. For one, he had never engaged 
himself much with military endeavours as a way to implement foreign policy goals, leaving most 
of the decisions to be taken, from a very early stage onwards, to the Ministers of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs. Secondly, as explained by his special advisor, he was more engaged with domestic 
politics, which were assessed to have a greater impact on him and his party’s achievements. 
The dominance of the military in the decision-making process in the run up to the 
deployment caused far more nuisance in British civil military relations than it did in Dutch 
civil military relations. True, some Dutch diplomats felt the military was moving too fast, but 
most of them tellingly stated this was feasible because they had been provided with great room 
to maneuver in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The question remains as to 
whether Foreign Affairs had really consciously provided the military with the room to maneuver 
or if they neglected to acquire an active role themselves at an early stage. Some diplomats have 
argued that the military was far ahead of a political situation that needed time for deliberation. 
Even though historically the senior civil decision-makers of the United Kingdom have been 
faced with a proactive military and public support for military missions, they now felt themselves 
to have less and less influence on the deployment of military forces. As indicated by some of the 
political advisors who acted in and around the decision group entrusted with the deployment to 
Afghanistan, civilians who allegedly had great concerns about the mission only spoke up briefly 
or remained silent throughout the process, only to comment on the course of events later on. 
The second proposition put forward the decision-making dynamics to reveal a process of 
interpretation in which the senior civilian and military decision-makers perceive and deduce 
constraints and pressures imposed on them by the domestic and international environment. 
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As the cases have evidenced, this occurred in both nations. In addition, the (normative) 
pressures imposed upon the senior civil and military decision-makers conditioned the 
language that was exercised both in the formulation of the goals that needed to be attained 
and in the accompanying rhetoric. As a result, slowly but distinctively, a discursive exchange 
of arguments transpired whereby all actors tried to establish some common definition of the 
situation. The argument that had swayed domestic interest was the need for both nations 
to employ their militaries and the international argument was to uphold NATO’s legitimacy 
and to live up to the expectations that were created by the international community to take 
Afghanistan forward. This argument coincided with the international pressure that was 
felt, especially in the Netherlands, to deliver troops and ensure NATO’s ability to expand its 
presence to South Afghanistan. 
The primary constraint that featured the processes of interpretation in both the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the limitations with regard to the force packages 
and the time frames of the deployment. 
Within the process of interpretation, especially in the Netherlands and less so in the 
United Kingdom, the senior civil and military decision-makers accepted each other as valid 
interlocutors. Eventually, they established some common definition of the stabilisation of 
South Afghanistan and agreed on the norms guiding the situation. Hence, argumentative 
rationality took over and both governments that started moving down the road of arguing 
eventually matched words with deeds9: the deployment of troops to  respectively Urzugan 
and Helmand.  The dynamics in fact featured the working of what is known as ‘argumentative 
self-entrapment’. The process of argumentative ‘self-entrapment’ commences as rhetorical 
action and strategic adaptation of governments to external pressures. Governments are 
seen as not entering the process of arguing on a voluntary basis but are in fact forced into 
a dialogue by the pressures of fully mobilised domestic and/or (trans) national networks.10  
The third proposition suggested that the output of the series of decisions on the 
deployment of military forces was a strategy articulating the purpose of their use. Like the 
first proposition, this proposition was informed by theoretical prescriptions. The study 
brought to light the delivery of strategy as a complex endeavour in the sense that the purpose 
of the use of military means remained vague. Furthermore, the creation of a strategy did not 
derive from a political objective that has been put forward but in fact was very dependent 
on bottom up initiatives. A pragmatic approach to the formulation of strategy, allowing 
room for these initiatives, would not be as worrisome as many theoretical purists would like 
to believe. It becomes problematic however if no strategic ownership is assumed over the 
strategies that are in fact guiding the military efforts. 
9 This line of thought is taken from Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”.

























































Unfortunately, this is what occurred in both nations: room was allowed for bottom up 
initiatives in the drafting of a plan, but little strategic ownership was acquired. The main 
reason, as brought to light by the respondents, was the bureaucratic infighting amongst the 
departments about who would be responsible for what. Whilst all of them acknowledged the 
need for a comprehensive approach, it now seemed to be more of an artefact than a reality. 
In fact, the lack of ownership acquired the features of ‘fragmented symbolic action’. This is 
in fact a deadlock where disagreement explodes outside the decision unit.11
The lack of strategic ownership that occurred in both states seriously hampered not 
only the articulation of a narrative that was to facilitate public support but more so caused 
friction at the military operational level. The friction that occurred was paradoxal in nature: 
on the one hand the military asked for clear objectives and guidelines on the other hand, 
given the  limited information and intelligence that was available about the regions they 
were to deploy to, they felt they were the only ones able to draft a reasonable plan. 
To conclude, confronting the propositions with the collected data it becomes apparent 
that the theoretical prescriptions on civil military relations and strategy have not been as 
prevalent in the practices of the senior civil and military decision-makers of these case studies 
as one would supposedly expect. The decision unit dynamics and interpretation process of 
the problem during the decision-making as described in Hermann’s model however does 
seem to reflect very much the realties as discovered in the case studies. 
 
8.8 Conclusions 
The decision of both nations to deploy troops to South Afghanistan was based on an 
emergent case that largely built itself. One of the most prominent findings is the dynamics 
of the trilateral military initiative that occurred at the level of the directorates operations 
at the respective Ministries of Defence. The cooperation between the three NATO partners 
was commented on by the respondents of both nations as a logical step since they viewed 
one another as like-minded and shared thinking about how to best stabilise the Southern 
Afghan provinces as well as feasible time-frames. The habitual response that informed the 
trilateral cooperation between Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in fact 
created agency which ultimately led to the deployment of forces to the South of Afghanistan. 
11 Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy’, 69
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Without the partnering of any one of these three states, none of them would have been likely 
to have deployed their forces.
This military initiative demonstrates the emergence of agency at a level not commonly 
expected and illustrates the gap between civil military theories and practice. Moreover, it 
exposes the multiple roles and the variety of alternative rules assigned to the senior civil and 
military decision-makers. It furthermore reveals that an apparent clarity of political goals 
that needed to be attained in South Afghanistan seemed to be predominantly founded in a 
combination of the various demands put upon the senior civil and military decision-makers 
in both states.  These demands were at times difficult to reconcile as the decision-makers 
engaged in a series of decisions in response to the foreign policy problem. Whilst involving 
themselves in several different actions simultaneously, some of the senior civil and military 
decision-makers would at times still be interpreting some parts of the problem, whilst others 
were in the midst of already initiating provisional action.   
In establishing a common definition of the task at hand, the Dutch and British senior 
civil and military decision-makers were predominantly led by their desire to matter to both 
NATO and subsequently the United States. That is, they habitually followed their traditional 
foreign political strategies which required them to maintain good relationships with the 
United States and its preferred alliance NATO. Secondly, there was the normative demand 
derived from the language exercised in the international arena with regard to the Western 
responsibility to ́ finish the job´ it had started in Afghanistan. These two demands needed to 
be captured in a convincing strategic narrative that was to provide guidance for the planning 
of the mission and was to facilitate public support.
The dictating prominence of the belief in deploying military forces to South Afghanistan 
acquired features of groupthink, more so in the United Kingdom than in the Netherlands. 
This can be primarily explained by the different institutional settings of the two nations, 
foremost the role of the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, which effected the 
configuration of the decision unit in which the senior civilian and military decision-makers 
operated. He had articulated his desire for a prominent British role in NATO’s expansion in 
Afghanistan and due to this open preference, most senior civil and military decision-makers 
focussed on the task that was set out. Moreover, the senior military decision- makers were in 
favour of the mission, seeking a way out of Iraq. 
In the Netherlands, a dominant idea had not been communicated top down and had to be 
developed. However, as witnessed in the British case as well, a coinciding of mutual interests 
between the senior military decision-makers served to permit the series of decisions. Even 
though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not instigated the initial undertakings for the 
employment of forces to South Afghanistan, it did provide its support - albeit initially only at 

























































The course of events in both nations seemed to emerge within a dynamic that, at times, 
transcended institutional peculiarities. This can be best explained by three striking 
features: personal initiatives of authoritative (military) personalities, the convincing logic 
of a dominant idea, and the lack of strategic guidance during the decision-making process, 
resulting in bottom up initiatives. These workings seemed to matter far more than the 
institutional differences between the countries or the different configurations of the 
decision units that were engaged with the deployment of forces. 
A remarkable aspect of the comparison of the political oversight provided during the 
decision-making phase is the fact that even though the Netherlands applied the assessment 
framework developed to prevent political and military fiascos when deploying military 
means, the outcome of the decision-making process in both nations was the same: the forces 
were deployed in the way that was put forward in the international military working groups. 
This implies that regardless of the existence of such a framework and the requirement of 
parliamentary approval, the course of events remains the same. This is an interesting finding 
in the sense that it falsifies assumptions held in both countries on the use and non-use of 
such frameworks and regulations.  
In both nations, the question was raised by respondents as to whether sufficient political 
oversight was delivered throughout the decision-making phase of the deployment of troops 
to South Afghanistan. In itself, as stated earlier, the sheer fact that military agents proactively 
sought opportunities to employ their means is not a novelty. It is a rational tactic if the 
military is to prove the ongoing need for its existence. In addition - as alluded to earlier on - a 
shared belief was present amongst most of the senior civil and military decision-makers in 
maintaining good relationships with the United States and its preferred alliance NATO. That 
is, they followed their habitual traditional foreign policy strategies which prescribed them 
to do so: a role enactment that had proved beneficial many times before.
To conclude, the governing idea of the need to deploy military forces to South 
Afghanistan, as brought about in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, showcased the 
working of a trap. The momentum created by the internationally agreed NATO expansion to 
the South was captured by a like-minded group of senior military decision-makers acting as 
agents of their states. Their actions were – albeit to some degree much later than one would 
expect – supported by their political masters, who joined them in the workings of a self-
enforcing logic, at times habitual, at times reflexive. The interesting aspect is that despite 
the differences in the British and Dutch decision-making process and the divergence in the 
configuration and dynamics of the decision unit(s) in which the senior civil and military 
decision-makers acted, the eminence of the deployment remained. As such, the ultimate 
foreign policy action, the deployment of military forces, as had been envisioned from the 




Chapter 9 Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction
In this concluding chapter, the questions that instigated and guided this research will be 
answered. First of all, the question of why the senior civil and military decision-makers in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom decided to provide military means for the stabilisation 
of South Afghanistan will be answered.  Secondly, the question as to how this political 
ambition was converted into a military operation will be answered, followed by theoretical 
deductions, inductions, and recommendations. Subsequently, avenues for future research 
will be proposed for advancing the findings of this study. The contribution of this study is 
believed to enrich both theoretical and empirical findings on the decision-making of senior 
civilian and military decision-makers on the use of military means. 
 
9.2 Why and How: Inescapable Entrapments?
In order to understand why the United Kingdom and the Netherlands engaged their 
military forces for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, both the foreign policy problem and 
the opportunity for a decision on the matter were scrutinised. The pressing nature of the 
deployment that took root in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom featured 
prominently in both cases. It strongly suggests the power of a dominant idea instigated by 
a shared belief in the possibilities the deployment to South Afghanistan could offer to both 
politicians and the military.
In fact, a window of opportunity occurred in which the dynamics of a military initiative 
came to steer the course of events. In both nations, the militaries needed redemption from 
their poor reputation (acquired in Iraq and Srebrenica) and, moreover, the fear of further cut 
backs very likely figured their calculations as well. This seemed to be a perfect match with the 
rhetoric exercised by NATO and the international community that a reinforcement of troops 
in Afghanistan was ‘the right thing to do’ for Western nations.  In fact, the iteration of the 
moral obligation came to underpin NATO’s expansion to the South of Afghanistan. 
In order to understand how it was decided to commit troops for the stabilisation of South 
Afganistan, the interpretation of the matter and the subsequent actions of the senior civil 
military decision-makers were investigated. Firstly, as showcased, whilst trying to establish 
a common definition of the task at hand, the senior civil and military decision-makers were 
dealing with various accounts of information of how best to do this. 
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Whilst doing so, the main focus was on how to launch the military campaign which involved 
the selection of provinces and the force levels. In fact, these strategic issues were dealt with 
quite quickly even before political approval was sought. The military initiative that came 
to drive the course of events was only much later followed by the political process that was 
needed to provide the political legitimacy and subsequent public support required for the 
deployment.
The interplay between the senior civil and military decision-makers during the decision-
making process was very much nurtured by bottom up initiatives. Within this interplay, the 
actors at times computed costs and benefits but also habitually followed their respective 
political strategies along the lines of traditional pillars of foreign policy. All this was 
compounded with the earlier mentioned normative demands put upon the senior civil and 
military decision-makers instigated by rhetoric exercised within the international arena 
about collective values such as the responsibility to take the Afghan society forward. 
The emergent bottom up plans that materialised in both nations were never truly signed 
off as the official strategy for the military operations, nor were they ‘owned’ at the strategic 
level. This actually engendered the difficulties both governments subsequently faced in trying 
to communicate the purpose of the mission. A strategic narrative about the stabilisation and 
reconstruction of these provinces was not apprehended by their national audiences. Most 
possibly, this was because the primary purpose of the need to stabilise these provinces, had 
in fact never been at the heart of the initial decisions taken to engage to start with.  
In conclusion, the senior civil and military decision-makers applied inescapable 
entrapments, prompted by the utter virtue of seeing no way out. Both their actions and 
decisions resulted in a deadly embrace: a deployment of forces was imminent without having 
asked or answered the most pressing question to the degree it deserved to be analysed and 
answered: what is the purpose of this engagement? Instead, the primary activities of the 
senior civil and military decision-makers were directed to catering for the deployment and 
as such the questions that surfaced predominantly addressed the how. 
 
9.3 Theoretical Deductions, Inductions and Recommendations
The emergence of agency has been prevalent throughout this study. Instead of assuming 
agency of senior civil actors at the strategic level instigating the use of military means, 
this study has brought to light a more complex understanding of agency. Thus, one of the 
recommendations would be altering current approaches to investigating the use of military 



































through the actor approach and the actions taken during the decision-making process. The 
approach taken in this study allowed for distinguishing the creation of agency throughout 
the process. By doing so, it downgraded the notion that agency can be identified prior to the 
instigation of events and makes it person and context dependent.
The study demonstrated the pronounced role of the military in the instigation of the 
engagement to South Afghanistan. Military involvement in, or even as a driving force of, 
policy has long been an anathema in both academic and practitioner circles. It is the 
theoretical prescriptions in Western societies that have nurtured the closely guarded 
line circumscribing military involvement in policy making. The question remains if this 
approach is in fact still beneficial for modern day operations in which the blurring of these 
lines might imply that the boundaries are more artificial than supposed, and are in fact in 
need of addressing in order to advance civil military relations. 
Deducing from theoretical prescriptions on civil military relations and strategy making, 
the appropriate courses of action for the senior civilian decision-makers would have been 
to first of all to answer the question of what the political objective of a possible engagement 
would be, and secondly to answer the question of whether the use of military means was 
indeed required, and lastly, in what way the necessary means were to be assigned. Even 
though the prescriptions carried weight in the sense that they were constitutive to their 
formal approach on the matter, in practice a combination of the shared interest and a 
window of opportunity surfaced in which the traditional roles assigned to the senior civil 
and military decision-makers were not adhered to. 
If the line of analysis that has been followed in this study is correct, scholars and senior 
civil and military decision-makers who seek keys to understanding, possibly even wanting 
to improve the process of deciding if and how military means are to be used, could very well 
be helped by the outcome. The prescriptive vigour about civil military relations and strategy 
have proven to be less (if at all) foundational to the roles acquired and actions initiated by the 
senior civil and military decision-makers. 
These arguments challenge traditional prescriptive arguments about civil military 
relations and the use of strategy. Most of all, the analysis as presented in this study gives rise 
to a more realistic approach to upholding practices in the field. These practices go beyond an 
invented theoretical world in which the dynamics of the logics at play in the minds of agents 
are often downplayed, ignored, or denied. While doing so, the normative undertaking 
within this discipline remains dominant - all the more reason to call for a shift of attention 
to the entrapment that seems to occur between the senior civil and military decision-makers 
and the path dependency that seems to evolve out of their decisions and consequent actions. 
Furthermore, as this study indicates, nowadays – if it were in fact ever the case - military 
operations are not an outcome of a linear process in which political objectives are set and 
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subsequently means are selected. A complex interplay in which the military acts as an 
agent of the state, anticipating demands put upon the states, and in which they can profile 
themselves, adheres to the dictum of an emergent circular process of strategy making. 
The dynamics that surfaced during the advancement of the intended military deployment 
in fact featured the working of what is known as ‘argumentative self-entrapment’, a 
phenomenon advanced by Thomas Risse.1  The process of argumentative ‘self-entrapment’ 
commences as rhetorical action and strategic adaptation of governments to external 
pressures. Governments are not seen as entering the process of arguing on a voluntary 
basis, but are in fact forced into a dialogue by the pressures of fully mobilised domestic 
and/or transnational networks. They might also face economic or political sanctions by 
the international community. The initial ‘forced dialogue’ ultimately culminates into 
argumentative behaviour. Within this process, argumentative exchange takes place by which 
both sides accept each other as valid interlocutors, try to establish some common definition 
of the situation, and agree on the norms guiding the situation. That is, they behave as if they 
were engaged in a true moral discourse.2 
 
9.4  Recommendations for Future Research
This study outlined why and how British and Dutch senior civil and military decision-makers 
have employed their military means. It illustrated the emergence of a powerful, hardly 
contested idea that engendered a path dependent reasoning which senior civil and military 
decision-makers joined hands. Furthermore, the findings bring to light the emergence of 
agency at a level which is believed to be unlikely. It would be of interest to enrich the findings 
of this study by investigating the Canadian case as well. As mentioned earlier, due to reasons 
of time, money and feasibility, examining the decisions made by the senior civil and military 
decision-makers in Canada was not possible. However, the dynamic of the trilateral military 
initiative that acquired such a prominent role in the course of events would be scrutinised 
even more comprehensively by including the Canadian case. 
In addition, investigating the case of Denmark: a nation which – when it comes to the 
use of its military means – is very similar to the Netherlands and investigating the case of the 
United States: a nation that more often than not seems to employ its military means, would 
further enrich this study. Would the presence of agency be as prevalent as was showcased in 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands? 
1 Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”’, 7, 34



































It would be of further interest to, in terms of broadening the scope of the findings, to include 
the decision-making process of a NATO member state that decides not to engage (not limited 
to the intervention in Afghanistan) but did initially show an interest to do so. Why did they 
decide not to engage, was the absence of a military working initiative or a strong political 
leader with a prominent view on the use of military means the most dependent variable? 
Expanding the research with such a case would test the findings of this study, especially with 
regard to the emergence of agency. 
 Decision-Making Framework 
Decision-making approaches are well suited to contribute to further advance international 
relations theory especially with regard to better understanding of the black box of decision- 
making dynamics with regard to using military means.  Traditionally, the field of foreign 
policy analysis aims to do so. In fact, the concept of decision units and their decision paths 
heavily builds upon the insights as provided by FPA. It would therefore be logical to further 
test the propositions of the model of Hermann. The testing of this model was not the 
objective of this study, rather the intention was to use the model as a vehicle to reconstruct 
the activities of the group under study. However, it will be valuable to enrich the usefulness 
of this study by deducting theoretical inferences from it and by doing so further advance the 
efficacy of the model. 
A subsequent line of inquiry advancing the findings of this study would be testing the 
premises of the decision unit framework as developed by Margaret Hermann. The most 
prominent premise of the framework is that the configuration of the decision unit will shape 
the nature of that decision. As has been showcased in this study, despite the fact that the 
configuration of the civil and military decision unit in both nations and the process differed, 
ultimately the foreign policy action was very similar, if not identical: a deployment was 
eminent. The objective of this study was not to test the propositions of Hermann’s model, 
but to use it as a vehicle to structure the decision-making process and to conceptualise the 
group of senior civil and military decision-makers. It would be of great value, though, to use 
the gathered data for this study and test whether the proposed accounts, as put forward by 
Hermann on the effects of the decision units, does in fact provide an adequate explanation 
for the course of events. Indirectly, some parts of the propositions as laid down in the model 
are tested, but a more comprehensive account would provide greater insight.
Furthermore, the outcome of this study challenges the belief that formal codes 
and procedures and decision-making processes improve the ultimate decision. In fact, 
recommendations have been made to develop a decision-making process on the use of force 
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in the United Kingdom subject to a formal code, approved by Parliament3, similar to the 
Dutch assessment framework. Ultimately, this code ought to define the process through 
which decisions are taken, and the roles and responsibilities of those involved. Supposedly, it 
would facilitate the political impartiality of the armed forces, underscoring that their advice 
must be based on their professional military assessment. It would also aid accountability by 
showing who gave what advice, when and why. Further more, the code would improve the 
quality of decisions by providing a firm framework upon which policy-makers can rely when 
under pressure.4
These recommendations assume that the use of formal codes, regulations and decision- 
making tools would ensure objective, coherent qualified advice when deciding on the use of 
military means. This assumption can be questioned based on the evidence as put forward by 
the Dutch case.  The use of these kinds of tools and regulations does not ensure an enhanced 
decision-making process, or civil military dialogue for that matter.  Moreover, the findings 
of this study, illustrate the limited deviance, particularly with regard to the outcome, that is 
likely to occur. 
Logics of Social Action
One of the shortcomings of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) still needs to be advanced in a more 
comprehensive and rigorous manner, namely the fact that it often fails to properly include 
the structures that shape the behaviour of the actors in its actor - oriented approach. In fact, 
it hardly attends to how agents potentially influence structures. The application of the logic 
of action within the field FPA could possibly fill this void.  
Employing an analytical framework that largely builds on the theory of social action 
allows switching between two levels of analysis since it accounts for both individual and 
group behaviour.  Within the theory of social action5, several logics of human behaviour are 
identified. Each mode of action/logic can be thought of as an ideal type that rarely occurs in 
pure form in real life. The controversies mainly focus on how far one can push one particular 
logic of action to account for observable practices and further explain which logic dominates 
a given situation.6
According to the four most prominent logics, individuals act on calculating costs and 
benefits (consequences), abiding by identity-constituting rules (appropriateness), generating 
3 De Waal, Depending on the right people.
4 De Waal, Depending on the right people.
5 Giddens, Central problems in Social Theory; Bourdieu, Practical Reason; Jessop, ´Interpretive Sociology and the Dialectic of 
Structure And Agency’.



































a convincing argument (argumentation), or following tacit common-sense (practice).7 The 
use of these logics in the field of FPA is to interpret the actions and practices of the senior civil 
military decision-makers. Potentially this could be done in an integrated fashion instead of 
separating them, since drawing from all four logics of action allows a more dynamic analysis 
of the actions of civil military decision-makers. Thus the human element of decision-making 
processes cannot be grasped into orderly scholarly boxes since this element is very much 
instigated by the creativity of the actors themselves. They use their imagination to compose 
views of the world that make it comprehensible to them. In addition, it could very well be 
that during the different phases of the decision-making process actors come to make up their 
minds using different logics.8 It would therefore be of interest to study the logics at play in 
the minds of the agents by trying to identify not only when what logic comes into play during 
the decision-making process, but also how these logics intermediate with one another. 
Underlying Uncontested Assumptions 
Within the interpretation phase of the decision process, actors are faced with the challenging 
task of ‘asking the right questions’. Many respondents commented that in hindsight one can 
wonder if in fact the right questions were asked. This particularly included the underlying 
assumptions of the concepts that were driving their interpretation and possible solution of 
the problem. 
 The British and Dutch experience in both the planning and the execution of operations 
in the Southern provinces of Afghanistan did vary in terms of their assessments, views, 
and activities. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions of their respective stabilisation 
strategies did not differ. Both countries believed the mix of defense, diplomacy and 
development aimed at strengthening the fragile government of Afghanistan could bring 
about stability. 
The evaluations and debates about the Dutch and British mission to the South of 
Afghanistan primarily centered on the decision-making, and closely analysed the (in) 
sufficiency of the provided capacity and resources. Hardly ever were the assumptions of the 
applied concepts questioned. Consequently, difficulties in stabilising South Afghanistan 
seemed to be mainly addressed in terms of implementation difficulties. 
As was stressed more than two decades ago by Michael Shafer, one needs to understand 
the environment in which one is to operate, and consequently the nature and sources of the 
7 Kornprobst, ‘The Agent’s Logics of Action’, 71.
8 Ibid, 74-76
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conflict.9 Both countries were convinced about the possibilities of advancing the expansion 
of the credibility of the Afghan government and viewed this as a realistic aim to pursue in 
the first place. As proclaimed agents of change, the British and Dutch governments and their 
forces were committed to the cause, advocating to ‘put an Afghan face’ on their activities in 
support of the (local) government. The willingness to ‘Afghanise’ their efforts does illustrate 
their awareness with regard to sustainability through local ownership, but it disregards 
the fact that ‘the face’ of the (local) authorities whose legitimacy they were to enhance was 
disputed by the populace in the first place. Hence, acting in the name of the central and local 
government, whilst trying to install a democracy founded in the neo-liberal peace-building 
ideology,  may have complicated matters even more. 
Leaving this aside, the cases of the British and Dutch experiences with regard to the 
design of their respective stabilisation efforts in South Afghanistan have shown hearts and 
minds prescriptions, which were challenged and criticised by Michael Schafer, to still dictate 
contemporary operations. Thus, the citation used in the concluding chapter of his book, 
continues to capture the experiences of Western nations today.
One is bound by one’s commitments; one is committed even by one’s mistakes. The10 
(…) may be free to avoid new and mistaken entanglements in the future. It is not free to 
tear out of its scrapbook the political misjudgments of the past. Nor is it free to avoid 
entanglements altogether.11
This citation alludes to what seems to be the inescapable – especially when put in the context 
of current stabilisation operations – persistence of familiar ideas that remain despite their 
deficiencies. The experiences of the British and Dutch illustrate the uncontested ideas of 
how outsiders could support and potentially even stabilise an insurgent threatened state. It 
seems to be indicative of a Western perseverance in ‘asking the wrong questions, turning to 
the wrong analysis, and, thus in end provoking the wrong results’.12 This seems to be a hard 
habit to break, resulting in inescapable entrapments that may time and time again result in a 
central focus on how to intervene before sufficiently addressing why to intervene.
9 Michael. D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton 1989); Michael. D. Shafer, ‘The 
Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, Political Science Quarterly 103(1) (1988) 57–80; Grandia Mantas, ‘The Three Great 
Oughts’. 
10 In this case the United States, but it could be applied to many states
11	 Stanley	Hoffmann,	‘Restraints	and	Choices	in	American	Foreign	Policy’,	Daedalus 91(4) (1962) 668-704, 678.
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Samenvatting  
Nederlandstalige samenvatting behorende bij het proefschrift “Deadly Embrace? The Decision Paths to 
Uruzgan and Helmand” 
Het doel van de inzet van militaire middelen voor de stabilisatie van post - conflict staten 
is een bron van discussie. Hoewel de theorie voorschrijft dat er een duidelijk politiek doel 
moet zijn en er een strategie ten grondslag moet liggen aan de inzet, is de praktijk vaak 
weerbarstiger. Wat gaat er vooraf aan de fase dat er daadwerkelijk wordt overgaan tot het 
lanceren van een militaire operatie?  Wie zijn de mensen die zich bezig houden met de 
besluitvorming omtrent de inzet van militaire middelen? 
Kijkende naar het vraagstuk aangaande de besluitvorming over de inzet van militaire 
middelen, richt de aandacht zich op een groep senior civiele en militaire besluitvormers. 
Zij houden zich op het strategische niveau bezig met de besluitvorming omtrent de inzet 
van de krijgsmacht. Als casus is er gekozen voor één van de meest besproken missies van 
de afgelopen decennia, Afghanistan. In het onderzoek wordt specifiek gekeken naar de 
uitbreiding van de NAVO naar Zuid Afghanistan, een zogenaamde stabilisatie missie. De 
context van deze uitbreiding in combinatie met de retoriek van stabilisatie van post- conflict 
gebieden is de setting waarin besluiten moesten worden genomen door NAVO lidstaten om 
deel  te nemen of niet. 
Er wordt in deze studie gekeken naar de besluitvorming omtrent deelname aan deze 
missie naar Zuid Afghanistan in zowel Nederland als het Verenigd Koningrijk. Er is gekozen 
voor deze twee landen vanuit de vooronderstelling dat de besluitvormingsprocessen van 
elkaar zouden verschillen omdat de landen een ander politiek systeem kennen en andere 
procedures hanteren die ten grondslag liggen aan de inzet van hun militaire middelen. 
Daarbij voeren beiden landen een andere buitenlands- en veiligheidspolitiek als gevolg van 
hun positie op het wereldtoneel.  De vraag die centraal staat in dit onderzoek is waarom en 
hoe de senior civiele en militaire besluitvormers in Nederland en het Verenigd Koningrijk 
zijn gekomen tot de inzet van hun krijgsmacht voor de stabilisatie van Zuid Afghanistan. 
Deze key players zijn voor deze studie geconceptualiseerd als een ‘decision unit’. Een decision 
unit beschikt over de mogelijkheid om middelen van de staat in te zetten.
Het onderzoeksdoel van dit proefschrift is zowel empirisch als theoretisch.  Empirisch 
in de zin dat er gebruikt wordt gemaakt van tientallen interviews met key players en 
archiefmateriaal en theoretisch in de zin dat de proposities zijn gebaseerd op theoretische 
inzichten over civiel militaire relaties, strategie en besluitvormingsprocessen aangaande 
buitenlandse politiek. De integratie van de theoretische voorschriften en inzichten hebben 






































PI.  De inputs in het besluitvormingsproces zijn geïnitieerd door politieke sturing over 
een buitenlands politieke kwestie;
PII.   De dynamiek van het besluitvormingsproces onthult een proces van interpretatie 
waarin de senior civiele en militaire besluitvormers beperkingen en druk ervaren die 
ze is opgelegd zowel op nationaal als internationaal niveau; 
PIII.  De output van het besluitvormingsproces is een strategie die het doel van het gebruik 
van militaire middelen uiteenzet.  
De decisision paths van de senior civiel en militaire besluitvormers zijn in de cases 
gereconstrueerd aan de hand van de verschillende fasen in de besluitvorming aangaande 
buitenlands politieke kwesties. Allereerst wordt er gekeken naar de kwestie die vraagt om 
handelen, vervolgens wordt er gekeken naar de totstandkoming van de decision unit (die 
gaande het besluitvormingsproces kan veranderen), dan wordt het proces van interpretatie 
van het probleem in ogenschouw genomen en ten slotte wordt de uitkomst van het 
besluitvormingsproces en de uiteindelijke actie beschreven.
Er is gebruik gemaakt van een zogenaamde ‘gecontextualiseerde aanpak’ wat inhoudt dat 
bij de uitvoering van het onderzoek heel duidelijk de nadruk is gelegd op de context waarin 
de activiteiten en beslissingen hebben plaatsgevonden in de wetenschap dat alleen het 
verzamelen van feiten zonder hun context tot een beperkt en wellicht foutief beeld zouden 
kunnen leiden. Om zo accuraat mogelijk de mechanismen te kunnen identificeren die een 
rol hebben gespeeld tijdens de besluitvorming, is er gekozen voor een  structured focussed 
comparison die een diepgaande analyse van de cases faciliteert. De studie een is vergelijkende 
case studie die gebruikt maakt van interviews met de key players  en archief onderzoek om zo 
goed mogelijk te kunnen reconstrueren wat er in de ‘black box’ van besluitvorming omtrent 
de inzet van de krijgsmacht is gebeurd. 
Het onderzoek toont aan dat, wanneer de bevindingen van de cases worden 
geconfronteerd met de proposities, de theoretische prescripties op het gebied van civiel 
militaire relaties en strategie een zeer minimale - wellicht zelfs geen rol – hebben gespeeld 
bij de ontplooiing van de activiteiten van de senior civiele en militaire besluitvormers. De 
belangrijkste bevindingen van het onderzoek laten zien dat de ‘agency’ zowel in termen van 
de voortrekkersrol die bepaalde (militaire)  individuen hebben gespeeld als wel de dynamiek 
van het trilateraal (CAN, NLD, UK) militair samenwerkingsverband, een prominente 
rol speelt. De bevindingen van dit onderzoek tonen ook aan dat, hoewel de landen zijn 
geselecteerd op basis van hun verschillende politieke systeem, verschillende procedures ten 
aanzien van de inzet van hun krijgsmacht en een ander buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid, de 
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uiteindelijke uitkomst van het besluitvormingsproces hetzelfde was: hun krijgsmacht werd 
ingezet voor de stabilisatie van Afghanistan. 
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